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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines why post-colonial African states are not able to institutionalise 
the ideal ethical and democratic societies, given their access to international best 
practices and the abundance of human and natural resources; why the future of 
democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation; 
if western democracy can be implemented in Africa; why  the West is able to produce  
better systems of governance; why leaders and managers find it daunting to create 
the kind of society that is inspiring, ethical, immune to bureaucracy, and that 
possesses excellent economic performance; how leaders, members of the 
community, bureaucrats, corporate executives and managers can contribute to the 
realisation of the ethical and ideal African state; and the options for alternative 
democratic order for the African continent. 
 
The inability of post-colonial African states to institute systems and strategies that 
adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens has created chaos 
and anarchy that in some states can be likened to Hobbes state of nature where the 
weak is at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short. While the West 
has been largely blamed for playing a significant role in Africa’s inability to effectively 
manage itself, other theorists criticise African leaders and the community members for 
their inability to conduct themselves ethically and to implement a constructive and 
effective system of governance. It is imperative that African states devise adequate 
means of ethically administering their territories in a manner that meets societal 
expectations and needs, and in order to avoid intractable socio-political and economic 
complications.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die redes waarom postkoloniale Afrika-lande nie die ideale 
etiese en demokratiese samelewings instabiliseer nie, gegewe hul toegang tot 
internasionale beste praktyke en die oorvloed van menslike en natuurlike hulpbronne; 
waarom die toekoms van demokrasie in Afrika onduidelik bly ten spyte van die huidige 
pogings vir demokratisering; as westerse demokrasie in Afrika geïmplementeer kan 
word; waarom die Weste beter stelsels van bestuur kan lewer; hoekom leiers en 
bestuurders dit skrikwekkend vind om die soort samelewing wat inspirerend, eties, 
immuun vir burokrasie is, te skep en wat uitstekende ekonomiese prestasie besit; hoe 
leiers, lede van die gemeenskap, burokrate, korporatiewe bestuurders en bestuurders 
kan bydra tot die verwesenliking van die etiese en ideale Afrika-staat; en die opsies 
vir alternatiewe demokratiese orde vir die Afrika-kontinent. 
 
Die onvermoë van post-koloniale Afrika-state om stelsels en strategieë in te stel wat 
die behoeftes en verwagtinge van hul burgers voldoende aanspreek, het chaos en 
anargie geskep wat in sommige state vergelykbaar kan wees met Hobbes se toestand 
van die natuur, waar die swakeling aan die genade van die wat sterk is afhanklik is en 
die lewe ‘n nare, brutaal en kort lewe is. Terwyl die Weste grotendeels die blaam kry 
in terme van hul groot bydra in Afrika se onvermoë om homself doeltreffend te bestuur, 
kritiseer ander teoretici Afrika-leiers en die gemeenskapslede vir hul eie onvermoë om 
eties op te tree en om 'n konstruktiewe en effektiewe bestuurstelsel te implementeer. 
Dit is noodsaaklik dat Afrika-state voldoende middele voorsien om hul gebiede eties 
te administreer op 'n wyse wat voldoen aan maatskaplike verwagtinge en behoeftes, 
en om onwikkelbare sosio-politieke en ekonomiese komplikasies te vermy. 
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ABSTRACT: NORTHERN SOTHO TRANSLATION 
 
Thuto ye e lekola mabaka a gore ke eng dinaga tša ka morago ga bokoloneale di sa 
kgone go hloma dipeakanyo tša maswanedi tša maitshwaro le ditšhaba tša temokrasi, 
tšeo di filwego phihlelelo go ditiro tše kaonekaone tša boditšhabatšhaba le bontši bja 
methopo ya semotho le tlhago: ke ka lebaka la eng Bodikela bo kgona go tšweletša 
mekgwa ye kaone ya pušo; ke ka lebaka la eng baetapele le balaodi ba hwetša go le 
boima go hlama mokgwa wa setšhaba seo se nago le mafolofolo, maitshwaro, se sa 
huetšwego ke mokgwa wa pušo wo o diphetho di tšewago ke bahlanka ba mmušo 
bao ba sa kgethwago, gomme ba na le tiro ye kgahlišago ka ikonomi; ka moo 
baetapele, maloko a setšhaba, batšeasephetho ba mmušo ba sa kgethwago, 
malokopharephare a dikoporasi le balaodi ba ka aba mo go phihlelelong ya 
maitshwaro le naga ya maswanedi ya Afrika; le go dikgetho tša peakanyo ye e 
hlatlolanago ya temokrasi mo kontinenteng ya Afrika. 
 
Go se kgone ga dinaga tša ka morago ga bokoloneale go hlama mekgwa le maano 
ao a maleba a go bolela  ka ga dinyakwa le ditetelo tša baagi ba bona di hlotše 
tlhakatlhakano le tlhokapušo yeo mo go dinaga tše dingwe e ka bapetšwago le naga 
ya Hobbes ka tlhago moo mofokodi a lego ka fase ga yo maatla gomme bophelo bo 
se bose, bo le šoro le go ba bjo bokopana. Mola Bodikela bo pharwa molato kudu mo 
go bapaleng karolo ye e tšweletšego mo go se kgonego ga Afrika go itaola ka 
tshwanelo,  borateori ba bangwe ba solago baetapele ba Afrika le maloko a setšhaba 
mo go se kgonego go itshwara gabotse le go phethagatša mokgwa wo hlamilwego 
gabotse wo o šomago wa pušo. A bonagala gore dinaga tša Afrika di loga maano a 
makaone a go laola ka tshwanelo dinagadilete tša bona ka mokgwa wo o tla fihlelelago 
ditetelo tša setšhaba le dinyakwa, le gore go thibelwe go se boelemorago ga dipolotiki 
tša selegae le tlhakatlhakano ya ikonomi. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
This study examines the state of democracy on the African continent and attempts to 
construct what the ideal African state should be in our post-colonial era, taking into 
consideration the views of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Rawls and Wiredu, among other 
philosophers. While there are different approaches to the definition of democracy, it is 
generally understood as relating to good governance, popular participation, and 
respect for human rights. The core principles of a democratic system are found in the 
historical understanding of democracy as ‘rule of the people’ in the sense of popular 
control, political equality and sovereignty. Some of the other basic principles relate to 
inclusive citizenship, majority rule, pluralism, freedom, competition, consensus and 
constitutional rule (Senghore (2013: 164-165). With the end of colonialism and the 
emergence of democracy in Africa, a number of its leaders have attempted to 
institutionalise refined or reconstructed systems of democratic governance. As a 
result, most African states are leaning towards western liberal democracy (Senghore, 
2013: 182) that is concerned with the market economy and hence a developed system 
of capitalist production. However, it is poorly implemented, and appears unsuitable for 
the post-colonial African society.  
 
Most African states have largely failed to successfully implement the principles that 
promote ethical leadership, integrity, accountability and care for the people. They have 
failed to institute efficient and effective democratic norms and standards that 
adequately address the socio-economic needs of their citizens, despite the vast 
human and natural resources at their disposal, and despite their abilities to formulate 
admirable policies and laws. Some of the socio-economic challenges confronting 
these states include poverty, lack of service delivery, homelessness, high cost of 
owning a property, unemployment, illiteracy, drugs and health challenges. While most 
of them are able to develop enviable policies and laws, they have not been able to 
implement them successfully. Although countries such as South Africa and Nigeria 
provide constitutional protection for the rights of their citizens to social and economic 
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benefits, it does not appear as though these provisions are capable of promoting 
socioeconomic equality (Christiansen, 2008: 371). Even though these countries are 
blessed with vast hectares of land, many of their citizens cannot afford them. As a 
result, many people in South Africa have resorted to or agitate for land grab. It is 
baffling that land cannot be made available to all citizens who need it at affordable 
rates.  
 
The inability of post-colonial African states to institute systems and strategies that 
adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens has created chaos 
and anarchy that in some states can be likened to Hobbes’ state of nature where the 
weak is at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short. A few examples 
include the Rwandan genocide, the insurgents and militants in Nigeria, the 
destructions in Libya, and the protracted protests in South Africa. For Hobbes, human 
nature is innately materialistic, selfish, aggressive, violent, and lacks much 
consideration for a universal appeal to morality. He considers the shortage of material 
resources as resulting in power struggle among competing individuals, while the 
inability of members of a community to adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence 
and good governance in a commonwealth leads to violence and death (Hobbes, 1968: 
186). 
 
In the Rwandan genocide, the Hutu majority attempted to annihilate the Tutsis and the 
moderate Hutus over the control of the State and its resources as they were not 
prepared for peaceful coexistence. In Nigeria, the menace of the Boko Haram 
insurgents has led to the killing, maiming and displacement of thousands of people in 
the Northern region; the Movement for the Emancipation of the Ogoni People agitates 
for a greater share of their region’s oil wealth; while the Movement for the Restoration 
of the Sovereign State of Biafra clamours for the creation of an independent state, not 
minding that the same region was at war between 1967 and 1970 for the same cause 
and lost over a million of their people as a result[MK1]. The chaos in Libya led to the 
destruction of the country’s developed infrastructure, the death of thousands of the 
population and of the country’s leader Muammar Gaddafi. The intermittent youth 
unrest and protests in South Africa results from their agitation for adequate basic 
services, employment opportunities and free or affordable education. This often results 
in the destruction of infrastructure and transferred aggression on foreign nationals. In 
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all these wars and violence, peoples’ lives, livelihood, resources and limited 
infrastructure are destroyed; and many people are displaced, giving rise to further 
problems. These events in the main, result from citizens’ disillusionment at the inability 
of their leaders to create a better life for them. The events further reveal that post-
colonial African states have failed to institute the ideal society. 
 
African states are further confronted by the search for external financial assistance, 
and additional external pressure from the West, the international financial institutions 
and the donor agencies who are demanding restoration of democracy or democratic 
reform as a prerequisite for foreign aid and support. It appears also that Western 
influence in Africa is doing more harm than good by not propelling Africa to greater 
heights. For instance, the Structural Adjustment Programmes that the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided in the form of loans to countries 
experiencing economic crisis and the accelerated rate of globalisation played a 
significant role in weakening the African state both socially, politically and 
economically. While post-colonial Africa started off in the 1960s and 1970s as 
deliberately interventionist, the pressures from the World Bank and the IMF from the 
1980s rendered them timid to such a degree that they became disorganised and 
began to retreat in a manner that allowed these financial institutions’s market 
fundamentalism to be entrenched (Idowu, 2012: 150 & 158). 
 
Wiredu considers the extent of conflicts on the African continent and the failure of post-
colonial African democracy as resulting from its harmful political experiences and the 
adversarial and competitive nature of Western model of multiparty democracy, which 
Africa copies. He does not consider Western multiparty democracy as suitable for 
post-colonial Africa. Rather, he proffers democracy by consensus as better placed to 
bring harmony and progress to Africa (Ani, 2014a: 311[MK2]). 
 
Although the West has played a significant role in the inability of post-colonial African 
states to effectively manage their states, African states also appear generally 
incapable of taking charge of their territories and implementing a constructive and 
effective system of governance that can turn them into model States. While significant 
progress has been made in the process of bringing Africa into the democratic line 
through the present attempt at democratisation, the future of democracy in Africa 
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remains uncertain. The efforts do not seem capable of resolving the problems 
hindering enduring democratic consolidation in Africa. Democratic consolidation is the 
process of deepening and strengthening democracy and assessing its authenticity and 
survival prospects. It is a dominant yardstick for evaluating the prospects of new 
democracies (Friedman, 2011: 27-29). The following criteria will be used in the thesis 
to evaluate the extent to which post-colonial African states, especially South Africa 
and Nigeria have consolidated the gains of democracy: affluence, economic 
performance, access to land, favourable international climate, and service delivery. 
 
The study will examine the following issues: why Africa fails to make significant 
progress in its democratisation effort, even though it has access to best practice 
policies, governance systems and theories; if Western democracy as propounded by 
philosophers can be implemented in Africa; why  the West is able to  largely  produce  
better governments when  Africa itself is  exposed to  a similar  mode of governance;  
the role of ethical leadership in fostering the ideal state; and the options for alternative 
democratic order in post-colonial African states, bearing in mind that the alternatives 
previously practiced in the West, including communism and socialism did not bear 
sustainedable impact.[MK3] 
 
The study considers the moral character of leadership, which largely appears 
questionable; why leaders and managers find it daunting to create the kind of 
organisations, and by extension, society that is inspiring, ethical, immune to 
bureaucracy, and that possess excellent economic performance. The study will 
examine the role that integrity and three philosophies of leadership, namely: political, 
directive and values driven leadership can play in enhancing the realisation of the ideal 
society. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The manner in which governments and bureaucrats in post-colonial African states are 
generally neither able to deliver on their mandates nor able to ensure the realisation 
of society where justice, fairness, and socio economic benefits are dispensed to the 
advantage of all members of society, bearing in mind, economic constraints, makes it 
seem as though it is impossible to seek the ideal[MK4]. The failure of politicians and 
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bureaucrats to deliver on their mandates, to effect democratic consolidation, and to 
seek the ideal results largely from ignorance, lack of moral courage, lack of will to be 
effective, efficient, ethical and to act with integrity. 
 
The problem to be examined, therefore, is why African countries continue to fail in 
institutionalising ideal ethical and democratic states, given their access to international 
best practices and abundance of human and natural resources. 
 
1.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
African countries continue to fail in implementing the kind of democratic systems that 
adequately address the myriad of challenges confronting them in an ethical manner. 
Through the study I hope to contribute innovative ways of ethically administering a 
state in a manner that meets societal expectations and needs. I am keen to explore 
options that will bring about meaningful changes in the way leaders govern and 
administer their countries. 
 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1.4.1 Aims of the Study 
The aims of the study are: 
 To understand why African states are not able to govern well, given their 
exposure to international governance trends. 
 To examine why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite 
the current efforts at democratisation. 
 To establish how leaders, members of the community, bureaucrats, corporate 
executives and managers can contribute to the realisation of the ethical and 
ideal African state.  
 
1.4.2 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of the study are: 
 
 To expose how African democracies differ from the ideal state as propounded 
by philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and Hobbes. 
 To establish if Western democracy can be implemented in Africa. 
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 To investigate the role of ethical leadership in fostering a more result; oriented 
system of governance and the ideal African state.  
 To examine the options for alternative democratic order in Africa, bearing in 
mind that the alternatives previously practiced in the West, including 
communism and socialism, did not bear sustainedable impact. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
1.5.1 Research Methodology 
This study employs the qualitative research method, an approach used in 
comprehending the meaning given to a human or social problem. Qualitative research 
is a rigorous, careful and methodical analytical process of theorizing, understanding, 
interpreting and drawing conclusions from data. It is a kind of scientific investigation 
used in obtaining specific information about behaviours, values, opinions and social 
contexts of specific individuals or communities. It attempts to find answers to a 
question, to systematically use specific procedures to answer the question; to collect 
data; produce findings that were not predetermined; and to establish findings that can 
be applied even outside the confines of the research. Qualitative research can provide 
complex textual descriptions of the manner in which people experience the matter 
under investigation. It is also effective in identifying intangible factors, whose role in 
the study may not be immediately obvious, such as ethnicity, socio-economic status, 
social norms, gender roles, and religion (Mack, 2005: 1-2). 
 
Qualitative research is usually an unstructured approach to inquiry, which unlike the 
structured quantitative method, gives room for flexibility in the manner in which the 
researcher proceeds with all aspects of the research process, including the objectives, 
sample, design and the questions that the researcher intends to ask the respondents 
(Kumar, 2005: 12). 
 
My qualitative research adopts the inductive approach because it will look for a pattern 
of meaning based on collected data by moving from the specific to the general. The 
inductive approach enables the researcher to briefly summarise raw data, to derive 
clear links between the objectives of the research and the summary of the research 
findings. The inductive approach provides a set of procedures that can be easily used 
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in data analysis and leads to valid and reliable findings. It also enables the researcher 
to derive straightforward results (Thomas, 2006: 237). 
 
1.5.2 Research Strategy 
The cases of ethical and democratic failures in South Africa and Nigeria will be the 
point of departure of this research. It appears as though the policy provisions of these 
countries do not adequately assist them in addressing their social, political and 
economic challenges. In South Africa, the failure to implement a number of strategic 
polices such as on the provision of basic services, poverty reduction and property 
rights through its land redistribution strategy remain focal. The Freedom Charter 
provides that land shall be shared by the people. This has not been extensively 
implemented. The cost of land and housing in the county is so high and beyond the 
reach of both the poor and many in the middle class. Those who have benefited from 
the land redistribution programme have mostly underutilised the lands given to them. 
 
Nigeria and South Africa are the largest economies on the African continent. Despite 
of its large natural and human potential, Nigeria remains largely underdeveloped, even 
after 50 years of independence, while South Africa can be described as a first and a 
third world. The two countries are the main leaders on the African continent. While 
Nigeria has a highly educated population, there is nothing significant to show for it as 
poverty, unemployment, corruption and underdevelopment remain prevalent. It is 
baffling that while these countries have immense potential for growth and 
development, while the tools needed for progress are readily available and accessible, 
they seem either unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to bring about the 
ideal ethical and democratic state in their respective countries.  
 
1.5.3 Research Setting 
This study will be set within the South African and Nigerian environments. South Africa 
can be described as two economies, a highly developed and a highly undeveloped 
economy, with a high rate of social and economic disparities. Prior to the new 
democratic dispensation in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) committed 
itself to providing the citizens, especially the indigents with free education, housing, 
water and electricity. The current reality, however, is contrary to these undertakings 
(Seekings, 2013: 4). Instead of delivering on the promises, the government is 
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understandably in view of the global economic challenges, not able to fulfil most of its 
pledges. What, however, remains incomprehensible is why the government allows 
some of its  structures  to deepen the social and economic crisis that the poor people 
are experiencing, such as Eskom’s  continued  increment of  electricity tariffs, which  
automatically leads to increase in other  costs of living and even unemployment. 
 
Nigeria is the largest economy on the African continent and the largest in terms of 
population. The wealth of the country has not translated to meaningful social, political 
and economic growth. The government does not do much to improve the living 
conditions of its citizens, unlike in South Africa where despite its challenges better 
steps are taken in its governance arrangements. The Nigerian state is highly 
mismanaged and there is lacks of accountability.  
 
1.5.4 Sampling 
This study will employ the purposive or selective method of qualitative sampling. 
Purposive sampling method clusters participants on the basis of pre-selected criteria 
that are relevant to a specific research question. It is selected in cases where the 
number of participants is more of an approximate target rather than a strict quota 
requirement. It is not necessary, even if it were possible, to collect data from all 
members of a community in order to establish valid findings. As a result, qualitative 
research selects only a sample of a population for a specific investigation. The objects 
of study as well as the numbers of people to select are determined by the objectives 
of the research and by the characteristics of the population under study (Mack, 2005: 
5) 
 
1.5.5 Data Collection Methods 
The data will be sourced mainly from books, academic journals, online sources, 
research reports and newspaper articles. Qualitative descriptive studies, like other 
qualitative research approaches, are generally characterised by simultaneous data 
collection and analysis. Data collection of qualitative descriptive studies is about 
understanding the nature of the particular events under investigation. Therefore, data 
collection may involve observations and examination of records, photographs, reports, 
documents and minimal to moderately structured, open-ended, individual or focus 
group interviews. 
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1.5.6 Data Analysis 
The analytic induction method of data analysis will be applied in this study. In this 
process the researcher will examine events and develop a hypothetical statement of 
what transpired and how they occurred. Another similar case will be examined to see 
if it fits the hypothesis. If it does not, then the hypothesis will be revised. In this case 
the specific governance challenges in South Africa and Nigeria will be examined. 
Exceptions to the hypothesis will be examined, such as a model post-colonial African 
state. Eventually the researcher will develop a hypothesis that accounts for all 
observed cases. 
 
1.5.7 Strategies Employed to Ensure Quality Data 
The data will be effectively managed to prevent errors, gaps and inaccuracies in the 
scholarly record. Documentation is important in validating published results and to 
prevent the kind of errors that could lead to retractions (Coates, 2014). The data will 
be evaluated, checked and rechecked to ensure the validity of interpretations. The 
results will also be submitted for peer review to screen for quality and relevance, to 
confirm the soundness of the findings, and to ensure that professional standards have 
been maintained in the collection and analysis of data. 
 
1.5.8 Research Design 
The study will employ both the descriptive and case study design. The qualitative case 
study method provides the researcher with the tools to investigate, explore or describe 
a phenomenona within their contexts, using various sources of data, and supports the 
deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction of the matter under investigation. The 
flexible and rigorous nature of the case study method is valuable in enabling the 
development of theory, evaluation of programmes and the development of 
interventions. A correct application of the case study method is vital in the 
development of theory, to assess programmes and to proffer options (Baxter & Jack, 
2008: 544). 
 
Descriptive qualitative research aims to comprehensively summarise specific events 
as experienced by individuals or groups of people. It is less interpretive because the 
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researcher is not obliged to move either far away or too close to the data, and does 
not require very abstract exposition of the data. Qualitative descriptive study tends 
towards a naturalistic inquiry which supports the investigation of phenomenon in its 
natural state as much as is possible within the context of the research arena. Any 
purposeful method of sampling can be used in a qualitative descriptive design since 
the goal of any qualitative research design is to obtain cases that are rich in information 
(Lambert & Lambert, 2012: 255). 
 
1.6 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
There are seven chapters in this study. Chapter one is the introduction; It gives an 
overview of the whole study. Chapter two is the literature review. Chapter three 
considers the philosophic ideal state. Chapter four examines ethics and governance 
in traditional African societies. Chapter five looks at the ethical and governance failures 
in post-colonial African states. Chapter six proffers options for the ideal African society. 
Chapter seven provides the conclusion for the whole study. It summarises the salient 
points of note in the research. 
 
In chapter two, ethics and its basis for moral conduct are examined. The chapter 
explores virtue ethics’ exposition of the primary good for human beings, its 
implications, how human beings should live, what the good life is, and what are proper 
family and social values? Ethics is premised on the consideration of the interests of 
others and doing what is right. One of the main concerns in ethics is the need to 
establish the basis of moral principles or standards. (While some theorists posit that 
morality and the arguments for moral standards are contextually determined, other 
theorists infer from this that there are no objective moral principles or ethical 
standards, and that we are directed to either perspectivism, scepticism or relativism). 
Alasdair MacIntyre, however, denies these assumptions, claiming that this is largely a 
result of the inability of these proponents to arrive at rational criteria for securing moral 
consensus (Sweet, 2000: 220-221). 
 
Virtue ethics is mostly associated with Aristotle, whose theories are largely found in 
the Nichomachean Ethics - a collection of his writings. His theory of virtues is based 
on the belief that morality is a necessary condition for human beings, a precondition 
for human dignity. For Aristotle, immoral people are debased and have lost their 
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purpose in life. Morality for Aristotle manifests in human character and the 
development of character hinges on the cultivation of virtues (Rossouw, 2002: 45-46), 
such as goodness, courage, prudence, temperance, justice, and benevolence.  
 
The fundamental question in Aristotle’s (Nichomachean) Ethics is what the ultimate 
goal of human life is. He refers to the same ultimate goal as the human good, the 
highest good, the good, the best thing, or the practically attainable good.  In his 
investigation of the highest good, or of what it means to do well in life, he considers 
various possible answers, by examining various human virtues and their characteristic 
actions, and concludes with a definite judgement that the ultimate goal is what we 
prefer most in life and that to which we focus all our other endeavours, and which once 
achieved we do not seek anything else. To achieve this ultimate goal is to have 
achieved happiness (eudemonia) (Pakaluk, 2005:  2). Eudamonia, also known as 
flourishing and wellbeing, for Aristotle, is  “activity of the soul in accordance with 
excellence (virtue) in a complete life….This definition sets the agenda of Aristotle’s  
Ethics, which develops into a complex theory of human aretai or excellences, that is, 
those qualities that make for a good human being” (Echenique, 2012: 1). 
 
Plato, like Aristotle, understands virtue in the sense of excellence (or arête in Geek). 
Good things, for Plato, are good only when there is virtue in them. In other words, 
things are good not in terms of their quantities, power or pleasantness; but in terms of 
their excellence. Nietzsche, for instance, rejects the hedonistic idea that pleasure is 
intrinsically good (Gardiner, 2005: 179). For Plato, to be virtuous is to aspire towards 
godliness and to shun the things of the world. Other virtue theorists, then, enjoin 
people to discover their human nature with the view to transcending it. Based on this 
theory, attaining the good life does not hinge on fulfilling our human nature, but on 
seeking a divine form of existence (Gardiner, 2005: 11-12).  
 
Swanton (2003: 8) criticises Aristotle’s conception of virtues, claiming that it does not 
sufficiently explain the relationship between the flourishing of the man of virtues and 
the demands of this world. He observes that instead of giving a comprehensive 
account of what he (Aristotle) means by flourishing, Aristotle provides a narrow 
reflective equilibrium which gives rise to conflicting moral intuitions, considered 
judgements, and the beliefs of the wise or of the many regarding the matter under 
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focus. This is, however, done without taking into account the background theories that 
assist in resolving conflicts among the beliefs of the wise or of the many. These 
background theories, in a naturalistic ethical theory, are theories about human nature. 
Aristotle provides a background theory of human nature, as one of human flourishing 
which plays the role of justifying claims about virtue. 
 
Chapter three examines elements of the philosophic ideal state as propounded by 
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes; and their contributions to shaping 
government’s policy positions on meeting the needs of community members. Hobbes 
(Missner, 2000: 1-5) attempts to establish why human beings seem not able to 
peacefully coexist, but to fight and make peace. He concludes that this results from 
human fundamental characteristics, which inclines them to reject cooperation with 
each other. He considers people’s natural condition, otherwise known as state of 
nature, as innately aggressive and violent, and filled with fear. He illustrates this belief 
with the hypothetical image of people’s natural state before the advent of government, 
as one of continuous fear, aggression, war and death. With the limitation of resources 
power struggle results when a number of people want the same thing. In the absence 
of human cooperation and other consensus building factors, human beings would be 
living in a perpetual state of war. Therefore, he concludes that if human beings 
continue to live in such state of nature, then all lives would be solitary, nasty, brutish 
and short. He therefore proposes his Leviathan – his ideal state, claiming that for men 
to live in peace and harmony they must enter into a social contract in a commonwealth 
ruled by a sovereign head. He claims that, even an oppressive government is better 
than living under the threat of war (Missner, 2000: 1-5; Hobbes, 1968: 186). 
 
For Plato and Aristotle, the goal of the ideal state is to be ethical by promoting justice. 
The state and the person, according to Plato, are one since they both possess three 
parts in by nature, which derive their balance from the application of justice. For 
Aristotle, the city state exists for the sake of the good life. Plato classifies citizens into 
guardians, auxiliaries and artisans. The guardians are the rulers, the auxiliaries are 
the warriors and the artisans are the workers (Lull and & Mico, 2011: 5; Wright, 2016: 
11-12).  
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While Plato proposes the abolition of the family and for children to be raised by the 
state so as to ensure more unity and less disharmonies, Aristotle proposes that the 
family is the foundation of the state, and biological parents must therefore continue to 
take care of their biological children. While Plato prescribes a collective ownership of 
property, Aristotle proffers both individual and collective ownership of property, which 
does not condone excessive ownership of property, and citizens are to utilise their 
limited resources to promote the common good. Aristotle proposes a best life and the 
kind of state that would make that vision of the best life possible. Yet his treatise on 
the utopian (ideal) state is not widely regarded as the originator of utopian thought like 
Plato, essentially because he starts his treatise with a conception of the best life, while 
most utopian theorists begin their treatises with a conception of what constitutes the 
best regimes, the most productive economy, or social justice, and derive what 
constitutes the best life from it. Instead, Aristotle conceives the ideal state as that in 
which only those who are able to do so live the best life. In the long-run, however, 
Aristotle, just as Plato, systematically outlines what constitutes the best life and the 
ideal state, with the city state existing for the sake of the good life (Jackson, 2001: 1-
4). 
 
Aristotle posits that the good for human life involves members of the community 
relating well with one another (Smith, 2003: 14). He conceives the ideal state as 
constituting everything human. It consists of various communities coming together to 
form the best form of human association and comprises all parts of human life, 
including the family, religion, economy and society. He outlines what constitutes 
citizenship, types of governments, political stability and justice, and submits that 
existing constitutions are not adequate, although lessons can be drawn from them 
about what is right or wrong. Constitutions should provide for ideal but possible, 
practical and achievable requirements, he claims (Jackson, 2001: 2-3). 
 
Jeremy Bentham is probably the first systematic exponent of utilitarianism, although 
the concept dates back to Aristotle and Plato. For Bentham, in considering the 
rightness or wrongness of human action, one must take into account the impact of the 
action on all the people affected by that action. In other words, the measure of right 
and wrong is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For Mill’s utility or the 
greatest happiness principle, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
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happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (MCGeeMcGee, 
2004: 91). 
 
Mill’s theory of Justice attempts to shape policy positions on issues such as property 
rights, education, welfare, and government interventions. For him, justice requires that 
all members of the community must see the state as just. Therefore, the state must 
ensure that the principles of justice consider the interests of the citizens and evolve 
with changing dynamics in dealing with the developments in social institutions and 
individual interests. The fairness of policies and the resolution of conflicts and 
competing interests must also be based on objective standards of justice. In other 
words, a well-designed liberal theory of justice requires objective consideration of the 
interests of all members of the community, as well as a subjective standard that 
supports the rules and regulations of concerned social institutions (Clark & Elliot, 2001: 
471). 
 
 Mill posits that since the end goal of justice is to promote the long term maximisation 
of utility, it therefore follows that the interests of citizens must be promoted in a way 
that the citizens receive the potential for future personal development. The standards 
of justice must regulate the pursuit of personal interests so that citizens do not 
encroach on the rights of others. While taking cognizance of the conflicting value 
commitments that human beings face, as well as the complexity of human existence, 
Mill posits that properly constituted institutions must educate and guide their citizens 
around the issues of justice, because the effectiveness of public policies and laws 
depends on the extent to which the citizens have been capacitated. Therefore, before 
the state embarks on far-reaching institutional reforms, the consciousness of the 
citizens must first be changed. Mill condemns capitalism for creating class conflict, 
insufficient opportunities for personal growth, selfishness, restricting personal 
development, and reducing most of the population to second-class citizens. Capitalism 
further encourages the pursuit of personal wealth and turns the quest for riches and 
fame into the goal of human life. This quest breeds individualism that turns a man’s 
feelings and sympathies only towards himself and his immediate family (Clark & Elliot, 
2001: 486-488). 
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One of the weaknesses of utilitarianism as evident in many African countries is its 
seeming support for the marginalisation of minorities or individuals in its promotion of 
the general good (Riordan & Ibana, 1991: 29). The affirmation action policy of the 
South African government readily comes to mind. This is the government’s 
intervention aimed at reversing the inequalities that were perpetrated by the apartheid 
regime in the pre-democratic era against the previously disadvantaged citizens of the 
country. Many people have termed this reverse discrimination. When this policy is not 
implemented with moral sensitivity for others, it can divide or demoralise the workforce 
and the citizens (Rossouw, 2002: 94). 
 
Bentham’s utilitarianism is criticised for not providing an acceptable theory of justice 
for liberal societies prone to endemic conflicts of interest. Rather, his definition of rights 
has become an object of debate, disagreement, political contestation and polarisation 
of class interests. In societies dominated by conflicts of interests, the citizens will 
constantly compete with each other. Therefore an adequate liberal theory of justice 
must be able to take the interests of its whole population into account, while not 
overlooking the community’s rules and regulations (Clark & Elliot, 2001: 471). 
 
Chapter four explores the systems of politics, governance and the conception of moral 
life in precolonial African society. It also examines how they differ from the liberal 
democracy of the West, and their role in reaching just decisions and actions. The 
understanding of ethics as the moral ideal of the good can be associated with all 
societies throughout the ages, including precolonial and post-colonial eras. Most 
interactions among people are rooted in ethics, values, principles and standards, even 
though human thoughts, actions and words are not always ethical (Sindjoun, 2009: 
24). African morality can be understood from the importance placed on familial 
relations. A high value is placed on family structure as the bedrock of morality and the 
best institution for moral education. The extended family is seen as a true 
representation of what an African community means. Family is valued in itself as it 
plays a fundamental role in the individual’s development, progress and well-being 
(Metz & Gaie, 20106[MK5]: 276; Molefe, 2016: 4-12). 
 
In the traditional African definition and concept of moral behaviour and good character, 
God is seen as the ultimate custodian of ethical and moral codes, and of law and order. 
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Although Africans strongly perceive God as the ultimate arbiter, they also have a 
traditional view that is very humanistic to such a degree that their conception of 
morality is anchored on the promotion of the welfare of members of society. According 
to Wiredu for instance, “what is morally good is what befits a human being; it is what 
is decent for man – what brings dignity, respect, contentment, prosperity, joy, to man 
and his community. And what is morally bad is what brings misery, misfortune, and 
disgrace” (Borishade, 2007: 261). In African ethics, a person who either harms, 
exploits or  deceives or is unfaithful to others, who is selfish, unkind or uncaring or who 
does not relate well  with others  is considered inhuman or lacking in personhood and 
likened to animals (Metz & Gaie, 20106: 275). In the Yoruba culture, morality is 
associated with good character. The possession of good character for the Yoruba 
people makes life joyful. As a result, a person’s life is expected to be dominated by the 
qualities of a good character. A person therefore is good when  
 
he shows in his life and personal relations with others the right qualities of 
a person. The opposite description is ‘He is not a person, he merely 
assumes the skin of a person’. That means that the person is socially 
unworthy; in consequence of his character he is not fit to be called a person, 
even though he goes about in the semblance of one (Borishade, 2007: 
265). 
 
In traditional African society, actions are considered right when they promote 
harmonious co-existence among members of the community or by respecting 
communal relationships. Sub-Saharan African morality subscribes to the belief that a 
human being derives his humanity through other people. In fact, traditional African 
worldviews, including the contemporary era, believe in the interrelatedness and 
interdependence of human beings as essential for living a moral life, for the direction 
that their lives take, and for their survival. (Metz & Gaie, 20106: 273-275; Ekeopara, 
2014: 39-40).  
 
Traditional African societies and worldviews believe that the interconnectedness of all 
beings impliesy that the flourishing of one entity affects the flourishing of the others. 
They believe that community members have a moral obligation to help each other; to 
be always considerate and sympathetic towards other people’s conditions; and to 
protect nature and the environment for the benefit of all. African moral philosophy also 
posits that  
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one has a moral obligation to think of oneself as bound up with others, that 
is, to define oneself as a member of a common group and to participate in 
its practices. One also has a duty to identify with others. Community of 
harmony is the combination of both solidarity and identity, so construed […]. 
Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the 
whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all 
[…].Harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations 
within the group […] The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing 
of an overall way of life, inspired by the notion of the common good (Metz 
& Gaie, 2010: 276). 
 
The concept of Ubuntu denotes communal coexistence of human beings with the 
ancestors and future generations. The former, though dead are believed to exist in the 
spiritual realm which has direct connection with the human world. Communal and 
harmonious coexistence with the ancestors requires that human beings take better 
care of their land. Communal coexistence with future generations requires that the 
present generation live in a sustainable manner by protecting and preserving the 
natural resources for generations yet unborn (Murove, 2010: 383). By attuning oneself 
to these fundamental value-laden assumptions on identity, personhood and 
humanness, human beings are able to strive for that ultimate goal of becoming a 
genuine, full and authentic being (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 273-275). 
 
However, the African view of morality differs in a number of ways from the Western 
conceptions of ethics. Firstly, African morality, unlike the Western approach, lays 
substantial emphasis on good relations among members of the community as the only 
means of cultivating one’s humanity. Secondly, African ethics also differs from 
Western moral philosophy, including Aristotelian ethics, in the way it considers what 
constitutes good relationships with others as depending on communal coexistence. 
Unlike the western moral philosophy in which positive relationship among community 
members does not depend on  maximising general welfare, giving people what they 
deserve, political participation, or  respect for people’s rights; in most, if not all of pre-
colonial Africa, the  desirable way of relating to each other hinges on peaceful and 
harmonious co-existence. The search or need for peaceful coexistence among 
Africans does not solely rest on obeying the rules of one’s constituency or the wishes 
of the majority as the West subscribes. Rather, African societies consider harmonious 
and peaceful community the kind of interaction that is objectively desirable and that 
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should guide constituted norms and the expectations of the majority (Metz & Gaie, 
2010:274- 276; Udokang, 2014: 268). 
 
In the West, justice is dispensed mainly through law enforcement agencies and judicial 
systems that lawyers and judges preside over; and through retribution and deterrence, 
unlike in the African society where reconciliation is given more priority. While the 
rationale for deterrence lies in the belief that punishment is better served by instilling 
fear in the offender so that he does not commit any other offence in future, retributive 
justice holds that punishment is the appropriate response to a crime or an offence. 
While these two approaches are also found in the traditional African society, a third 
element is found in the way African societies conduct themselves, namely 
reconciliation which is geared towards the restoration of broken  relationships (Metz & 
Gaie, 20106: 278; Ajayi & Buhari, 2014: 153). 
 
A number of Westerners, such as Leo Frobenius and Lord Lugard regarded Africans 
as people without moral heritage. Lord Lugard specifically regarded the Southern 
people of Nigeria as devoid of principles of conduct and systems of ethics. The word 
‘morality’, for Basden lacks any significance in the vocabulary of the Igbo people; and 
in areas where the traditional Igbo people have not been affected by external influence 
there is nothing that accurately corresponds with the social evil of European life.  Other 
theorists such as Correia, however admit that the Igbos do have a moral heritage, 
though at the lowest level of moral consciousness (Oguejiofor & Onah, 2005: 321; 
Dolamo, 2014: 6; Udokang, 2014: 266).  
 
The negative views of these western theorists regarding the moral heritage or moral 
consciousness of Africans in general and the Igbos in particular cannot be correct. 
This is because a close examination of traditional Africans, as exposed above, reveals 
a people rooted in ethics and moral consciousness, which shows in the way they relate 
to one another.; iIn the way they carry out their daily activities and governance 
processes; and in their cultures, which are embedded in  various beliefs and customs 
which all members of society are required to  comply with in order to prevent  
punishments and other calamities that could befall them for noncompliance 
(Oguejiofor and & Onah, 2005: 321; Idang, 2015: 104). These negative perceptions 
could have emanated during this period, from the critics’ inability to appreciate the 
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influence of cultural relativity on the way of life of the traditional African people, “as 
well as a seeming lack of understanding of the participatory and perspective nature of 
what we generally consider as truth, or something worthwhile, as proper, allowed, 
approved or legitimate” (Oguejiofor & Onah, 2005: 321).  
 
The preceding discussions on the Afro-communitarian moral views do not represent 
the beliefs of all Africans concerning the right way of life, since there were and still are 
those Africans who are immoral and who do not subscribe to the same principles of 
moral conduct. Rather, they are a reflection of common traits among many pre-colonial 
Africans, including those in East, West and Southern Africa. It is however logical to 
conclude that all precolonial African states must have had aversions for unethical 
conducts such a theft, cruelty, murder and wickedness in general. 
 
Precolonial African societies were infused with political and democratic tendencies. In 
pre-colonial Central Africa, for instance, its lineage system of government was 
characterised by radical Republicanism. In centralised kingdoms were found 
prominent fora that citizens could utilise to challenge the bureaucrats and the royals. 
In other societies, commoners were appointed to the office of the Prime Minister, while 
yet in other societies, the council of commoners provided a check on the public 
administration. The masses held strong bargaining powers. Although there was 
inequality in pre-colonial African states, the people that occupied privileged positions 
were required to commit themselves to ensuring that state benefits were dispensed to 
the generality of their community members (Bates, 2010: 1134). In fact, African 
traditional democracy for Claude Ake (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005: 20), lies in the 
commitment of community members  to collectively  participate in the affairs  of their 
communities in determining common goals and the means of realising them, so as to 
secure their rights and benefits. 
 
In traditional African societies, consensus, for Wiredu (Matolino, 2009: 35) was 
noticeably an evident in which all adults participated in social relations and at all levels 
of government. All political and social engagements, decision-making processes, 
discussions and interactions among members of society were channelled towards 
achieving consensus. Murove (2010: 383-385) also believes that traditional African 
democracy is based on consensual democratic decision making that seeks all sorts of 
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agreements on most major decisions that impact on citizens. This is in contrast with 
western democracy that promotes adversarial competition among various political 
parties in a majoritarian system. Conflicts and disagreements in most sub-Saharan 
pre-colonial African societies were resolved through seeking the opinion of all adult 
members of the community until they came to an agreement. This, in line with the 
sharing notion of Ubuntu, also relates to sharing political power in a manner that 
ensures that decisions are not only to the benefit of the majority, but that every one’s 
interest is taken into account. In pre-colonial Burundi, for instance, a king did not 
unilaterally determine policy directions. Rather, the task belonged to both the king and 
the group of appointed elders to resolve societal issues in a way that is to the benefit 
of everyone. 
 
In the pre-colonial Akan society and system of politics, for Wiredu, the leader and head 
of its political structure, was a chief who though having obtained his position through 
heredity, did not command absolute authority, but managed the affairs of his 
community in conjunction with members of council. The final decision on matters 
before the council did not proceed from the chief. Rather, his pronouncements were a 
reflection of the collective decision of all members of council. The position of the chief 
was also considered both political and religious as he is seen as the link between the 
ancestors and community members (Matolino, 2009: 35). The chief may be relieved 
of his position if he attempted to either overrule or dominate the council or its 
proceedings.  Representatives from various clans within the community constituted 
the council, and through them, the concerns of their specific constituencies were 
relayed to the council. The decisions of the council on matters under discussion were 
arrived at through dialogue. Although voting was not a criterion for arriving at a 
decision (this became a determining factor only after its imposition by the colonialists), 
the decisions reached through logical persuasiveness were owned by all, even if some 
of the participants were not in agreement with them (Matolino, 2013: 140). 
 
Democracy by consensus, for Wiredu, provides a political system that is not defined 
by competition for dominance and power among political parties. It avoids the 
conferment of power on winners based on majority votes. This is different from the 
western majoritarian democracy, which thrives on competition and confers political 
power on the party that got majority votes in an election, while relegating the losers to 
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opposition. Wiredu’s preference for democracy by consensus over majoritarian 
democracy attempts to develop an understanding of a state where the majority party 
does not exercise political power while overlooking the opposition and minority parties. 
He notes that such slanted appropriation of power has been a source of problems in 
Africa since the end of the colonial era and the emergence of majoritarian democracy. 
Wiredu’s arguments in favour of democracy by consensus also attempts to find 
solutions to the myriad of challenges confronting post-colonial Africa (Matolino, 2013: 
138). Consensus for Wiredu does not mean that all aggrieved parties are in full 
agreement. Rather, it appreciates diverse points of view and utilises dialogue to bring 
about results that are acceptable to all concerned individuals and groups. When 
concerned individuals and parties are willing to reach agreement, dialogue can 
motivate the stakeholders to suspend their disputes (Matolino, 2009: 35).  
 
A number of conceptual factors play a significant role in Wiredu’s conception of 
democracy by consensus. Firstly, in his assessment of human nature, he claims that 
the differences among human beings proceed from a mistaken belief or the failure to 
understand and correctly judge their actual interests. When disagreements arise, the 
parties to the dispute should rather take cognisance of the fact that ultimately they 
share an identity of interests (Matolino, 2013: 140). In other words, consensus hingesd 
on the belief that the interests of all community members are ultimately the same, even 
though their initial understanding of those interests may differ. Wiredu believes that 
human beings are able to work through their differences until they arrive at a similar 
comprehension of their interests through rational dialogue and debate (Matolino, 2009: 
35). 
 
Since Wiredu interprets the traditional pre-colonial Akan system of politics as 
essentially consensual, he notes the potential of democracy by consensus to enhance 
the realisation of contemporary Africa’s search for ideal democratic order. As a result, 
he advocates the adoption of a modified version of its ideals of good governance for 
contemporary systems of governance and administration in Africa. He adamantly 
criticizes the multi-party electoral processes characteristic of modern oligarchies (e.g., 
the UK and US models) as too expensive and distracting from development agendas 
so critical to modern African citizens’ welfare  all over the continent (Lauer, 2012: 41-
43). 
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However, theorists such as Eze (Lauer, 2012: 43), concerned about how to ensure 
that post-colonial African democracies do not revert to the resurgence of one party 
authoritarianism of the past, argue against Wiredu’s proposals, claiming that adoption 
of Wiredu’s ideas on democracy by consensus could derail the new African 
democracies and lead to a resurgence of one party autocratic states that were 
prevalent during the earliest periods of independence from colonial rule. [MK6]He also 
rejects Wiredu’s proposals on the grounds that “formal reinforcement of chieftaincy 
structures and loyalties undermines the development of sufficiently strong and 
progressive state apparataapparatus to make these capable of fulfilling even the most 
basic of modern democratic ideals” (Lauer, 2012: 43).  
 
While Wiredu promotes non-party politics in Africa, Eze promotes multi-party politics. 
Wiredu’s non-party consensual politics are essentially utilitarian, though he has not 
been able to provide practical processes for its implementation, capable of replacing 
multi-party rule in a large society. Nonetheless Wiredu and Eze are in agreement on 
a number of areas such as promoting freedom of speech and opinion, discouraging 
autocracy, and encouraging political contestation. They both discourage the lust for 
power, wasteful, extravagant and reckless lifestyle, which seem to be prevalent in the 
political life of many oligarchic democracies. They both believe that African societies 
can derive immense benefits from systems of rule that have not been perverted by the 
worse forms of capitalism. However, they both disagree on the feasibility of a reformed 
form of democracy by concensusconsensus as an alternative to the excesses of 
Western democratic practices (Lauer, 2012: 54). 
 
Eze disagrees with the manner in which Wiredu portrays the identity of human 
interests, wondering if such an identity is realistic and, assuming that it were, members 
of the community may not be positively inclined towards it. It is unrealistic for instance, 
to conceive of the possibility of an identity of interests where there are little or no 
commonalities among warring parties. The case of shareholders in Shell Oil 
Corporation in Ogoniland comes to mind, where the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the community makes it impossible for the two stakeholders to share an 
identity of interests (Matolino, 2013: 140).  
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Eze criticises Wiredu’s treatise of the traditional centrepiece of pre-colonial Africa’s 
system of governance, as an excessive rationalisation and a misleading 
romanticisation. He condemns it as a non – party system of politics, which can serve 
the purpose of defending the early nationalists’ single party system of politics in which 
their total control of political power did not encourage democratic freedoms. The 
concerns raised by Eze gains support from a number of contemporary African political 
analysts, who suspect that the kind of consensus building processes that Wiredu 
alludes to can undermine the egalitarian ideals and inclusiveness of contemporary 
representative democracy and become a means of hiding authoritarianism, as well as 
a useful hegemonic instrument for side-lining opposition (Lauer, 2012: 41- 43). 
 
Various theorists disagree among themselves on the political legitimacy of traditional 
African system of rule and their relevance to contemporary democracy.  However, a 
substantial aspect of the indigenous African system of rule and its intrinsic value 
remains undiluted, effective and relevant for centuries, despite colonial interference 
and the corruption of the local traditional authority (Lauer, 2012: 54). Democracy in 
Africa was not imported, but has always been an inherent feature of rule in pre-colonial 
African society, with distinctive advantages over majoritarian rule (Matolino, 2013: 
139).  
 
Chapter five considers the failure of post-colonial African states in regards to ethics 
and good governance. It examines the contributing factors to the inability of post-
colonial African states to govern effectively and to adequately attend to the needs of 
their community members, given their access to best practices and resources. There 
is a general pessimism that pervades post-colonial African states as a result of the 
underdevelopment of the continent. It is over fifty years since African states such as 
Ghana and Nigeria received independence, while in South Africa, Apartheid ended 
over twenty years ago. Many of these states are still struggling to resolve their 
economic, social and political challenges. While Nigeria seems not unable to 
effectively govern its territory, South Africa seems to be losing its grip on consolidating 
the gains of democracy. The failures of post-colonial African states have been 
attributed to various factors, such as the negative impact of colonialism and 
globalisation; the failure of citizens to play their part in creating the desired state; and 
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the incompetence and unethical conduct of the leaders, politicians, and other officials 
who have managed and administered African states since independence (Ogbogbo, 
2011: 1). 
 
Since independence, developments in African states appear to have stagnated, while 
there is little or no hope that these failures willould be resolved. Although Africa is a 
rich continent, it is also the poorest as a result of its inability to harness its wealth 
optimally. Instead, the continent exposes itself to foreign exploitation. It is increasingly 
becoming apparent that Africa may implode if nothing substantially concrete is done 
to turn its cracking structures around. Most institutions in  
 
African states have either collapsed or are collapsing. Instability in all 
spheres and structures of the modern African states has become part of 
their characterisation. Most of these have manifested in the form of 
economic and political instability. Whether in Algeria, Lybia, Egypt, Sudan, 
Liberia, Sierra-Lone, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Congo, Mali, etc, the story is the 
same. The instabilities have produced cycles of violence across the African 
continent, making it the highest producer of refugees and the greatest 
receiver of aids. The debt burden, the streams of migrants out of the 
continent, the dilapidating infrastructural facilities, the unprecedented  
elevation of  corruption as part of  statecraft and the concomitant socio-
cultural decay epitomised by professionalization of fraud as a means of 
livelihood are some of the manifestations of  the current African crises          
(Ogbogbo, 2011: 2-3). 
 
As most African countries got closer to independence between the late 1950s and 
1960s, the departing colonialists hastily assembled institutions and democratic 
constitutions that did not include sufficient input from the local population (Cheeseman, 
2013: 404). On the broadest terms, African states received their independence without 
endeavouring to transform or reconstruct the states they received from the colonialists. 
They continued to administer their independent states in the same authoritarian 
manner as the colonialists did (Harbeson, 2013: 84).  During the transition period, 
which involved a change of leaders, the dominant elite employed a strategy of 
predatory rule, which enabled them to manipulate the system to suit their selfish 
agendas. Post-colonial countries such as Nigeria were divided into ethnicities. This 
racial divide also confined the citizens into indigenes and settlers for those who chose 
to reside outside their allotted ethnic areas. This system of predatory and bifurcated 
rule has enabled the privileged elite to consolidate their power base since its notion of 
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indigene and settler created a fragmented and antagonistic group of citizens at the 
national, state and local levels of government. In the long run, the system of bifurcation 
enabled the postcolonial state to indulge in wide scale corruption, service delivery 
failures and underdevelopment (Aiyede, 2009: 262).  
 
In the transition period, the power that was transferred to the post-colonial African state 
was supported by the rules of Western sovereignty. Political players in post-colonial 
Africa who felt overlooked in the affairs of the new state either through electoral 
processes or through autocracy were not prepared to comply with established norms 
and standards. Rather, they either resorted to armed conflict or to dirty politics. Efforts 
to resolve through political means their differences and divergent claims regarding the 
shape and how to administer the new state were not successful. Military and political 
competition became the norm in countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, South 
Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe where liberation movements and insurgencies 
became widespread (Dorman, 2006: 1085). 
 
As reform insurgencies and liberation movements successfully took control of their 
respective countries, this led to political practices that produced negative and 
undemocratic results. The ideologies that the revolutionary movements acquired 
during the struggle period, the prolonged period of struggle for liberation, the link with 
arms dealers and external supports, the brutality and hardships experienced, and the 
hierarchies developed through the long period of struggle, continue to influence the 
manner in which they relate to the civilian population and their style of governance. 
Although many of the post-colonial African states embraced liberal constitutions, the 
tensions between the legacies of the liberation struggle and the liberal underpinnings 
of the state have emerged. In attempting to resolve the competing paradigmatic 
challenges around rights and democracy, structures and institutions, the leadership 
agitation to bring control and stability overrides the concern for democracy or 
liberation, thereby giving rise to higher levels of exclusivist and authoritarian politics 
(Dorman, 2006: 1086).  
 
Furthermore, political rivalries along ethnic lines, weak state institutions,  and lack of 
commitment to and experience with governance processes and democratic 
procedures by  the elite in the main, resulted in partial entrenchment of democracy 
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and  its disruptions through coups, counter-coups, wars and dissent. Democratic 
governments were soon replaced by autocratic and military regimes. During the cold 
war when super power rivalry was at its peak, the Western states, especially France, 
the United States and the United Kingdom paid little attention to Africa’s internal 
governance processes, including human rights abuses, corruption and other 
excesses. Their focus was mainly geared towards Africa’s foreign policies and  
ensuring that their African allies did not fall into the hands of the Soviet Union 
(Cheeseman, 2013: 404). 
 
These factors also led to their weaknesses as shown by the coups and counter coups 
that followed. What resulted from this was the entrenchment of authoritarian rulers 
over weak postcolonial African states. The disarray that resulted from the political and 
development failures created the opportunity for international financial institutions and 
funding bodies to influence the economic and political agendas of post-colonial African 
states. As a result of the debt crisis that developing nations experienced in the 1980s, 
most bilateral donors and international funding institutions contributed to the sharp 
decline in the ability of African states to effectively steer the development of their 
economies by their conditional development assistance  (Harbeson, 2013: 84-85), 
when they pronounced  between 1989 and 1990 that 
 
future aid allocations would depend on the extent to which recipient 
countries had democratised. They used a combination of carrot (increased 
development assistance) and stick (aid sanctions) to promote 
democratisation in African countries. This connection of aid flows to 
domestic modes of governance is generally referred to as political 
conditionality (Cheeseman, 2013: 406). 
 
Most post-colonial African states have failed to institute adequate and effective 
democratic norms and standards that adequately address the socio-economic needs 
of their citizens, despite the vast human and natural resources at their disposal. African 
countries such as South Africa and Nigeria provide constitutional protection for 
socioeconomic rights. But one wonders if the governments’ policies around the 
provision of basic amenities such as healthcare, welfare, education and housing can 
promote socioeconomic equality (Chritiansen, 2008: 371). The South African Freedom 
charter (1955: 1), a statement of core principles and visions of alternative society, for 
instance, provides that unused land and housing space shall be given to those who 
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need it. It appears as though such provision does not adequately assist the country in 
addressing its social, political and economic challenges. For instance, while many 
citizens agitate for land grab from the former colonialists to be redistributed to the 
citizens whose lands were forcibly taken away, the South African government adopts 
a careful process of land restoration. This strategy hopes to avoid the situation in 
Zimbabwe, where the as a result of dispossessing the white farmers of (their) land, led 
to the collapse of the country’s economy. 
 
By the time Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the mainstay of its economy 
derived mainly from the exportation of agricultural products such as cotton, cocoa, 
groundnuts and rubber. These products accounted for about 64 percent of national 
output, while oil only accounted for about 15 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) output. With the discovery of enormous oil reserves in Nigeria, agricultural 
outputs decreased dramatically, despite the government’s clarion call for a revival of 
agricultural production though programmes such as back to land, green revolution and 
structural adjustment schemes. Although the Nigerian state derives huge income from 
oil revenue, the funds are largely mismanaged with large chunks of it stolen by public 
officials. The oil revenue has not been not channelled directed towards the 
development of other sectors of the economy. Rather the Nigerian state has found 
itself moving from the prospects of rapid development in the 1970s to one of 
deindustrialisation in the 21st century (Aiyede, 2009: 254). All the states in Nigeria 
depend largely on the proceeds of oil that mainly come from the South-South 
geopolitical zone for their sustenance. This has had a devastating impact as “the oil 
producing  communities have suffered extensive environmental damages and 
economic retardation due to the destruction of their old- age-old industries of fishing 
and  farming by oil exploration activities” (Abolurin, 2008: 14). 
 
The extent of corruption in Nigeria is startling. For instance, between 1960 and 1999, 
more than $380 billion was stolen from the public coffers by public officials. From 1985 
to 1993 when General Ibrahim Babangida was the head of state, about $12 billion 
disappeared from the oil revenue. During the four years administration of General 
Abacha, he was believed to have stolen between one and three billion dollars. 16 
billion dollars that was allocated for power generation between 2006 and 2007 was 
squandered by the government of Obasanjo without any substantial contribution to the 
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national integrated power projects. Unspent budget allocations are in most cases not 
returned to government coffers, but shared by government officials. When the 
government began to insist on the return of unspent budgetary allocations, about four 
billion dollars was returned to the fiscus in the 2007 financial year alone (Aiyede, 2009: 
256). Nigeria’s economy relies mainly on oil revenue. This puts the country in a 
precarious situation, because a drastic fall in the price of oil in on the international 
market wouldill result in less money accruing to the fiscus and more hardship for the 
citizens.  
 
The underdevelopment of most African countries in areas such as economic growth, 
poverty reduction, literacy, healthcare, income inequality and life expectancy has been 
attributed by some scholars to the low quality of their public institutions. However, the 
quality of public service delivery and the contributions by the private sector are 
essential for the development of the state and for the benefit of the entire population 
(Gustavson, 2014: 1-2). Therefore, what Africa needs in its quest to resolve the current 
crisis are both strongmen and strong institutions in order to strengthen its 
democratisation processes. African states also need a critical, politically conscious 
and enlightened population that are prepared to sacrifice for the realisation of the 
desired change. They must be ready and willing to challenge the inadequacies and 
excesses of the leaders and bureaucrats whose failures have kept the African states 
in their perpetual state of failures (Ogbogbo, 2011: 1-2) 
 
Chapter six searches for a new frontier in promoting the ethical and ideal post-colonial 
African state. It provides guidance on how leaders, community members, bureaucrats 
and all stakeholders can contribute to the realisation of the needs and expectations of 
the ideal state for contemporary and future African society. In that regard, the chapter 
begins by drawing from Rawls’ attempts to define perfectly just institutions. It briefly 
brings together the salient elements in the previous chapters that touch on good and 
bad governance practices. It brings out the elements of the ideal society as 
propounded by various philosophers. It then proceeds to consider the role of ethical 
leadership, in the realisation of good governance; the kinds of leadership that 
contemporary African states require; how leaders can manage conflicts; how to ensure 
democratic consolidation; and options for alternative systems of governance for the 
continent in view of the failures of the current systems of governance. 
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Rawls theory of justice marks a return to an exploration of the kinds of principles, ideals 
or preferences that should be advocated at the level of political and social 
organisations, which the philosophers in the previous half century departed from to 
rather focus on mere analysis of principles and ethical ideals. The application of these 
principles, he posits, are such that in concrete cases, it leads to intuitively sound 
judgements. Rawls’ contractarian approach presents an alternative answer to the 
question of what is the desirable kind of social and political arrangements in the state. 
In considering the kind of socio-political arrangements that the citizens would make if 
they were given the opportunity to choose among alternative arrangements, he claims 
that their interests must lie oin the choices they would make under a veil of ignorance, 
otherwise known as the original position of the contract. Rawls outlines two principles 
of justice that constitute justice as fairness and which parties in the original position 
must choose. He considers the principles to be the result of rational choice that the 
agents make under controlled conditions. In these principles, which primarily apply to 
the society’s basic structure, social goods such as wealth, income, opportunity and 
liberty, must be equally distributed, unless unequal distribution of either any of these 
goods benefits the least favoured. In his just society, the government can only restrict 
citizens’ liberty in order to uphold security and public order (Kukathas & Pettit, 1990: 
6, 19, 44, 48-49; Rawls, 1972: 60-61). 
 
Rawl’s’ transcendental institutionalism, which sets out to define perfectly just 
institutions is criticised by Sen, who claims that since it is not possible to define 
anything perfect, human beings should desist form the pursuit of perfect institutions. 
Instead, he advocates the comparative approach to justice, which concentrates on the 
elimination of observed injustices in place of the transcendental search for a perfectly 
just society (Sen, 2009: 96-102; Clare & Horn, 2010: 75).  
 
The issues that this research addresses reveals the centrality of good leadership in 
bringing harmony and development to the state. All political philosophers, including 
moral philosophers, recognise the centrality of good leadership in the attainment of 
national development, irrespective of the system of governance in place, be it 
capitalism, communism, socialism, feudalism, constitutionalism or liberalism. The 
differing factor among them is that while some of them place leadership in absolute 
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individuals, others place leadership in the hands of citizens, in institutional 
development or in constitutionalism. In Hobbes treatise on the state of nature, he 
shows how solitary, nasty, brutish and short human life is until the adoption of the 
Leviathan (absolute leader) through a social contract, which in turn brings order, 
development and progress to the state.  
 
Plato emphasises the role of good leadership in the realisation of the just state. He 
notes the deficiencies in the city of Athens, and as a result calls for its revitalisation 
with the help of philosopher Kings whom he considers the beacon of societal growth 
and progress. For Machiavelli, the importance of leadership is so vital that it must be 
treated with cleverness, boldness and even with deception if and when the situation 
demands. Internal and external problems must be handled with both hard and soft 
power, or tricky diplomacy and coercive force. He considers such policy measures as 
capable of enabling the leader to eliminate his detractors and to attract friends 
(Agbelengor, 2012: 2-3). While some of Machiavelli’s pronouncements are extreme, 
there are occasions when some of them, such as the use of coercive force, become 
necessary when members of the state act irrationally and constitute a threat to law 
and order. 
 
The kind of transformation that post-colonial African states require is such that 
necessitates responsible leaders and citizens. Leaders and corporate executives have 
a big role to play in creating the kind of ideal state that post-colonial African societies 
require. But they have not always lived up to that expectation. The only guarantee for 
good leadership and by implication, the realisation of the ethical and ideal state is that 
leaders, managers, corporate executives and members of a state conduct themselves 
with integrity and professionalism, and abide by the principles of virtue. Creating the 
ideal state does not need extraordinary strategy. Rather, it is no harder to build 
something great than it is to build something good. It might be statistically more rare 
to attain greatness, but “it does not require more suffering than perpetuating 
mediocrity” (Collins, 2005: 205[MK7]). Human beings will be on the way to achieving the 
ideal state once they have the inner disposition to do so and as Aristotle says, once 
they possess or acquire the traits of character that will assist them to attain their goals. 
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1.7 SUMMARY 
This study sets out to investigate the reasons for the inability of postcolonial African 
states to implement the ideal ethical and democratic societies, which is are able to 
adequately provide for the needs and expectations of their citizens, despite the 
immense human and natural endowments at their disposal and their exposure to 
international best practices. The study further considers the contributions that leaders, 
politicians, members of society and other stakeholders can make to the realisation of 
the ethical and ideal postcolonial African state. 
 
The extent of incompetence and immorality among many leaders, managers, public 
officials and the public at large which results in a disorganised, unproductive and 
conflict-ridden society filled with injustices and inhuman conduct gives the impression 
that the task of constructing a desirable society is beyond human comprehension and 
ability. This is not entirely the case because human beings can transcend their current 
nature if they are willing and committed to being ethical and to conduct themselves in 
accordance with virtues.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the concept of ethics and the moral theories that provide 
guidance on right and wrong actions. It examines the understanding of ethics in 
general and virtue ethics in particular, drawing its point of departure from Aristotle’s 
theory of virtues. The chapter examines the ultimate goal of human life, and the 
application of the theory of virtues in the contemporary era.  
 
Ethics is understood as the study of morality; or the examination of the morality of 
human actions, behaviours and their consequences. Various philosophers distinguish 
between ethics and morality, claiming that while ethics relates to the examination or 
critique of specific moralities, morality relates to virtues, principles or systems of rules 
(Paulo, 2016: 11-12). However, ethics and morality are often used interchangeably in 
ordinary language (Thiroux and & Krasemann, 2015: 2). 
 
There are various ethical theories that provide guidance on right and wrong conducts, 
notably deontology, utilitarianism and virtues ethics. There is lack of consensus among 
these theories on the determination of morality. While deontology prioritises the 
adherence to duties, utilitarianism lays emphasis on the greatest happiness principle, 
while virtue ethics hinges on the importance of good character in producing right 
actions (Sim, 2010: 195-196). The conflicting nature of their emphasis makes it difficult 
to have a sole measurement of right and wrong. It is however noted that our moral 
judgements tend to be largely measured in line with the utilitarian provisions (Sheskin, 
2015: 2).  
 
In his consideration of the ultimate goal of human life, Aristotle (Polansky, 2014: 14; 
Guseynov, 2016: 486) notes that human beings generally consider happiness to be 
the highest good. However, they do not have a general consensus on what constitutes 
happiness. While some see honour as the ultimate goal, others consider it to be either 
wealth, glory or pleasure. However, Aristotle posits that these cannot be the main 
objective of all human endeavours because they are very shallow. Rather, he 
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considers true happiness (eudemonia) as consisting of a life of contemplation, while a 
life of virtue plays a central role in the realisation of true happiness. 
 
One of the major points of note in this chapter relates to Aristotle’s claims that human 
beings have natural virtues and are therefore naturally able to act virtuously (Winter, 
2012: 101). If this is the case, then why do many people, including politicians, 
bureaucrats and leaders find it daunting to act and behave ethically, but instead 
engage in all forms of unethical conduct that bring harm to their people and societies?  
These challenges will be examined in the next chapters.  
 
2.2 WHAT IS ETHICS  
When most philosophers refer to ethics, they, according to Paulo, (2016: 13) are 
considering human actions and behaviours from a moral perspective and their impacts 
on others in line with rules and moral principles. Ethics, according to Thiroux and 
Krasemann (2015: 1-2) is the study of morality; and its concerns relate to what is wrong 
or right in the conduct and behaviour of human beings. A number of academic 
philosophers place a distinction between ethics and morality,  
 
such that morality is a certain system of rules, principles, values, or virtues, 
whereas ethics is moral philosophy, that is, the theory of morality. According 
to this view, ethics has to do with the examination, justification, or critique 
of particular moralities. This understanding of morality is very wide, for it 
includes not only the traditional  moralities based on Aristotelian virtues, on 
the Kantian categorical imperative, or versions of consequentialism, but 
also less elaborated forms of normative systems that regulate human 
conduct (Paulo, 2016: 11-12). 
 
In ordinary language, however, ethics and morality are frequently used 
interchangeably in the sense of referring to a person or an action as ethical or moral; 
as unethical or immoral (Thiroux and Krasemann, 2015: 2). If there is any distinction 
that is made between ethics and morality in ordinary language, this lies in the 
connotation, whereby  
 
Morality sometimes has a more traditional, oftentimes religious, 
conservative, or outdated, doctrinal ring to it; the connotation of ethics is, in 
contrast, more neutral and modern. It is, thus, not surprising to see that the 
practical approaches to right or wrong human conduct in medicine, 
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business, or environmental issues have been called applied ethics rather 
than applied morality (Paulo, 2016: 12). 
 
In other instances in ordinary language, the terms morality or immorality are 
associated with issues relating to sexuality, while the terms ethical and unethical are 
used in discussions that relate to the conduct of professional communities and 
business towards the public or their members. However, these words are no longer 
commonly used as often as the terms right, wrong, good or bad are currently used 
(Thiroux and & Krasemann, 2015: 2). The kinds of questions that ethics poses include:  
 
what constitutes any person or action being good, bad, right, or wrong and 
how do we know (epistemology)? What part does self-interest or the 
interests of others play in the making of moral decisions and judgements? 
What theories of conduct are valid or invalid and why? Should we use 
principles or rules or laws as the basis for our choices, or should we let 
each situation decide our morality? Are killing, lying, cheating, stealing, and 
certain kinds of sexual acts right or wrong, and why or why not? (Thiroux 
and & Krasemann, 2015: 2) 
 
A large proportion of all the theoretical problems that have preoccupied the thoughts 
of philosophers from the advent of the history of philosophy concern ethical problems. 
Both the Nicomachean Ethics and the various platonic dialogues have been largely 
dominated by the issues of justice, virtue and other related questions. In other cases, 
ethical problems directly concern human daily lives, and require that actions be taken 
by individuals, groups or organisations (Kucuradi, 2016: 63-64). 
 
The field of ethics, according to Inwood (2014: 2) was founded by Aristotle as a 
discipline. He is not claiming here that no other theorist or philosopher has contributed 
immensely to the field of ethics prior to Aristotle. Rather, he is claiming that the first 
clear boundaries to the discipline of ethics was set by Aristotle, who identified 
distinctive high level principles that define the field of ethics; provided a framework for 
working within the principles, and postulated precise, vital and lasting treatises on 
ethics. He recognises Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics as “the most consistently studied 
treatise in the history of ethics; it has done more than any other text to give the field 
whatever unity and cohesion it has” (Inwood, 2014: 3). 
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This research wonders what the need is for ethics when there are clearly defined rules 
and regulations that ought to hold people accountable for their actions and behaviour. 
Most people concede that there are differences between ethics and law. This 
variations is seen in the fact that  
 
Law is a highly institutionalised system, strictly regulating human conduct 
and consisting of largely contingent rules that every individual has – under 
the threat of coercion – to follow. Ethics in contrast, is primarily a personal 
matter, allowing for ad hoc reasoning and demanding existential decisions 
(Paulo, 2016: 11).  
 
This study notes that this is a very critical distinction between ethics and law because 
when we consider human actions and behaviours, it can be noted in many cases that 
many people obey the law not because they sincerely want to do that, but out of fear 
of reprisals. In many instances, such people would not do the right thing if they realise 
that their intended actions and behaviour would not be exposed. There are various 
standards of right and wrong as will be noted in the following sections. These variations 
are problematic for good human relations and for issues of justice and fairness when 
people hold on to different conceptions of morality. Therefore,  
 
There is a sense of urgency built into the nature of ethics. As regards the 
proper standards of conduct, many have been afraid that unless such 
standards can be delivered, we are left vulnerable to relativism, amoralism 
and general disorder. No matter whether philosophers look at ethics as 
something divine, as a social contract, as standards we are bound to 
through our rationality, or a system built upon certain moral sentiments, they 
seem to agree on one thing: we need ethics. Certain normative guidelines 
are necessary for proper living – especially for living together with others 
(Martela, 2017: 59).  
 
 
2.3 MORAL THEORIES THAT PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON RIGHT AND WRONG 
ACTIONS 
Various schools of thought, including virtue ethics, utilitarianism and deontology 
provide opposing standards or moral theories that over the ages have become 
dominant in the determination of right and wrong actions (Chappell, 2009: 206; Sim, 
2010: 195). These three theories, “disagree about the measure of morality, prioritising 
virtues, social utility or duty” (Sim, 2010: 195). 
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According to Thiroux and Krasemann (2015: 30), the consequentialist (utilitarianism 
and ethical egoism) and the non-consequentialists (deontology) are the two major 
moral positions that have emerged in the history of ethics. The consequentialist, which 
refers to the consequences of individual behaviour and actions as the determinant of 
right actions is traditionally referred to as teleological. The nNonconsequentialismt 
does not concern itself with consequences. According to Gaworonski [MK8]et al., (2017: 
343), the distinction between these two moral positions has shaped research on moral 
dilemma judgements. In most cases, virtue ethics has mostly 
 
been defined against other ethical theories like utilitarianism and 
deontology. Whereas virtue ethics emphasises the virtues of character to 
measure right actions, utilitarianism emphasises the adherence to the 
greatest happiness principle and deontology emphasises the adherence to 
duties to produce moral actions […]. Non-virtue ethical theories like 
utilitarianism and deontology are said to differ from virtue ethics in their 
reliance on general rules or principles for prescriptions about moral actions, 
as well as universal laws or principles for the assessment of moral actions  
(Sim, 2010: 195). 
 
Chappell (2009: 207-208) disagrees with the manner in which these moral theories 
tend to  wrongly base everything on a specific determinant of right and wrong, good 
or bad in all cases. This tendency, according to Gaworonski et al., (2017: 343) creates 
a potential conflict among these theories, which are two principles that play a 
fundamental role in research on moral judgement. This conflict according to Dougherty 
(2011: 527) creates lack of consensus on what constitutes right and wrong actions. 
For instance, he claims that if deontologists believe that killing must be avoided at all 
times, then they will disagree with the consequentialists (‘utilitarians’) view that human 
beings are morally obligated to reduce the extent or number of bad things that occur 
in the world. A deontologist would say that it is wrong to kill anyone since killing is an 
action that must be avoided at all costs. The prevention of other killings is not a 
sufficient reason according to the deontologist to kill other people. 
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2.3.1 Deontological Ethics 
The word Deontology was created by Jeremy Bentham and represents the science of 
duties or what is proper for a person to do. Deontology is that branch of knowledge 
that concerns itself with moral obligations. Bentham’s deontology is utilitarian in 
contrast to Kant’s deontology. In a broad original sense, any ethical system that 
prescribes concrete actions is deontological. Bentham’s deontology appears not to be 
enjoying any interest among contemporary moral philosophers who consider 
deontology as a form of ethical theory that is not utilitarian or teleological 
(Timmermann, 2015: 76-77). 
 
Kant’s moral philosophy, and indeed, deontological ethics as a whole, is generally 
viewed as an ethics of duty. Deontological ethics is characterised by fulfilment of 
duties, a focus on what human beings should do, and rightness of actions (Jing, 2013: 
451). His deontology hinges on the prioritisation of duties over consequences 
(Thomas, 2015: 3). The proponents of deontology (the nonconsequentialists) posit that  
 
consequences do not, and in fact should not, enter into judging whether 
actions or people are moral or immoral. Actions are to be judged solely on 
whether they are right and people solely on whether they are good, based 
on some other (many nonconsequentialists would say ‘higher’) standards 
of morality. That is, acts or people are to be judged moral or immoral 
regardless of the consequences of actions (Thiroux and & Krasemann, 
2015: 46). 
 
The Divine Command theory, according to Thiroux and Krasemann (2015: 46) is the 
most obvious example of this deontological theory. It provides that if an individual 
believes in the existence of a supernatural being, such as God, gods, or goddesses 
who have instituted a number of moral commands, then he or she will be considered 
good, and their actions right only on condition that these commands are obeyed 
irrespective of their consequences. For Kant (Thomas, 2015: 3) true freedom derives 
from voluntary, informed obedience to the provisions of moral law, no matter what the 
consequences may be.  Kant’s (Yudanin, 2015: 595) treatise derives from the moral 
philosophy that traditionally considers  two types of duties, namely those that  prohibit 
certain actions and those that command certain  actions, since it is difficult to imagine 
a moral standard that  only prohibits specific kinds of actions without also commanding 
people to be helpful towards those in need. 
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Kant (Yudanin, 2015: 597) associates the ultimate goal of human actions with the 
categorical imperative. His Categorical Imperative, which requires human beings to 
treat each other in the same manner that they would like to be treated, and that human 
beings treat each other as ends and not as means,  
 
imposes universal moral duties that will not only stabilise social 
expectations, but also help to protect individuals from potentially destructive 
acts committed by others. But the categorical Imperative also resembles an 
agreement between persons on a basic set of guidelines that will ensure 
individual freedom, civil order and the rule of law […] (Thomas, 2015: 3). 
 
A human being, though rational, according to Kant (Jing, 2013: 459), is a limited entity 
who, throughout his lifetime, is constantly confronted with two struggling parties, the 
one being the inclinations that emanate from the empirical appetite, while the other is 
the duty according to the moral law. Virtue, which he considers to be primarily some 
form of self-control, is the strength of will that enables the person to carry out and fulfil 
his duty. 
 
One of the major criticisms of the Kantian deontology is that it is implausibly rigoristic 
as well as hopelessly insensitive to moral complexity while exhibiting righteous 
absurdity and committing to a set of perfect duties without exception that expect 
human beings to always keep their promises and to never tell lies, among other 
obligatory requirements. Although some Kantians reject these objections, claiming 
that the Kantian moral philosophy does acknowledge exceptions to perfect duties, this 
acknowledgement fails to indicate when and how such exceptions should be made 
(Cholbi, 2013: 439). 
 
Kant (Dierksmeier, 2013: 598) is criticised on the one hand, as purely a deontological 
thinker, who is not sensitive towards the preconditions and effects of ethical conduct.  
His critics therefore propose that his theory needs to be revised and complemented 
by the theories of virtue ethics. On the other hand, Kant’s scholars disagree with these 
criticisms, claiming that Kant’s moral philosophy already contains these considerations 
and already culminates in virtue ethics. Many scholars, according to Jing (2013: 451), 
believe that virtue plays a vital role in Kant’s moral philosophy, while some other 
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contemporary theorists criticise Kant’s virtue theory as not real virtue but as largely 
comparable with the Aristotelian strength of will (continence) when confronted by 
contrary emotions and appetites. Jing, however, argues that Kant’s conception of 
virtue as strength is not the same as Aristotle’s conception of continencess, and that 
Kant’s virtue as strength  resides at the much higher level of the inner state of freedom 
and the mental attitude of the soul of a person. 
 
2.3.2 Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism and ethical egoism, which are the two main ethical theories of 
consequentialism concur that human beings should conduct themselves in a manner 
that results in good consequences. However, they lack consensus on the beneficiaries 
of the results. While the utilitarians posit that human beings should act in the interest 
of all stakeholders, the ethical egoists claim that individuals should always act in their 
self-interest. However, they argue that this does not mean that they are necessarily 
promoting selfishness (Thiroux and & Krasemann, 2015: 30-32).  
 
The term utilitarianism means utility or usefulness. Its main proponents are Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill. For the utilitarians, an act is moral or right if it is able to 
lead to the realisation of a good or desirable end. They posit that human beings are 
required to conduct themselves or to adhere to moral rules in a manner that will ensure 
the realisation of happiness or the greatest good for all relevant stakeholders (Thiroux 
and & Krasemann, 2015: 37). Put differently, the utilitarian theory posits that an action 
should only be undertaken if its outcome produces a level of wellbeing (happiness) 
that is higher than the end result of an alternative action (Reichlin, 2016: 1-2). 
 
For Mill, (1965: 281), “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness. By happiness is 
intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain or the deprivation 
of pleasure”. According to Reichlin (2016: 1-2), well-being or happiness for ‘classical’ 
utilitarianism also relates impartiality in the consideration of individual benefits. These 
components of wellbeing or happiness for Mill (Kreider, 2010: 54-55; Reichlin, 2016: 
1-2), are the only desirable ends; and anything desirable should be sought either for 
the pleasures that they hold or as a means to promote pleasure and to prevent pain. 
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Mill (Loizides, 2014: 3) distinguishes two senses of happiness: the humble and the 
higher senses of happiness. He argues that the humble element of happiness reduces 
all aspects of happiness to basic feelings of pleasure and pain, while the higher sense 
of happiness relates to the happy life, which human beings who possess highly 
developed faculties wish for. 
 
Utilitarianism is criticised, according to Thiroux and Krasemann (2015: 37) for 
supporting ethical egoism because it is not always feasible to determine the factors 
that will produce good consequences for other people. Part of the difficulties inherent 
in the process of ascertaining the consequences of the actions that a person wants to 
take is the inability to establish what will be acceptable to others, right or good for 
them. Moreover, what an individual considers to be a good consequence “may not be 
equally, or at all, good for another; and how are you to tell unless you can ask other 
people what would be good for them? Very often, of course, there is no time to ask 
anyone anything; we simply must act in the best way we can” (Thiroux and & 
Krasemann, 2015: 37).  
 
This study notes that it cannot be right or acceptable that many actions and decisions 
are taken quickly as a result of insufficient time to ask questions or to do adequate 
investigations. This singular factor can create unfair decisions and treatments if in-
depth investigations are not conducted before decisions are made. It may even result 
in wrong judgements and the maltreatment of the innocent who may have been 
wrongly accused. It is therefore suggested that no decision must be taken until the 
truth of the issues under focus has been thoroughly ascertained.  
 
Kreider (2010: 53) disagrees with the critics who term Mill’s Utilitarianism as 
hedonistic, claiming instead that although Mill continuously used hedonistic 
languages, he rejects hedonism in its entirety, while characterising happiness to a 
greater extent in the Aristotelian eudemonic terms. Like Aristotle, Mill notes both the 
fact that the higher human rational faculties are the most important part of human 
happiness, as well as the intrinsic value of developing and exercising human higher 
rationality. On the other hand, Kreider also notes an important variation in Aristotle’s 
and Mill’s conception of happiness in the sense that “Mill places more importance on 
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practical reasoning than on theoretical reasoning to happiness than does Aristotle” 
(Kreider, 2010: 54). 
 
In reaction to his critics who term his moral theory athat portrayals of pleasure 
(happiness) as the only intrinsic good, as hedonistic, Mill (Kreider, 2010: 55) posits 
that pleasure refers not only to brutish physical pleasures, but also to all kinds of 
pleasure, including emotional, physical, and aesthetic pleasures. Eventually his use of 
hedonistic terms and of the word pleasure begins to wane in view of his realisation 
that with much tranquillity or inner peace, many people will be satisfied with minimal 
pleasure. He further asserts that it is better to remain a dissatisfied person than a 
satisfied pig.  
 
Moral decisions, according to Sheskin and Baumard (2015: 1), [MK9]appear consistent 
with the theory of utilitarianism for tending towards the maximisation of the general 
welfare of the population in the sense of increasing benefits and minimising harms. An 
example of this involves the runaway train that is switched to another track where the 
number of casualties will as a result be reduced to a few or to just one fatality. Many 
people appear to agree that it is better to preserve the lives of many people at the 
expense of one person. Many behavioural studies tend to appeal to this kind of 
judgement (of preserving the lives of many) in their motivations for an increase in the 
welfare of others.  
 
Sheskin and Baumard (2015: 2) [MK10]notes, however, that there are other judgements 
that do not support the maximisation of general welfare and as such run contrary to 
this utilitarian theory and the idea of increasing general welfare. Such judgements 
manifest themselves in cases where the attempt to maximise general welfare conflicts 
with the different notions of justice or fairness. For instance, in a process of deciding 
on peoples’ healthcare, most people will not agree to decrease the level and quality of 
treatment that one group receives in order to increase the level of cure that a larger 
group of people will receive even though such decision would maximise welfare. 
Research reveals that moral behaviour can be influenced by a number of other 
influences besides utilitarianism. These include the desire for honest behaviour, 
respect for property, constraints from reciprocity, and self-interest. However, the 
utilitarian mode of thought is often employed as a means of measuring our moral 
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judgements to such an extent that acting in contrast to it is conceived as biaseds. 
Another example where efforts to increase the general welfare conflicts with various 
conceptions of justice and fairness, as will be noted  in chapter five, relates to the  
imbalances in the distribution of land and  other benefits  in South Africa. 
 
This study notes that the manner in which Mill arrives at his universal principle of 
happiness through logical deductions appears fallacious because the fact that all 
people want happiness does not necessarily mean that they would want that 
happiness to be extended to others. As will be noted in chapters four and five, human 
beings exist in society as social, communal and individual beings. However, they tend 
to be more individualistic than communal in their way of life. If they were placed in a 
community devoid of rules and regulations, the tendency is that most of them wouldill 
resort to individualism, only caring about themselves and their immediate family 
members.  In this kind of society, most members wouldill probably be kind, caring and 
compassionate only towards those they love or those that their inner being gravitates 
towards. Although there are exceptions to the rule since there are individuals who will 
abide with this universal principle without being compelled to do so, one tends to 
believe that the rule of law, coupled with the cultivation of virtues and values play a 
significant role in people’s willingness and ability to be ethical.     
 
2.3.3 Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics, according to Paulo (2016: 14), is a great rival of the standard view of 
ethics because while the standard view of ethics is characterised by actions, their 
consequences and the reference to rules and moral principles, virtue ethics 
“emphasises the virtues of character to measure right actions” (Sim, 2010: 195) 
 
According to Aristotle (Wong, 2011: 71) “virtues signify excellence of character or 
admirable traits by which moral goodness can be achieved”.  Put differently, virtue for 
him, is “a habit, a tendency of character to act in accordance with practical reason 
towards worthy ends” (Stedman, 2010: 59). He considers virtues as playing a 
fundamental role in the pursuit of a good life (Thiroux and & Krasemann, 2015: 61); 
and he posits that “a good life is a virtuous life hence virtues ought to constitute a 
significant part of an ethical life” (Wong, 2011: 71). In Aristotle’s account of character 
traits, he asserts that virtuous people perform virtuous acts without internal conflict 
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because they feel and reason rightly, while continent people are only able to perform 
virtuous acts once they have overcome bad desires or passions (Curzer, 2012: 3).  
 
Virtue significantly tends, according to Audi (Winter, 2012: 13) “to influence conduct 
and supplies its possessor both with a normative reason indicating what sort of thing 
should be done in a wide range of contexts and with motivation to do such things for 
an appropriate kind of reason”. Virtues, according to Aquinas (Hause & Murphy, 2010: 
xviii-xx) are those habits that enable the faculty to properly execute its functions, while 
the habits that prevent the faculty form performing its functions well are called vices. 
Furthermore, he posits that virtue also enables us to carry out our rational activity in a 
manner that leads to happiness. However, we need to submit ourselves to discipline 
in order to have any chance of being happy, by directing our sensory appetites towards 
right reason so that we are able to act rationally; we need to go beyond narrow self-
interest.  
 
Aristotle (Stedman, 2010: 59-60) considers virtue as the ability to strike at a balance 
between extremes of excess and deficiency. He calls this balance the ‘golden mean’. 
For instance, he claims that  
 
Prudence is […] an intellectual habit (virtue) enabling the person to 
deliberate properly in order to choose the virtuous course, the right means 
of action in any here and now situation [...]. Temperance is the habit of 
moderation in the use of pleasurable things. Fortitude enables a person to 
stand firm against and endure the  hardships of life, to restrain fear, or to 
moderate fear in the face of danger, all done in accordance with reason 
(Stedman, 2010: 60). 
 
Aristotle (Solopova, 2016: 522-523) classifies the virtues into intellectual and moral 
virtues. He considers the difference between them as lying in the fact that while the 
objective of moral action is to derive the good, the aim of thought is to attain the truth. 
Put differently, he claims that while intellectual virtues are primarily associated with the 
rational or reasoning part of the soul, with thinking or can be realised by means of 
instruction and teaching, moral virtues concern the part of the soul that cannot reason 
on its own, but is only capable of following the thought patterns, and they find 
expression through passions and actions or though habituation or habit (Bykova, 2016: 
451) [MK11] 
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While Aristotle (Solopova, 2016: 523-524) posits that as a quality of human mind, 
intellectual virtue is related to human functions and decision-making, he asserts that  
moral virtue “enables an individual to make rational choices and good 
decisions…Further, moral virtue is also regarded as that which enables a person to 
be prudent in decision-making and in his or her actions; it is considered as practical 
wisdom (phronesis)” (Koenane and & Mangena, 2017: 66). While he considers 
intellectual virtues to include wisdom, intelligence, understanding and prudence, he 
classifies moral virtues into temperance and liberality (Solopova, 2016: 522-523). 
 
Aquinas (Hause and & Murphy, 2010: xviii) differentiates between intellectual and 
appetitive virtues. Intellectual virtues, for him, result from the acquisition of various 
elements of scientific knowledge such as geometry and physics. Appetitive virtues, on 
the other hand, lead our appetites to good ends, turning them into good tools of reason. 
They include temperance, which enables humans to avoid the temptations that come 
from drinks, food and sex; and patience, which enables us to be calm and controlled 
when confronted by challenges and unfair or unjust treatment. He considers these 
virtues important as they make our moral and intellectual activities easier.  
 
Human beings according to Aquinas (Hause and & Murphy, 2010: xvi) assume a 
higher state in the universe with its their gift of rational faculties, which separates them 
from other living things. Reason which is the highest part of human rational faculties 
possesses both contemplative and practical functions. While the contemplative aspect 
enables human beings to derive greater level of cognitive understanding of things than 
the senses do by enabling us to conceptualise and master ideas, the practical function 
enables us to establish the best means of performing our activities and spending our 
time. These rational faculties, according to Aquinas, give human life a considerable 
measure of open-endedness or indeterminacy while at the same time are subject to 
rational control, unlike other animals. For instance, the sheep reacts instinctively by 
trying to run away when they are confronted with danger.  When they see a wolf, they 
do not take the time to consider if running away would be the best option in their own 
interest. Unlike the animals, it is the prerogative of human beings to determine what 
course of action to take in a given situation. These faculties can be trained rationally 
to respond and act in more determinate ways and by extension to develop habits. 
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Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 100-102) makes two central points, namely: that human beings 
possess natural virtues and are naturally able to recognise virtuous acts. While he 
recognises that human beings have the internal disposition to recognise right from 
wrong behaviours and actions when they see them, he also acknowledges that in 
certain cases, the rightness or wrongness of certain acts may be difficult to ascertain. 
He claims that every person has uncultivated and undeveloped natural virtues, which 
are inclined towards doing the right thing. Even the young child is naturally inclined 
towards behaving in the right manner, and when this is properly cultivated and 
nurtured in a conducive environment, the disposition towards, for instance, generosity 
or honesty or any other right thing, can transform into virtues such as generosity and 
honesty. On the other hand, bad influences or wrong environment can prevent obstruct 
the individual’s dispositions to being virtuous or to doing the right thing.  
 
Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 100) does not believe that all the virtues can be found in one 
person, because this may imply the existence of a completely virtuous person whom 
other people can emulate. Rather, 
 
Virtue in Aristotle’s theory is acquired through practice. Put differently, by 
repetition of virtuous actions, virtue is a disposition which becomes second 
nature or habit. Accordingly, an Aristotelian would argue that an individual 
becomes what he or she does repeatedly. This further suggests that actions 
define individuals’ dispositions (Koenane and & Mangena, 2017: 67). 
 
Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 100-102) further posits that virtues can be acquired by 
emulating the wise person in whom at least most of the virtues reside. In so doing, 
human beings can for instance, learn about generosity by learning from a generous 
person; they can learn about temperance by learning from the way temperate persons 
conduct themselves; and they can learn how to practice the other virtues by looking at 
the manner in which the virtuous people live their lives. He further provides that in 
cases where human beings are not sure of what to do, they should consult the 
practically wise persons for advice and guidance. 
 
It is unique, according to Bykova (2016: 451) that Aristotle associates the acquisition 
of virtues with engaging in specific activities moderately, at the right amount and 
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possessing the right level of specific passions; while virtues are lost as a result of 
excessiveness and defect. He wonders how possible it is for human beings to 
determine the required or acceptable level of actions or feelings, taking into 
consideration their unique and relative nature. Aristotle’s response to this kind of 
question is that virtue requires that extremes in actions, passions and desires beare 
stabilised by the ‘golden mean’. But Bykova contends that it is not easy to attain the 
golden mean since it requires that human beings make huge effort. Nonetheless, the 
golden mean is considered by Bykova (2016: 452) as “the highest wisdom, and this 
becomes especially clear in the context of the ancient philosophers’ discussion of 
diverse opinions on proper behaviour”.  
 
Virtue ethics is often criticised for failing to outline how human beings should conduct 
themselves morally in ambiguous or confusing instances. Instead of laying emphasis 
on the actions of the individual and question their rightness through an appeal to 
universal laws, its focus  lies on the character of the individual and virtue for various 
situations, which cannot be subjected to general rules. As a result, of this tendency, 
the critics contend that virtue ethics, in contrast to its rivals, fails to give priority 
attention to actions in its evaluation of morality (Sim, 2010: 195-197). Furthermore, 
 
because of the intimate connection between social justice and human rights 
practices to universal laws which express our duties and obligations, critics 
of virtue ethics maintain that the absence of  universal laws and the lack of 
deontic concepts and their practices like ‘duty’ and ‘right’, make social 
justice and human rights practices challenging for virtue ethics (Sim, 2010: 
195-196). 
 
Paulo (2016: 14) also finds virtue ethics unjustifiable without some form of appeal to 
norms. He wonders for instance how an individual can “know what actually fulfils the 
virtue of justice without knowing which norms determine what is just…It would thus be 
much harder to gain any insight into reasoning within virtue ethics from a comparison 
to legal reasoning” (Paulo, 2016: 14). 
 
Sim (2010: 198) responds to these criticisms of virtue ethics by claiming that while 
Aristotle does not provide that human beings can become moral by merely adhering 
to laws, he however considers laws to play a significant role in the ability of human 
beings to become virtuous. The legislator, whose function is to make laws, according 
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to Aristotle, must enact laws and put mechanisms in place that enable citizens to 
understand what is required of them to become virtuous individuals. Aristotle posits 
that in order to become virtuous human beings must develop all the moral virtues and 
desist from bad actions. He considers a just person as the law abiding citizen. This 
means, for this research, that to be virtuous, the individual needs to conduct him or 
herself on the basis of established laws, guided by values and virtues; going beyond 
the norms while appealing to the human inner disposition to live a moral life. 
 
Virtue ethics, according to Thiroux and & Krasemann (2015: 68) attempts to create not 
just good regulations or procedure, or impulsive individuals, but to create habitually 
and consistently virtuous or good people. Despite these ethical provisions and the 
prevalence of ethical codes, moral systems and laws, many virtue ethicists are 
challenged by the absence of (many) virtuous or ethical people. These theorists 
believe that  
 
until we create ethical or virtuous people, our chances of  creating a moral 
society will remain minimal. After all, they say, we have had rules, laws, and 
regulations for at least several millennia and have even more nowadays, 
but still badness, immorality, viciousness, cruelty, and vice seem to be 
getting worse rather than better. It is generally agreed that virtues are 
beneficial to individuals and the community (Thiroux and & Krasemann, 
2015: 68). 
 
The importance of good character is generally recognised around the world. In Britain 
for instance, there is a growing consensus that “the virtues that contribute to good 
character are part of the solution to many of the challenges facing modern society” 
(Arthur et al., 2014: 5).   
 
While virtue ethics is acknowledged for its potential to develop an ethical person 
internally as well as externally, many people do not consider it as more convincing 
than deontology and utilitarianism. The unsatisfactory nature of these moral theories 
creates a vacuum in the search for the absolute moral theory and raises the question 
of problem of choice from among them. As a result, more benefits will be derived from 
synthesising the best of the various moral frameworks and paying less attention to the 
worst of them (Thiroux and & Krasemann, 2015: 73).  
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For this research, a crucial question that needs to be posed concerns, is that which of 
these moral systems will be acceptable to most people since human beings remain 
largely independent in their worldviews? It is suggested that the kind of moral 
framework that combines adherence to rules and appeal to inner goodness be 
emphasised and promoted as this would have closed the gaps between being ethical 
because the law provides for it and because we believe that it is better and in the best 
interests of everyone to willingly act ethically. 
 
2.4 THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF HUMAN LIFE 
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle (Guseynov, 2016: 486) examines what the 
ultimate goal of human life is, and he concludes that happiness (eudaimonia) is the 
highest good and the ultimate goal of human endeavours. Aristotle (Polansky, 2014: 
14) posits that while most people consider eudaimonia (happiness) as the best of all 
practical goods, as what they prefer most in life, they do not seem to have a consensus 
on what constitutes eudaimonia. While some people consider the highest good to be 
pleasure, others consider it to be honour or wealth. However, Aristotle observes that 
these considerations are very shallow and do not offer human beings true happiness.  
 
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that happiness is not any kind of feeling, although most 
people tend to associate happiness with feelings of elation or pleasure (Hause and 
Murphy, 2010: xviii). Aquinas (Desan, 2016: 5) makes a distinction between happiness 
and enjoyment. For him, enjoyment relates to physical pleasures and earthly 
possessions, which do not last. He believes that human beings will remain unhappy 
even if they experience all their earthly desires and every possible pleasure because 
the nagging feeling that something is still missing remains. In defence of his claim, he 
alludes to the experience of many celebrities and rich people in the contemporary era, 
who despite their worldly possessions, family and friends, 
 
many of them remain deeply unhappy, even spiralling into the misery of 
drugs and suicide. Aquinas would explain this as follows: when every 
enjoyment is felt, the soul begins to crave for something more than mere 
enjoyment. But if one has no knowledge of this ‘something more’ or doesn’t 
know how to go about finding it, the enjoyment turns to pain and suffering. 
This also explains why we see a lot of billionaires suddenly change towards 
the middle or end of their lives: that nagging feeling that there is something 
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more results in charitable work or an orientation to a higher purpose in life 
(Desan, 2016: 5). 
 
In view of Aristotle’s realisation that wealth, pleasure and honour do not bring true 
happiness, he concludes that true happiness (eudaimonia) can only result from a 
contemplative life, which he considers as the highest good because it is something 
that cannot be easily taken away from the owner (Polansky, 2014: 14). For Aquinas, 
rationality is the essence of human nature and the source of human happiness, and 
human beings become happier the more they readily, consistently, and accurately 
participate in this rational activity (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xviii).  
 
Aristotle (Echenique, 2012: 1) believes that eudaimonia (happiness, flourishing or well-
being) will be achieved through the application of virtues, since it is the “virtues that 
represent man’s path to happiness” (Guseynov, 2016: 486). Aquinas (Hause and & 
Murphy, 2010: xviii) agrees with Aristotle that happiness is the most fulfilling type of 
activity for human beings, and that human beings will never be happy without virtue.  
Eudemonia (happiness), for Aristotle, is the “activity of the soul in accordance with 
excellence (virtue) in a complete life…”  (Echenique, 2012: 1). He believes that  
 
in any situation, there is always the right thing to do. To determine which, 
one needs practical intelligence that is nothing else but an intellectual 
quality of a good human being. Hence, Aristotle’s main ethical task is to 
give an account of a good man living a good life and also describe a way to 
become one […]. We achieve the good life by rationally developing our 
human virtues (Bykova, 2016: 450). 
 
Aquinas distinguishes between perfect and imperfect happiness. He believes that 
human beings cannot attain perfect happiness in this lifetime because the world is 
highly submerged in unsatisfied desires that prevent human beings from achieving the 
ultimate good that they look for in nature. However, Aquinas believes that human 
beings can attain a measure of imperfect happiness in our earthly life. He appears to 
have been influenced by Aristotle in reaching such a conclusion since Aristotle posits 
that the attainment of happiness hinges on the ability of humans to actualise their 
natural faculties, which isnotably reason. In other words, human beings can attain 
happiness on earth in proportion to the measure of truth that is accessible to reason 
(Desan, 2016: 2-3).  
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Aquinas (Hause and Murphy, 2010: xix) adopts a part of Aristotle’s account of 
happiness by claiming that human beings can in a way live earthly lives that are happy 
in the form of imperfect happiness. Based on Aristotle’s teachings, Aquinas 
distinguishes two levels of imperfect happiness: , namely:  
 
The higher tier consists in the virtuous activity of rational contemplation. We 
will be happiest if we contemplate God, since he is the noblest of objects, 
though even contemplation of the various branches of knowledge will make 
us happy as well. The lower tier consists in the virtuous activity of practical 
reason, directing our life’s many actions and passions…..those who enjoy 
this-worldly contemplative happiness will also have moral virtues, on the 
grounds that moral virtue is required for the sort of self-control and 
tranquillity of mind needed for that kind of contemplative activity (Hause and 
& Murphy, 2010: xix). 
 
This study observes that Aristotle and Aquinas associate contemplation or rationality 
and virtues as indispensable to the realisation of virtues. It appears as though they are 
saying that human beings can only engage in rationality or contemplation, and by 
inference pursue happiness on the basis of their virtues. In other words, if human 
beings are not virtuous they cannot have the capacity or willingness to pursue a happy 
life. This makes sense because to be truly happy is not about pleasure or acquiring 
worldly possessions as shown above. Rather, it is about living a good life, and this can 
be achieved when human beings continue to engage in introspection with the view to 
being the best individuals possible.  
 
2.5 APPLICATION OF VIRTUES THEORY IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA 
Aristotle and Aquinas, as shown in this chapter, allude to the central role that reasoning 
plays in promoting a life of virtue, even if they have done so with different emphaseis. 
Nonetheless, one tends to agree with them that the function of man is to reason well. 
This research notes that the reason why many things go wrong in the world can be 
traced to the failure of people to reason well. Sometimes such people deliberately 
choose to ignore logic while others are not able to reason well.  
 
Obstacles to clear thinking, according to Vvan den Berg (2010: 10-13), can result 
either from fallacies or from preconceived ideas. A fallacy is a subtle and as a result, 
more deceptive because it is an unsound mode of reasoning which can deceptively 
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persuade us illegitimately. At first glance, the errors, unreasonableness or falseness 
of the fallacy may not be apparent since the statement has the appearance of truth or 
reasonableness. Preconceived ideas on the other hand, are socially conditioned and 
societally ingrained. Such ideas are rarely subjected to logical reasoning or critical 
reflection and many people make far-reaching decisions based on such notions, with 
attendant negative or unintended consequences. This study recommends that human 
beings should endeavour to always avoid such obstacles in all aspects of their daily 
lives in order to avoid all or most of the problems that confront the world at large, and 
Africa in particular; especially racism, discrimination, inequality, inequity, lack of justice 
and fairness, conflicts and wars.  
 
The level of corruption in Nigeria and South Africa, as will be espoused in chapter five, 
where officials divert huge amounts of public funds into their private accounts without 
due consideration for the welfare and interests of their citizens; and the recurrent spate 
of service delivery protests in South Africa and the consequent destruction of public 
property lend credence to the negative implications of the obstacles to clear thinking. 
[MK12]The protesters take action without thinking through the real causes of their 
grievances and the consequences of their intended actions. In the face of the tough 
economic climate that many governments find themselves, where the government  in 
South Africa is struggling to find sufficient  resources to meet  the needs of the country,  
the protesters  are destroying properties that  may take ages to replace  or that  may 
not even be replaced or replaceable. Reasoning well enables people to discern good 
from bad judgements, actions, decisions and choices. According to Aristotle 
(Stedman, 2010: 59), human beings will live well if they reason well; and happiness 
consists in reasoning well over the course of a person’s life. 
 
As shown in this chapter, human beings do everything for the sake of being happy, 
although they tend to associate happiness mostly with the realisation of external goods 
and desires. Aristotle (Halim, 2012: 111) also believes that a happy life needs some 
measure of material goods since it is not easy or possible to engage in good activities 
without external goods. However, as shown in this chapter, he posits that happiness 
goes deeper than the possession of material goods and fame, because most of the 
things that human beings seek in order to be happy do not really bring them true 
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happiness. This being the case, this research submits that true happiness consists 
mainly in the realisation of inner peace.   
 
This study notes that the challenges that currently confront the world can derail a 
person’s quest, willingness or ability to be ethical. For instance, in cases where one’s 
rights are trampled upon, or injustice and lack of fairness is rife in the work place and 
social settings, it may be difficult for the victim to maintain his integrity. This 
observation is not in any way condoning immorality as a result of the circumstances in 
which human beings may find themselves. According to Audi (Winter, 2012: 14), virtue 
may not always be able to give rise to the most desirable conduct. However, the 
virtuous person will always wish to do the right thing. Having robust character traits is 
a sufficient condition to guarantee that the owner of the traits will be positively disposed 
to acting with integrity when and where it is proper to do so, even in the face of 
difficulties. 
 
Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 101) claims that human beings have natural virtues and are 
naturally capable of virtuous acts. If we agree that at best most people have the innate 
tendency to be virtuous, then one wonders why politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats 
are not able to govern and administer their countries and organisations properly as 
seen in the myriad of governance challenges and corporate failures? The reasons as 
will be revealed in chapter five include selfishness, greed, corruption, temptations, and 
widespread immorality.  
 
Becoming a better or ethical person depends on factors such as self-awareness. A 
substantial number amount of empirical research, according to Ashley and Reiter-
Palmon (2012: 2), suggests that self-awareness plays a fundamental role in becoming 
successful people and leaders, and successful leadership development. It entails an 
inwardly focused process of self-evaluation in which the concerned individuals or 
leaders with a higher sense of self-introspection derive better results than those with 
lower degree of self-awareness. They posit that human beings have a unique  
 
capacity to contemplate not only their status quo, but also their ideal status 
quo. This capacity is underpinned by the ability to imagine a future that is 
better than the past, evaluate alternatives, identify problems, and a 
yearning to progress toward an ideal. Intertwined are processes of self-
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reflexive thought, self-examination, and introspection. All of the above 
broadly circumscribe the construct of self-awareness, and although 
conceptualisation of self-awareness does vary, at their its core is an ability 
to focus attention inward and study oneself as though looking in a mirror 
(Ashley and & Reiter-Palmon, 2012: 2). 
 
Authenticity in human beings and leadership, according to Berkovich (2014: 246), is a 
requisite condition in any genuine effort aimed at becoming the best human being 
possible. Proponents of authentic leadership claim that key features of authentic 
leadership involve being aware of one’s true self, and self-regulation. Authentic 
leaders employ introspective reflection in becoming aware of their identity, core 
values, and goals, while the process of authentic self-regulation includes the elements 
of relational transparency, internalised regulatory system that proceeds from the 
leader’s intrinsic self, actions that reflect the individual’s core values, and the 
processing of information relating to the person in unbiased manner. The theory 
assumes that human beings have the capacity to discover and develop their innate 
authentic potentials in a manner that combines self-awareness and self-narration. 
 
Critics of the authentic leadership theory, however, do not agree with these positive 
propositions, claiming that authentic leadership theory overlooks the political and 
practical aspects of leadership in institutions. Numerous shortcomings have been 
noticed in the authentic leadership approach, notably among which are that  
 
authentic leadership theory conceptualises leaders’ authenticity as an 
essentialist entity. Thus, it is suggested that leaders’ authenticity has 
common features that can be objectively observed and identified…As 
against this perception, Price…argues that most leaders can be said to 
support the values of authentic leadership. They disagree widely, however, 
on the specific demands of honesty, loyalty, and fairness as well as on what 
constitutes justice, equality, and human rights. Moreover, the assumption 
of a coherent and consistent self is seriously questioned because in 
everyday life individuals play different and even opposing social 
roles…Thus, the conceptualisation of authenticity as a fundamental and 
realistic human characteristic seems at best problematic (Berkovich, 2014: 
246). 
 
Leadership, according to Benjamin and O’Reilly (2011: 453) depends on the capability 
of the person concerned since it relates to who the person is, his thoughts and actions. 
Although acquiring these leadership skills may be partly dispositional, the greater part 
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of the development process results from experience and learning. From this 
perspective, the process of improving leadership development can be enhanced by 
“by better understanding what aspects of ‘doing’ leaders struggle with and why. 
Understanding the early ‘doing’ challenges will likely produce significant insight into 
other aspects of leadership as well” (Benjamin & O’Reilly, 2011: 453). 
 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined ethics in general and virtue ethics in particular, using the 
thoughts of Aristotle as its point of departure, while also examining the views of other 
philosophers such Aquinas on the constitutive elements of virtue ethics and the impact 
of virtues on human conduct. The chapter has considered the moral theories that 
provide guidance on right and wrong actions, especially deontology, utilitarianism and 
virtue ethics. The ultimate goal of human life from the perspectives of Aristotle and 
Aquinas was espoused, while the import of virtue ethics for the contemporary era has 
also been considered.  
 
While some philosophers consider ethics and morality to mean the same thing, others 
apply different meanings to them, claiming that while ethics is a theory of morality, 
morality connotes virtues, values or certain system of rules. Morality in many cases is 
associated with religious, traditional or outdated notions of human conduct; while 
ethics is associated with contemporary notions of right and wrong. In ordinary 
language, however, morality and ethics are often used interchangeably. The chapter 
reveals that ethics is about knowing what is right; acting or behaving in the right 
manner; a consideration of the interest of all stakeholders; and the evaluation of the 
morality of human conduct and their its consequences.  
 
Deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics are the main ethical theories that provide 
standards for the determination of right and wrong behaviour. However, they disagree 
on the measure of morality. For deontology, the consequences of people’s actions do 
not determine their morality. Rather, morality results from adherence to duties. For 
utilitarianism, actions are right when they result in happiness for most of the people 
who are affected by those at actions. Happiness in this case means pleasure, the 
absence of pain, and impartiality in the dispersal of rights and benefits. In opposition 
to these theories that base the measure of morality on actions, their consequences, 
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rules and moral principles, virtue ethics emphasises the virtue of character as the 
determinant of morally right actions. 
 
Deontology is criticised for not concerning itself with the consequences of individual 
actions and behaviours on others. The critics suggest that this theory should be 
complemented by the virtues theory. The deontologists reject this criticism, claiming 
that virtues play a crucial role in Kant’s moral theory. However, the critics of deontology 
do not consider Kant’s virtue theory as authentic.  
 
A number of the critics of utilitarianism posit that the utilitarian philosophy that 
considers happiness or pleasure as the only intrinsic good is hedonistic. In reaction to 
this criticism, Mill asserts that the pleasure that he refers to does not apply mainly to 
brutish physical pleasures, but also to pleasures such as physical, emotional and 
aesthetic pleasures. He further asserts that many people can be satisfied with minimal 
pleasure if and when they attain the state of inner peace and tranquillity.  
 
Virtue ethics is often criticised for failing (unlike deontology and utilitarianism) to 
prioritise actions in its determination of morality; for failing to indicate how human 
beings can be moral; for instead of establishing the rightness of actions through appeal 
to universal laws, it questions the individual’s character  and virtue for different 
situations. Sim responds to the critics of virtue ethics, claiming that Aristotle does 
recognise the importance of rules in enabling human beings to be virtuous because 
he posits that people must avoid wrong actions and be law abiding in order to be come 
virtuous. 
 
Aristotle posits that happiness (eudemonia) is the ultimate goal of all human 
endeavours. He asserts that while all human beings recognise happiness as the main 
goal of human life, they do not have a common understanding of what it means. While 
some people see it as pleasure, others believe it is honour, fame, or glory. However, 
Aristotle posits that these elements do not really bring human beings true happiness. 
Aquinas concurs with Aristotle in this regard, claiming that most rich, famous and 
powerful individuals have not found happiness through their status. They both consider 
a life of rational contemplation and living in accordance with virtues as the true sources 
of happiness. 
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One of the critical contributions that Aristotle makes to virtue ethics is his assertion 
that human beings possess natural virtues and are able to naturally recognise virtuous 
acts. The problems in this assertion for the contemporary era is that so many 
challenges are facing the world at large and Africa in particular as a result of the failure 
of leaders, managers and society members at large to behave ethically and to 
contribute positively to the development of their countries, to peace, security and 
welfare of their citizens. As Aristotle alludes tonotes, all the virtues cannot be found in 
one person since no one is perfect. However, he believes that human beings can 
acquire these virtues through practice, by emulating or consulting the wise and 
virtuous individuals, and through learning.  
 
Human beings can also become virtuous through self-awareness and self-
introspection. A number of eEmpirical research suggests that many people and 
leaders have become successful through self-awareness, which enables them to not 
only evaluate their present situation, but also their ideal expectations in life. Self-
awareness further enables the individual to contemplate a future that is better than the 
present or past; identify the challenges; consider possible options; and hope for 
advancing towards the ideal state. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3 THE PHILOSOPHIC IDEAL STATE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of this chapter are to examine the features of the philosophic ideal state 
as propounded by Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes; and the commonalities and 
divergences in their views regarding the constitutive elements of a good political 
society. While Plato (Lull and & Mico, 2011: 8) considers the foundation of the ideal 
state as resting on well-defined division of labour, Aristotle (Gordley, 2015: 201) 
considers the city state as existing for the purpose of promoting the good life, in just 
relationships, and in the distribution of goods and services based on merit. Hobbes 
(1968: 186) considers human natural conditions as intrinsically aggressive, and filled 
with fear; and he concludes that if human beings continue to live in a such state of 
nature, then all lives would be solitary, nasty, brutish and short. Based on these 
observations, Hobbes (1968: 223-224) asserts that peaceful coexistence among 
human beings can only be guaranteed when they enter into a social contract in a 
commonwealth ruled by a sovereign head.  
 
One of the salient features that emanate from this chapter which holds far-reaching 
implications for contemporary systems of governance is Aristotle’s (Gordley, 2015: 
201) rejection of Plato’s communism of property for its propensity to generate 
disagreements, discontent and civil unrest among the citizens when they are not 
rewarded in proportion to their contributions. The challenge that this research notes 
here is that over the ages various governments and institutions have practiced either 
communism or private ownership of properties without either of these systems having 
the requisite ability to meet the needs and aspirations of community members. The 
research therefore posits that it is imperative that a satisfactory system is conceived 
and successfully implemented to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. This demands 
that the right kind of leaders be elected. The onus lies on such leaders to be cognisant 
of their values, capacities and capabilities; and to engage in a renewed quest for 
ethical governance.  
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3.2 DESIRABLE ENDS OF THE IDEAL STATE  
Hobbes (1968: 186) considers the human natural condition, otherwise known as the 
state of nature, as innately aggressive, troublesome, chaotic, violent, and filled with 
fear. He illustrates this belief with the hypothetical image of people’s natural condition 
prior to the advent of a formal state, as one of continuous fear, antagonism, and 
exposure to misery, aggression and death. He notes that with the limitation of 
resources a power struggle results when two people want the same thing. Hobbes 
(Wolfenden, 2010: 1) submits that the quarrelsome nature of human beings makes it 
impossible for them to peacefully coexist in the absence of a greater authority. He 
points to three main causes of quarrels, namely: diffidence, competition and glory; and 
he also considers the main objectives of human beings as safety, gain and reputation. 
For Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1), human happiness resides in their ability to be better 
off in comparison with others; and they are constantly competing for dignity, honour 
and glory. As a result, he concludes that these contestations or competition among 
human beings lead to hatred, envy and ultimately war.  
 
Hobbes (Lloyd, 2013: 4) asserts that as a result of the conflicting nature of human 
beings, the natural inclination for self-preservation, happiness and felicity, on the one 
hand, and the need for interdependence, on the other, it is rational for human beings 
to seek cooperation with each other. Therefore, Hobbes (1968: 223-224) proposes his 
Leviathan – the Ideal State, claiming that for men to live in peace and harmony without 
having to rely on individual strengths as a means of protection, they must enter into a 
social contract in a commonwealth ruled by a sovereign head.  
 
The establishment of the Leviathan through a covenant, for Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 
1) is voluntary, necessary and rational because it is the only means of avoiding the 
lawlessness that characterises the state of nature, the troublesome characteristics of 
human nature, the probability of human beings flouting the laws of nature, and to 
ensure security and peace for everyone.  He claims that, even an oppressive 
government is better than living under the threat of war. This study notes that there 
may be merit in the claim that even an oppressive government is better than living 
under the threat of war. However, this research also notes that an oppressive 
government can also lead to unrest among the citizens and eventually war, as 
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reflected in the recent destructive developments in various parts of the world. For 
instance, the regime of Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader “was characterised by bad 
governance and corruption…Gaddafi reinforced his authoritarian rule by granting 
economic privileges…to various tribes or by threatening punishment” (NatoNATO-
Harvard Project, 2013: 12) 
 
Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) outlines a number of natural laws which he considers to 
be general rules that proceed from reason, which discourage human beings from self-
destructive tendencies, and which he believes are able to improve human life if they 
were consistently adhered to. These include the need to search for peace and 
covenants and to defend oneself if necessary. However, he observes that it is difficult 
for human beings to adhere to these rules, which are able to guide them towards self-
preservation in the absence of a sovereign head since they run contrary to human 
nature. For Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) “the only way to erect the common power 
needed to maintain peace and security is through a covenant, in which men give their 
power to one man and submit their wills to his will and their judgement to his 
judgement”.  
 
Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) agrees with those who contend that members of a state 
are to a greater extent not happy under a powerful sovereign. However, he argues 
that it is not possible for human beings to be totally happy in any case and since 
unhappiness can lead to civil war. Civil war and absence of powerful sovereignty, this 
will only exacerbate the level of suffering that accompanies such chaos. He believes 
that community members will live in consensus once they become part of the 
commonwealth since the accompanying contract is binding. He considers the rights of 
the sovereign to be the same irrespective of how he came to power; his powers can 
neither be usurped nor transferred to someone else without his consent; he may 
neither relinquish his power nor be accused by his subjects of abusing his power; his 
subjects cannot reprimand him; and he is the judge of doctrines and of what is 
necessary for peace. [MK13] 
 
According to Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1-2), the sovereign is the ultimate judge and 
he is above the law; since he acts on behalf of his subjects, his actions are effectively 
the actions of the members of his state; and he cannot harm his subjects since no one 
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can inflict injury on oneself. He considers the best form of administration as residing 
in the most powerful government made of an absolute monarch with unlimited rights.; 
He posits that the commonwealth should be administered indefinitely by a sovereign 
with unrestricted powers because human beings are fundamentally flawed and in 
order to avert the resurgence of the state of nature.; He prefers the monarchical form 
of government to other forms of governance such as Aaristocracy and democracy, as 
more superior because it accords the sovereign head maximum power with no 
constraints.; He considers democracies governed by representatives and 
Aristocracies ruled by a part of the population as weaker than a monarchy for their 
inability to guarantee a substantial level of peace and security[MK14].  
 
This study disagrees with the idea of according the sovereign head unlimited powers 
because that would be excessive. Rather, it is suggested that a competent sovereign 
head who rules his state with justice and fairness and who successfully provides for 
the needs of all members of his state should be allowed to continue administering the 
state until he is no longer able to perform his duties satisfactorily. This suggestion is 
made on the basis that there is no point in replacing a good leader when he is still 
effectively discharging his duties. Furthermore, it is recommended that leaders vacate 
their office between the age of 65 and 68 years; the leaders must put proper 
succession plans in place to ensure that worthy successors are prepared to take over 
the reins of power when the incumbents vacates their positions. 
 
This study considers the level of faith that Hobbes (as shown above) places on the 
sovereign head as excessive and capable of causing more harm than good for the 
state. His consideration of the sovereign as a perfect leader who is not capable of 
doing wrong, runs contrary to what obtains in reality, because there is no leader who 
has ruled his state to the ultimate satisfaction of his subjects. It is further noted that 
the conferment of excessive power in the hands of one ruler without the oversight of 
constituted authorities can lead to dangerous developments if the ruler is unethical. 
The fact that no normal person would consciously inflict harm upon himself as Hobbes 
claims above, does not mean that he is not capable of inflicting harm on others for out 
of selfish reasons.  
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Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 12) disagrees with Hobbes’ assertion that the concern of a 
political scientist should be on how to constitute the best regime. Rather, he posits that 
such concern should also be on how to improve existing governments; how current 
governments came into being; how to sustain them; and which model regimes exist 
that most other governments can emulate. The best form of rule for Aristotle (Nitsch, 
2009: 12-22) is an mixed regime which tends to be more stable than unmixed regime 
where claims about injustice result in conflicts, factionalism and revolutions. He 
considers Democracy and Oligarchy as holding specific beliefs regarding the nature 
of political justice. He asserts that based on the philosophy of the democrats that the 
people should rule, equality becomes the fundamental basis for deciding who rules, 
while political rule must be equally shared among the citizens since they are all equally 
free. He further posits that Oligarchs, on the other hand, believe that inequality of 
property should be the determining factor in deciding who rules in the sense that the 
rich should rule because they have wealth and property and by implication would not 
be tempted to misrule or divert public funds for personal use. Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 
22) is not convinced on of the efficacy of either forms of governance because 
adherence to either of them would lead to unfortunate consequences.   
 
Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 18) considers his Polity to be the best kind of democratic 
regime since it indicates how best to constitute a regime that is institutionally mixed. 
The polity, for him, can be a combination of individual laws that democracies and 
oligarchies typically practice. For instance, while democracies tend to make financial 
assistance available to poor citizens to take part in political life, oligarchies on the other 
hand tend to do the same for richer citizens. The two principles can be combined by a 
polity, according to Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 18-19) 
 
by using both at the  same time, encouraging all citizens to participate. 
Second, a polity might draw on both democracy and oligarchy by trying to 
find a mean between each of their characteristic approaches. Again, 
regarding financial incentives for political participation, for example, a polity 
might provide a middling amount of financial incentive for poorer citizens to 
participate not so much as would be typical of a democracy, but more than 
would be typical of an oligarchy…Finally, Aristotle indicates, a polity can 
combine the principles of oligarchy and democracy by taking some 
elements from one, and some from the other (Nitsch, 2009: 18-19).  
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This study recommends that countries, which witness rampant lawlessness and 
instability, such as South Africa and Nigeria, as will be exposed in chapter five, should 
opt for the monarchical system of governance if the sovereign head were just, fair and 
possessed sufficient wisdom. It is noted, that the extent of lawlessness that obtains in 
these democracies is disconcerting. In the case of South Africa, many disgruntled 
individuals and groups, according to Nembambula (2015: 47) engage in violent 
protests over issues such as corruption and inadequate provision of basic services. In 
the process they often engage in the destruction of public goods, property and private 
businesses.  It is observed in the Nigerian case that there are groups such as the 
violent Boko Haram who are attempting to islamiseIslamise a section of the northern 
region (Arendas, 2016: 40). This study notes that it seems as though democratic 
principles are not able to employ ultimate firmness to quash such agitations that could 
otherwise be expressed through peaceful means. These are cases where the monarch 
could employ drastic measures, including the use of force to quench such dissents 
and to serve as a deterrent. 
 
Wolfenden (2010: 1-2) considers Hobbes arguments as mostly valid, though 
consisting of a number of deficiencies. He finds Hobbes’ theoretical explanation for 
the formation of government as not capable of practical application. For instance, while 
Hobbes (1968: 223-224) posits that all governments are formed on the basis of a 
covenant, Wolfenden (2010: 1-2) contends that there are a number of cases where 
governments are imposed on an unwilling population. However, Hobbes (Wolfenden, 
2010: 2) defends his position, claiming that all people acting rationally would prefer to 
associate with the commonwealth since the alternative in the form of a state of nature 
is not appealing, and it is inconceivable that rational beings would prefer to choose the 
state of nature.    
 
Wolfenden (2010: 2) criticises Hobbes for placing excessive level sof faith in his 
absolute and benevolent sovereign; for making a number of implausible assumptions, 
including that the sovereign is prepared to work solely in the interests of his subjects 
without allowing his personal interest to cloud his judgements. This is considered an 
unlikely tendency, because most rulers do not always consider the interests of 
community members in their actions and decisions. Wolfenden (2010: 2) further 
criticises Hobbes for contradicting himself by also claiming that although the sovereign 
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may be selfish, he is at the same time able to take into account the interests of his 
community members. History has, however, often revealed that, according to 
Wolfenden (2010: 2),  
 
absolute power corrupts absolutely, that when leaders are allowed to act 
however they wish they more often than not take what they want at the 
expense of the state and their citizens. Hobbes reliance on a monarch who 
would somehow be able to ignore his personal desires for the good of the 
country makes his political regime seem much less practical. 
 
This study notes that it does not appear as though there is one absolute form of 
governance that is sufficient to guarantee a well ordered society in which the needs 
and aspirations of all community members are fulfilled. It is observed that while the 
monarchical form of governance may be preferable for applying tough measures on 
those who flout the rules and values of society, it is better to subscribe to a system of 
rule that holds the absolute monarch accountable if he fails to be ethical, just and fair 
in administering the state. This would include elements of a mixed regime as Aristotle 
(Nitsch, 2009) suggests. However, this study submits that the mixed regime must have 
the monarchical system as one part of it. 
 
3.3 FEATURES OF A GOOD POLITICAL SOCIETY FOR PLATO 
This section gives consideration to Plato’s treatise on a good political society because 
while one of the main objectives of this research is to come up with ideas that can 
contribute to a transformed post-colonial African society, Allen (2010: 4), among other 
theorists recognises him as the world’s first systematic political philosopher; the 
Western world’s first critical activist who wrote among other things, to effect change in 
societies that were in ethical, social, economic and political turmoil; and especially to 
transform his society’s politics and culture. [MK15]Plato’s era, according to Wright (2016: 
11) witnessed immense anarchy, violence, instability, internal and external negative 
influences which he realised would lead to the loss of the state’s social, ethical and 
cultural values. As a result, he attempted to comprehend the reasons for such a level 
of moral laxity, as well as to seek means of rectifying the problems identified. He 
concluded that the claims of the state must take precedence over those of the 
individual, and he laid emphasis on homogeneity and order. 
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Beever (2013: 37) recognises Plato as the West’s recognised first great philosopher 
for his immense contributions to ethics and political philosophy in his two major 
treatises: the Republic and the Laws, (as well as in other works namely Apology, 
Gorgias, Crito and Statesman), in which he addresses the question of how societies 
should be governed. In the Republic and the Laws (written in the form of dialogue), 
especially in the Laws, Plato (Beever, 2013: 37-39) blames the disasters that occurred 
in the Greek world South of Macedonia, including his city Athens, Sparta and their 
allies, on the cities’ inadequate political systems. In the Republic and the Laws, 
therefore, he searches for an ideal alternative system of politics, as well as how 
political office bearers in such systems ought to discharge their duties. This research 
observes that many of the factors that created upheavals many centuries ago in the 
Greek world and in other parts of the globe are still largely responsible for the socio-
political and economic confusion that seem to characterise the contemporary world, 
notably post-colonial African states. 
 
Allen (2010: 4) notes that although Plato was a political leader or politician as his 
writings show, he did not take an active part in the political affairs of his city. This 
research considers it wrong that Plato did not actively participate in the Affairs of his 
city-state, because it is not enough to propound ideas without taking an active part in 
their implementation. Those who conceive policy proposals are supposed to 
understand why they came up with the ideas in the first place. As a result they should 
be fully or partially involved in their development and implementation. If the originator 
of the ideas does not want to take active part in its their implementation, he should 
endeavour to play advisory and/or monitoring roles to ensure that the ideas come to 
purposeful fruition. This study notes that a number of the reasons for the failure of 
post-colonial African states can be attributed to the failures of intellectuals to be active 
participants in the running of the state as opposed to sitting in their ‘ivory towers’, 
making comments and analysis that may not be seriously considered. One wonders 
what is responsible for such reluctance on their part to actively engage in governance 
processes, because “post-independence leadership styles in Africa have hitherto 
remained…incompetent in both public and private organisations” (Kuada, 2010: 15).   
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3.3.1 Plato’s Ideal State 
In the Republic, Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 9) considers the Aristocratic state as the 
best, and as such, the most just type of government. He considers the other forms of 
government, such as oligarchy, democracy, timocracy and tyranny as a degeneration 
of aristocracy. He posits that rebellion is the only measure that could lead to the 
disintegration of a state, and therefore, could never be justified. The characteristics of 
these forms of government are described in the third chapter of the Republic, 
according to Lull and Mico (2011: 9): as 
 
Aristocracy is a state governed by the best. Timocracy is the government 
of the ambitious who believe themselves to be superior because they are 
good huntsmen, sportsmen, or soldiers and who are, in the end, men of 
action, who own properties and get rich in secret. Oligarchy represents the 
government of a small group of wealthy citizens who hold power. In 
democracy there are neither criteria, nor ideals of law and order, as truth 
itself is not believed in, only subjective personal appetites, depending on 
who governs the city. It is only the ideal form of government in appearance, 
where no one is in command, with no coercion, where equality is shared 
out equally. Tyranny is the degeneration of democracy and arises when 
freedom concludes in licentiousness and the people need a leader to settle 
internal conflicts produced by private desires and selfishness. 
 
Plato (Bruchmüuller, 2011: 44-46) asserts that in view of the decadent nature of the 
city states in his era, it was impossible to heal any state without a favourable destiny 
and a miraculous intervention of statesmen and philosophers in a collaborative effort. 
In other words, the process of implementing the best state for Plato hinges on human 
destiny, which depends on the providence of the gods, as well as on the efforts of 
human beings to establish the connection. The role or will of the gods in the realisation 
of the best state for Plato (Bruchmüuller, 2011: 46) lies in the influence they have on 
human actions and thoughts, on occurrences in the state, as well as on divine 
inspiration. He considers the realisation of the best state as depending on the 
possibility of finding powerful men who are able to acquire philosophic knowledge and 
ability, or who are prepared to be educated in true philosophy; and he stresses that 
the only means of attaining happiness on earth is by connecting with the realm of ideas 
with commitment. 
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3.3.2 Elements and Structure of Plato’s Ideal State 
According to Plato (Lull and & Mico, 2011: 8), his social order (Republic) is not founded 
on the principles of inheritance in which, for instance, certain positions are passed 
from father to son. Rather, he claims that it is structured around a meticulously planned 
division of labour, in which a person is given a social responsibility on the basis of his 
combined qualities of maturity and good education that links up with elements such as 
virtue and temperance.  
 
Plato (Lull and & Mico, 2011: 5) considers the objectives of the state to include being 
in control of power, attending to interior and exterior matters, including the economy, 
labour, material things and social order. In order to realise these objectives, he 
structures the population into three parts with clearly differentiated intellectual and 
social objectives, namely: the magistrates, rulers and philosophers; the guardians; and 
the workers. These structures, according to Plato (Wright, 2016: 11-12), correspond 
to the three parts of the soul. He posits that the philosophers should govern the city; 
the guardians will protect the city; and the producers, who are the lowest class, consist 
of farmers, artisans and general workers. 
 
Plato (Jonas, 2016: 205) notes that knowledge plays a fundamental role in the early 
stages of the moral growth of young adults. He posits that knowledge must be 
accompanied by a stringent process of habituation and imitation. He believes that one 
can only become virtuous by practising the virtues with the guidance of virtuous role 
models. Aristotle (Jonas, 2016: 205) agrees with this manner of acquiring virtues. He 
provides that a list of specific virtues should be given to students to practice in order 
for them to acquire good character, happiness, good reputation and wealth. He further 
posits that adults should also embody these virtues, and be made to practice them 
every day. Plato and Socrates (Jonas, 2016: 205) on the other hand, recommend only 
one virtue, namely justice as sufficient to enable human beings to be ethical, just and 
fulfilled. Furthermore, “the Platonic approach dispenses with the need to practice doing 
virtuous acts and instead focuses on helping students develop their knowledge of the 
good, which, when achieved, guarantees that they will choose the good.” (Jonas, 
2016: 205).  
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Jonas (2016: 206) criticises Plato’s treatise above, claiming that while Plato believes 
that one must have a clear understanding of virtues in order to be virtuous, he does 
not emphasise the importance of practical approaches to the development of character 
in the cultivation of virtues. Therefore, he concludes that this failure by Plato to 
emphasise the importance of affective and volitional aspects of moral development, 
while also failing to emphasise the relevance of educating people in the kinds of 
behaviour required to promote the affective and volitional, makes his theory  for 
educational theorists unattractive. 
 
This study finds it problematic that Plato overlooks the relevance of practical 
applications in guaranteeing effective absorption of virtues, because it is not enough 
to acquire knowledge without making any effort to put them into practice. This chapter 
notes that it is possible that Plato could have reasoned that having a clear 
understanding of issues or expectations would automatically translate to applying 
them in our daily lives. But history has shown that many people who are 
knowledgeable in various disciplines do not in many cases apply them. This matter 
will be considered further in chapter five, where the failure of postcolonial African 
states will be extensively linked to the inability of leaders and community members to 
be ethical and just in their conducts and approach to governance processes, even 
when they understand their duties and obligations. 
 
3.3.2.1 The Magistrates, Rulers and Philosopher Kings 
The first layer, from which the leaders of a state will be chosen, according to Plato (Lull 
and & Mico, 2011: 5), consists of magistrates, who are both rulers and philosopher 
kings. He posits that the only solution to the problems of any state and the human race 
is that its rulers must be the best. In other words, they should be philosophers devoted 
to the contemplation of knowledge and the search for goodness. He believes that the 
idea of the Good is something that only philosophers are familiar with. 
 
In his political theory, Plato (Beever, 2013: 41) recommends that the ruling class 
receive the kind of education that enables them to govern impartially and with 
disinterest. While he concedes that education alone may not be a sufficient means of 
producing the required kind of rulers, he adds that rulers must pursue the kind of 
lifestyle that enables them to always consider the interests of their citizens. He made 
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this provision as a result of what obtained in his era, where the oligarchs disbursed 
favours and political powers on wealthy individuals.  
 
This study notes that the manner in which political offices and privileges were 
disbursed in Plato’s era is similar to with what obtains currently in many parts of the 
world, including Africa as will be shown in chapter five, where powers and favours are 
distributed impartially, through favouritism and nepotism. The solution that Plato 
advances in this regard is to, according to Beever (2013: 41-42)  
 
regulate the lifestyle of the rulers so that such conflicts of interest cannot 
arise. It is as radical as we might now expect. He stipulates that the 
guardians are to hold no private property and are to have no families…the 
rule is not that guardians are prohibited from procreating. It is that they are 
not entitled to have spouses or to act as parents. Instead, they are to 
copulate during state-run mating festivals and their children are to be raised 
by a state-run organisation in ignorance of their biological parents. 
Moreover, as Plato holds that physical and moral traits are hereditary, he 
maintains that the state must adopt a programme of eugenics. 
 
This study contends that Plato must have thought that eugenics would enable society 
to produced well-ordered human beings by ensuring that people with undesirable traits 
are not allowed to have children since they might produce like-minded children who 
would constitute hindrances to the process of realising a well ordered and ethical 
society. It is possible that Eeugenics might be a good way of improving society. 
However, this study argues that it could also become a means of brainwashing people 
from childhood to act and behave in a certain manner. It is noted here that a society 
that sincerely aims at becoming ethical and just may use such a process to its 
advantage, by teaching and directing people from infancy to knowledge of the good 
life, to how to live a life that secures happiness, love, respect, peace and tolerance for 
everyone. A society, on the other hand, whose main objective is to cause chaos and 
illegalities can use such a  programme to create a more unstable world.  
 
For Plato (Beever, 2013: 41), leaders must possess the character of Philosopher 
Kings. He does not mean that philosophers must be given political power. Neither does 
he mean that political power should be given to a select group of people such as the 
Aristocracy, nor that power should be given to selfish people whose main goal is the 
acquisition of pleasure and wealth. Rather, he means that political power should be 
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given to those whose main focus in life is the discovery of truth because disinterested 
rulers are more likely to be incorruptible. Plato (Beever, 2013: 41-43) believes that 
philosophers who are more concerned with contemplating the world, who do not really 
seek political power, but who are prepared to actively participate in political affairs and 
governance out of a sense of duty, are more likely to rule disinterestedly. While he 
posits that the state must be governed on the basis of justice, he considers 
philosophers as the only people who are in the position of discovering what justice 
entails as their focus lies ion the form of the good. The potential to realise the ideal 
state for Plato and Socrates (Bruchmüuller, 2011: 54), depends on the ability of 
philosophers to rule the state. In this regard, they outline the characteristics of the true 
philosopher as one who ought to love all wisdom, who loves to learn and pursue all 
parts of knowledge whole heartedly. The realm of truth or wisdom, according to Plato 
and Socrates (Bruchmüuller, 2011: 54) 
 
is a structured whole with a considerable number of different parts, each of 
which the lover of wisdom has to investigate. Therefore, he needs 
intellectual capacity…which is indispensable for philosophy must be 
directed  toward the right things within the ontological structured whole…it 
is pointless to know everything if one is  unable to perceive how everything 
hangs together and incapable  of organising the manifold objects of 
knowledge  on a higher ontological order. 
 
The contemplative ideal for Plato (McCKeen, 2010: 198[MK16]) is the kind of life that is 
mostly associated with the natural character of the philosopher; this is the kind of life 
that brings the greatest happiness to the philosopher. He considers the happiness or 
the dominant factor in the happiness of the philosopher ais philosophical 
contemplation. His contemplative ideal relates to those who possess philosophical 
character, who possess good memories, who are critical thinkers, broadminded, 
naturally curious, persistent, and tend to engage in abstract thinking. Accordingly, he 
expects the philosopher to organise his life in a manner that prioritises philosophical 
contemplation. In order to attain such a philosophical ideal, he expects the philosopher 
to devote marginal time to non-intellectual and bodily matters.  
 
Socrates in (MCKeenMcKeen, 2010: 198), agrees with Plato’s characterisation of the 
philosopher as he posits in the Phaedo, that philosophers must seek wisdom above 
other things; and wisdom will be derived from philosophical contemplation. The 
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philosopher who seeks the contemplative ideal, according to Plato (McCKeen, 2010: 
198) ,should only engage in partial community and political activities especially in 
communities that he is very familiar with; rather, he should prefer a state (Polis) or 
community in which he can have  unlimited space to  engage in philosophical 
contemplation to the highest level permissible by nature. The individuals who possess 
natural philosophic characteristics in the ideal state, according to Plato (McCKeen, 
2010: 198) “will be identified, nurtured, and groomed through a long programme of 
education and training. At the end of this long road, these developed philosophers will 
serve in key roles governing the state”. 
 
This study finds it questionable that Plato expects natural philosophers to abstain from 
political activities, while he expects those in the city who have inherent philosophical 
potentials to participate in state affairs once they have been sufficiently trained. One 
wonders what use it would be for the natural philosophers to only engage in 
philosophical contemplation when they couldan use their good knowledge to improve 
the conditions in their countries. This study recommends that the natural philosophers 
be actively engaged in the administration of the state, so that their knowledge can be 
fully utilised for the development of their society. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Guardians and Warriors 
The second layer of citizens in the ideal state, according to Plato (Lull and & Mico, 
20116[MK17]), consists of the guardians whose role is mainly to protect the state from 
lawlessness, internal and external threat. He recommends that they receive the kinds 
of education that will ensure that they do not become tyrants or protectors of unjust 
individuals and rulers; but that will prepare them for possible assumption of leadership 
roles, and enable them to comprehend the ideas of Truth and the Good. Such 
education must include, according to Plato (Lull and & Mico, 2011: 6-7): 
 
fables and stories showing the gods as beings who only perform good, fair, 
and true deeds. Their instruction must avoid sentimental and emotional 
literature, and should include a certain type of gymnastics and music. The 
demand that the same tasks and training be applied to both women and 
men is again a revolutionary proposition for his time. 
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Although Plato (Beever, 2013: 39) recognises the importance of the role of the 
guardians, he also realises that since power corrupts, they could constitute a danger 
to members of society as a result of their physical dominance which could make them 
naturally aggressive towards the citizens. In modern democracies, according to 
Beever (2013: 39) this kind of threat is contained by ensuring that guardians are under 
the control of a civilian authority who controls the armed forces, who is are elected by 
the citizens and accountable to them. However, Plato (Beever, 2013: 39-41) responds 
differently, claiming that the way to eliminate the aggression of guardians is through 
adequate education that ensures that their minds do not tend towards aggressive 
behaviour. He considers the development of virtuous citizens as the main objective of 
education because it is the only means of ensuring the realisation of a just society. 
While he supports the admission of women into the group of guardians, he posits that 
the men and women must receive the same education, and be chosen solely on merit. 
 
3.3.2.3 The Workers and Peasants 
Plato (Lull and & Mico, 2011:6) conceives the workers, labourers, craftsmen and 
peasants as the third and final layer of citizens in his ideal state, with the role of 
providing society’s basic needs and services. In line with his plan, members in this 
group are not qualified to rule the state. Rather, he assigns this function solely to 
philosophers who are sufficiently equipped with the rational knowledge of the Good, 
and therefore, can fulfil the mandate of ensuring a just society. The other members of 
the state are required to acquire the virtue of temperance as this will enable them to 
accept their societal roles and recognise the rulers’ authority, not out of fear, but from 
the belief that, according to Plato (Lull and & Mico, 2011: 6-7) “the rulers are the most 
capable of the task intellectually and that their decisions will always be guided by the 
pursuit of the common good and never for private profit. [MK18]Only the ignorant would 
act against order, justice, and good”. 
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3.3.3 Plato’s Idea of Justice 
Justice, for Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) relates to fulfilling one’s duties and achieving one’s 
potentials without infringing on other people’s rights or doing something that is contrary 
to one’s nature. He assigns this position to both the just person and the just state. In 
the just state, he posits that everyone and each class is accorded specific roles and 
obligations which when fulfilled would create a harmonious whole; each person is 
rewarded for fulfilling assigned duties; and each person would be punished for failing 
to fulfil assigned functions. He considers deficiencies and excesses as unjust. For 
instance, a doctor who deliberately refuses to cure his patient is unjust, a thief is unjust 
for taking what belongs to anothers, a murderer is unjust for taking other person’s life, 
while a state is unjust when it fails to successfully implement its functions such as 
enabling the citizens access to shelter, food, clothing, and to seek the Good.  
 
In his treatise on the state, Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) believes that all aspects of nature 
are hierarchical, including the just state. He considers all aspects of nature to be 
harmonious, while all organisms perform specific roles. Furthermore, he claims that 
“anarchy is a supreme vice, the most unnatural and unjust state of affairs…individuals 
are ranked according to their aptitudes, and definitively placed in the social hierarchy” 
(Wright, 2016: 10). 
 
In his discussion on the just state, Plato (Wright, 2016: 11) clarifies the nature of the 
just soul because he considers both of them to be analogous, claiming that the 
divisions of both the state and the soul correspond to each other. The individual soul, 
according to Plato (Bruchmüuller, 2011: 46) is hierarchical in the sense that the 
rational part is superior to both the appetitive and the spirited parts, while the appetitive 
part of the soul is inferior to the spirited part; despite this, each part of the soul performs 
a crucial role. He asserts that while a person should be governed by reason, the 
appetites must also be considered so as to maintain a harmonious soul that is not in 
conflict with itself. He further posits that a moderate and ordered state of affairs will be 
maintained when every part of the soul fulfils its functions.  
 
Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) considers the soul of the virtuous person to be well ordered 
because he knows what justice entails and behaves in accordance with the knowledge 
that he has. The virtuous individual, according to Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) “knows his 
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place in the state; he knows what his aptitudes are; and he puts them into practice. He 
also adheres to the dictates of reason, doing everything in moderation”. In his treatise 
on the best state, Plato (Bruchmüuller, 2011: 46) assigns the soul a crucial role. He 
connects the soul to the concept of justice, claiming that justice relates to the order in 
human soul, and not necessarily with human possessions and actions. He believes 
that every part shall get what is due to it and that no one part of the soul may interfere 
in the affairs of another part. He concludes that when this rule is maintained, each 
person rules himself, orders his life, lives in harmony with others and with each part of 
the soul (Bruchmüuller, 2011: 46). 
 
Plato (Beever, 2013: 46) argues in the Republic that justice requires the establishment 
of a specific type of system of politics, which has to have the ability for adequate 
governance. He does not, however, give in-depth exposition of the kinds of policies 
that will enable the rulers to govern effectively, other than his treatise on the lifestyle 
and education of philosopher kings and his conviction that such a level of lifestyle and 
education wouldill ensure that the rulers govern in a just manner and implement just 
laws. 
 
Wright (2016: 11) notes that although there are similarities between Plato’s and the 
contemporary era’s conceptions of justice, fundamental differences exist. He observes 
that in the contemporary era, justice relates to individual freedom and the priority that 
a person enjoys over the community; non adherence to the laws are sometimes 
condoned in cases where they violate an intuition of individual rights. On the other 
hand, Plato (Wright, 2016: 11), posits that justice proceeds from his belief that the 
community as a whole takes precedence over an individual; human beings are 
expected to fit into a cosmic order; while duty to an extent, and virtue take precedence 
over rights. This study notes the similarities between Plato’s thoughts on the central 
role of the community and the traditional African concept of ethics and morality in which 
“community of life or communitarianism ranked over and above individualism” 
(Udokang, 2014: 268). This humanised African ethics will be considered further in 
chapter four. 
 
The just or ideal individual, for Plato (Wright, 2016: 11), is a philosopher whose 
appetites and passions are governed by his rational faculty, thereby ensuring that  they 
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are moderate in all their actions and words; and his wisdom results in  total harmony 
of the soul with itself. The just person understands his society and himself; he is always 
in control of himself; he knows what it means to be virtuous; and possesses 
considerable level of equanimity. On the other hand, the unjust person for Plato 
(Wright, 2016: 11), is in conflict with himself; struggles between his appetites and 
passions; and lacks regard for reason which is capable of unifying his soul.  
 
Wright (2016: 11) posits that the current liberal democratic society’s idea of the ideal 
person bears similarities with Plato’s idea of virtue. However, he contends that the 
modern world conceives virtue as more of treating others well and less of having a 
healthy relationship in the community. In other words, the modern conception of the 
ideal person dwells on being respectful and civil to each other, and not so much on 
promoting the cultivation of good character. This study observes that these claims 
regarding the insincerity with which many people relate to each other currently contain 
elements of validity. It is noted that many people pretend to care about others when in 
reality they do not mean it. Some people treat others well out of a sense of societal 
obligation, and not because they truly believe in being good to others. This manner of 
pretention has enormous negative consequences that could lead to violence and 
intimidation when the real intention in people’s’ minds takes over their pretentious 
façade.  
 
3.3.4 Critique of Plato’s Ideal State 
Popper (Wright, 2016: 10) condemns Plato’s ideal state as extreme, petty, immoral, 
the kind of life that obtains in a totalitarian regime, and crass promotion of a Spartan-
like regimentation of social life. He opposes Plato’s ideal state for lacking diversity; for 
limiting freedom of expression; for encouraging repression; for proposing that 
members of the state should only engage in the occupation for which they are best 
suited; for making no distinction between what is public and private; and for permitting 
neither poverty nor wealth because he considers both as leading to vice. His views on 
women and children are considered by the average liberal as alarming, for arguing 
through Socrates (Wright, 2016: 12) that: 
 
the traditional form of the family should be done away with. Men should 
have women and children in common, such that no man knows who his 
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children are or has excessive love for one woman in particular. Even 
mothers are not allowed to know who their children are. Their children are 
taken from them at birth, and they are given other children to suckle as long 
as they have milk. Plato’s breeding principles sound ominously like the Nazi 
idea, and Spartan practice, of killing weak and deformed infants. 
 
Popper (Beever, 2013: 39) criticises Plato’s Republic as responsible for many of the 
totalitarian movements that caused upheavals in the world in Popper’s time. He termed 
the Republic disastrous, claiming that its main failure is that as a result of its power of 
vision and persuasiveness, it projects the idea that a political society whose justice  
hinges on the  virtue of its leaders can be developed, while the only means of realising 
such justice is by relying on the rulers’ virtues. Popper (Beever, 2013: 39) insists that 
such claim fails to recognise what is obvious to contemporary humans that power 
corrupts. Therefore, he concludes that it is not possible for human beings to have 
excessive faith that powerful individuals will be virtuous. 
 
There are other theorists however, according to Wright (2016: 10), who note elements 
of democracy in Plato’s proposals such as in the egalitarianism that surrounds some 
elements of his programme of education. Although Beever (2013: 43) admits that Plato 
was wrong about many claims, he considers him neither wrong nor naïve about the 
corruptive nature of power, because this recognition of the corruptive nature of power 
motivated his contributions to his system of politics. While Beever (2013: 43) concedes 
from the foregoing that Popper’s criticism of the Republic is questionable since Plato 
was aware that power corrupts (as already noted), he contends that Plato’s responses 
to many issues are difficult to accept and unacceptably authoritarian in contemporary 
terms. Beever (2013: 43) criticises Plato, claiming that his ideas on:  
 
Censorship, the abolition (for the guardians) of private property, of the 
family, eugenics, and the (admittedly purportedly meritocratic) authoritarian 
rule of the Philosopher Kings is too much for even the most utopian modern 
thinker to stomach…In fact, not only is Plato’s position authoritarian, it is 
recognisably totalitarian, as pPopper sensed (though not for his reasons). 
This is because running through the whole of the Republic is the idea that 
the individual is merely a means to the community’s ends (Beever, 2013: 
43). 
 
Many scholars, according to Caccia (2012: 19) assume different positions on Plato’s 
comments on gender equality. For instance, while Rickman (Caccia, 2012: 19) refers 
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to Plato’s proposals for equal opportunities and education as emancipation, Annas 
(Caccia, 2012: 19) does not consider Plato as the first feminist. Rather, he finds his 
arguments unacceptable to a feminist and his proposals on gender and communal 
ownership irrelevant to contemporary debate. For Caccia (2012: 19-20), Plato’s 
proposals appear dogmatic, while he fails to explicate the potential implications of his 
communal proposals. However, he notes that it was Plato’s realisation that he was not 
able to clarify the consequences of communal ownership that led him to conclude that 
his rule was sufficient rather than great. 
 
Lull and Mico (2011: 8-10) consider the manner in which Plato allocates duties and 
responsibilities in his Republic to be most appropriate and fairest since everyone 
assumes his place in society based on the provisions of the best leaders 
(philosophers) who take into cognisance the abilities, strengths and weaknesses of 
each person and supports them with the appropriate form of education. However, they 
note a contradiction between Plato’s respect for ideas that are pronounced in a caste 
system that all children should acquire knowledge from the earliest possible age, and 
his idea of justice that partly implies that everyone should do what their nature allows 
them to do best. This implies the potential in everyone to seek any position in the 
community. However, Plato (Lull and & Mico, 2011: 10) clarifies his position by 
claiming that indeed everyone is free to seek any position, not on the basis of caste 
endogamy or hereditary wealth, but on the basis of their skills, innate aptitudes and 
good qualities. 
 
Wright (2016: 10) considers Plato’s worldviews as irreconcilable with what obtains in 
contemporary liberal democratic societies where human beings are not ranked on the 
basis of their value to society or their intrinsic value; where rigid hierarchical structures 
or ideas that promote a caste system are deemphasised, while instead dynamism, 
freedom and chaos are often the case. According to Wright (2016: 10-11) modern 
society neither considers the world a harmony nor really cares about analogies 
between society and nature. He claims that although order is preferred, it is not seen 
as a core value; driven and ambitious people are admired much more than those who 
do things in moderation or who seek internal peace. Moreover, contemporary cultures 
in general appear to censure the kinds of behaviours that impede the pursuit of 
happiness by others, instead of widely promoting good values. Plato, according to 
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Wright (2016: 11) would have considered such contemporary systems anarchical, 
decadent and unjust. 
 
Beever (2013: 45) posits that while Plato’s treatise in the Republic is largely rejected 
by modern political philosophers for its regulatory structure of individuals in the state, 
it is on the other hand, the basis of modern political philosophy, especially as a result 
of the consensus between Plato and modern political philosophers that the concern of 
justice relates to the relationship between all members of a community, and probably 
including external stakeholders. This reflects in Plato’s claim that each person counts 
equally, that justice has to do with taking the interests of all citizens into account. 
Beever (2013: 45) considers this contradictory to Plato’s acceptance of slavery on the 
one hand, and his rejection of slaves as citizens of a city state. The implication here 
for Beever (2013: 45) is that this equality does not apply to slaves; Plato does not 
consider all humans as equals in the modern sense going by his consideration of 
Philosopher Kings as better suited to rule. Nonetheless justice for Plato (Beever, 2013: 
45) is distributive because it takes into account the interests of the entire community 
and by extension of those he considers as persons. 
 
3.3.5 Evaluation of Plato’s Political Society 
It has been noted in this chapter that various philosophers, such as Popper and Wright 
(Wright, 2016: 10-12), find Plato’s ideal state unrealistic; though there are those 
theorists, such as Lull and Mico (2011: 8-10) who find elements of good democratic 
practice in Plato’s treatise. While it is recognised that most of these proposals are 
difficult to attain, this study concedes that the contemporary era needs such a radical 
reform process if it is serious about curtailing the excessive unethical conduct and bad 
governance that pervades African societies in particular, and the world at large. These 
include, erosion of values, cultures and traditions (The Saylor Foundation, 2012: 1); 
ineffective and unethical leadership (Ogbogbo, 2011: 1); and poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment and drug abuse (The Saylor Foundation, 2012: 2). These challenges 
will be exposed in detail in chapter five. 
 
Plato (Wright, 2016: 10-12) makes the far-reaching proposal that children be 
disengaged from their parents and brought up by philosopher kings. This study 
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believes that this would be a good way of indoctrinating children in the right way if it 
were feasible; if they are inculcated with strong moral foundations at a young age, the 
tendency is for them to grow up knowing what is right and what is wrong, and doing 
the right thing most of the time, if not always. It is argued here that it will be easier to 
realise the ideal state if contemporary societies can be restructured into small 
manageable societies, because it will make it easier for politicians and bureaucrats to 
pay detailed attention to their subjects and make more progress. 
 
Plato (Wright, 2016: 11-12) realised that some of his more radical proposals may not 
be favourably considered. However, he would have appreciated their 
institutionalisation in order to curtail the decadent conditions prevalent in many 
societies. Given this realisation, the question that this research poses is how can 
Plato’s ideal state become functional in the current world order? This study submits 
that the best the philosopher king can do in the contemporary era is to choose 
workable aspects of Plato’s theory; ensure that the right candidates in terms of 
education, experience and moral disposition are appointed to positions; and values 
must be institutionalised in all structures of society.  
 
3.4 CONCEPT OF JUSTICE IN THE ARISTOTELIAN IDEAL STATE 
The issues of justice and fairness, according to Velasquez et al., (2014: 1) have long 
been linked to ethics and morality in Western civilisation to such an extent length that 
all treatises on ethics have conceived justice as a fundamental aspect of morality. For 
Aristotle (Wielsch, 2013: 191), justice is the most perfect virtue since it is displayed 
towards other people. It is considered other-regarding or beneficial to others because, 
according to Bloomfield (2011: 46), “it is only the character trait of being a just person 
which reliably keeps us from taking advantage of others when we can get away with 
it”.  
 
According to Swanson (2011: 1377), Aristotle recognises various forms of justice, 
including distributive, economic, punitive and reciprocal justice. He considers 
distributive justice as relating not only to the distribution of money, but also to the 
dispensing of honour and offices; to decisions on how to distribute political authority; 
and on who should be given the right to govern. Punitive, criminal or corrective justice 
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for Aristotle (Swanson, 2011: 1377) performs a rectifying role in human affairs and 
interrelationships.  
 
A number of philosophers and immoralists such as Nietzsche, Machiavelli and 
Thrasymachus, according to Bloomfield (2011: 47), disagree with the Aristotelian idea 
of justice. They posit that human beings cannot be fair to everyone; that everyone 
does not deserve equal consideration; and that the stronger are more entitled to 
justice. This research notes that negative as these theorists may sound, the reality 
that confronts the world today is that everyone does not receive equal consideration 
in the dispensation of benefits and burdens; and this is one of the reasons for so much 
unrest in various countries. In reaction to the claims of the immoralists, Bloomfield 
(2011: 47) asserts that although it is widely recognised that justice entails being fair to 
other people, there is no generally accepted view of what it entails to be fair to 
ourselves and the implications thereof. However, irrespective of what justice entails, 
he contends that  
 
it cannot be the case that it is fully present in cases where people fail, with 
more or less regularity, to be fair to themselves, because of self-
aggrandising arrogance or self-abnegating servility. Being fair to oneself 
requires that one be fair to others: one cannot know what is fair for oneself 
without basing this in part on knowledge of what is fair for others. I can only 
know what is fair for me by seeing myself for who I am, through making fair 
self-assessments, just as I must make fair assessments of others in order 
to know how to treat them fairly (Bloomfield, 2011:47-48).  
 
The self unregarding point in this case, according to Bloemfield (2011: 48) is that the 
inability or failure of individuals to indulge in fair self-assessment negatively impacts 
on their self-respect. Justice in this case, for Brickhouse (2014: 204) would require the 
just person to perform just acts; but when people fail to perform just acts, there are 
consequences for such indiscretions. He asserts that this is where corrective justice 
comes into focus.  Aristotle (Brickhouse (2014: 204) assigns corrective justice a 
prominent role in his theory of justice when he posits that the objective of corrective 
justice is to rectify injustices or to equalise inequalities that proceed from interactions 
among people.  
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While Brickhouse (2014: 204) agrees that the objective of corrective justice is to bring 
about equality or to correct injustices, he also believes that corrective justice also 
produces occasions of proportional reciprocity, namely the desire to accept goods for 
provided goods and the desire to repay evil for evil. These are considered necessary 
for the realisation of a stable political society. He notes that in non-ideal societies that 
frequently witness occasions of injustice,  
 
if there is to be proportional reciprocity and the stability that comes with it, 
the community must be prepared to rectify through the courts. If this is right 
way to understand the relationship between corrective justice and 
proportional reciprocity, while it is proportional reciprocity, and the 
satisfaction of basic desires regarding communal life, it brings, that actually 
holds the city together, in all but ideal communities the adhesive power of 
proportional reciprocity is only as strong as the community’s commitment 
to corrective justice (Brickhouse, 2014: 204).  
 
In other words, Brickhouse (2014: 201-204) is claiming that if community members are 
not committed to corrective justice, then it would be impossible to achieve it. 
Furthermore, he contends that a community that does not recognise the vitality of 
corrective justice and the proportional reciprocity that accompanies it will eventually 
be confronted by either loss of support or open conflict or revolt by members of the 
community, including those who were denied restitution after suffering injustice, as 
well as other individuals who may see this as a sign that they might also not receive 
restitution if and when they become victims of injustice.[MK19] 
 
Reciprocal justice, for Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) shows that justice does not 
relate to comparing what each person owns because a society consists of 
incomparable persons. For instance, Gallagher (2012: 698) contends that it is unlikely 
that a professional in one field would succeed in every other endeavour that he decides 
to choose; a medical doctor may not succeed as an engineer; and a rich man who has 
no expertise in shoemaking or designing may not succeed in these endeavours, even 
if he tried. What Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) does here by basing his idea of 
reciprocal justice on an incomparability and incommensurability of sharers is to apply 
unconditional worth to every person and to show that justice cannot be quantified. 
Gallagher (2012: 698) believes that in reality, incommensurables cannot be quantified 
in terms of each other. However, he claims that a person can subscribe to the principle 
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of need in order to reverse conventional quantitative measures in the process of 
preserving a community; and Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) attempted to do exactly 
that with his diagonal pairing. 
 
In his treatise on reciprocal justice, Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) proceeds from the 
view that human beings exist in two complimentary realities in the sense that while 
human beings are unequal and different, they are on the basis of their differences able 
to contribute things to others which other people actually need. Moreover, he 
considers the differences in human beings to mean that no one is self-sufficient and 
as a result, human beings need to associate with others in order to meet their individual 
needs. This, for him, makes human beings civilised; and he suggests in his theory of 
reciprocal justice that civilisation proceeds from the perennial interrelationship among 
unequal and different people.  
 
Gallagher (2012: 698) finds this position contrary to the contemporary conception of 
right and justice, whereby human beings seek protection for members of the 
community on the basis of the principle of equality for every person, which they see 
as resulting from the same nature that human beings possess. However, for Aristotle 
(Gallagher, 2012: 698:-699)  
 
it is not an equality derived from an assumed sameness that protects the 
weak, but the recognition of one’s difference that protects the individual 
from marginalisation, or elimination, and grants one rights within the 
community. For the community needs each incommensurable other in 
order to function and survive. Therefore, the community acts collectively to 
satisfy the needs of each sharer, whatever one’s condition may be…Thus, 
surprisingly, it is through inequality that the rights of the individual are 
protected. So, justice for the individual lies not in equality, but in difference, 
in, as it were, inequality. 
 
Each person, according to Aristotle (Gordley, 2015: 201), should be rewarded or 
should ideally receive a share of goods and services based on merit or on 
contributions; while equal shares should be given to equals. The assertion that equals 
should be treated equally while unequals should receive unequal treatment, according 
to Velasquez et al., (2014: 2) is the most fundamental principle of justice that has 
received global recognition since its first postulation by Aristotle. In the current era, 
however, this principle is expressed: as: “Individuals should be treated the same, 
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unless they differ in ways that are relevant to the situation in which they are involved” 
(Velasquez et al., 2014: 2).  
 
Gordley (2015: 201) argues against the Aristotelian idea of rewarding individuals on 
the basis of merit, claiming that there is no single criterion for measuring merit. Rather, 
he contends that Aristotle and Aquinas (Gordley, 2015: 201) refer to two different and 
conflicting principles for appraising merit, both of which have some values. One of the 
principles provides that everyone should receive equal share. The principle of 
distributive justice provides that a larger share of societal resources should be given 
to those with superior virtue. Writers in the Aristotelian tradition, according to Gordley 
(2015: 201-202) consider such principles as ideals, claiming that the wealth of 
individuals should not be confiscated in a democracy and redistributed among others 
because doing so would lead to protracted disagreements and loss of incentive by 
individuals to work or to protect public property.  
 
Private property, according to Aristotle (Aloyo, 2008: 4-5) “is better than public 
ownership of all goods, but…some private property should be used in common to 
varying degrees”. Aristotle (Gordley, 2015: 201) criticises Plato’s communal ownership 
of property from which individuals can take what they need, claiming that communal 
ownership of property would lead to quarrels among people over the quantity that each 
person should receive. He also contends that this might lead to laziness among those 
who do not want to work hard, while benefiting them at the expense of the hard 
workers. Aristotelian scholars, according to Gordley (2015: 201) appear to agree that 
the objective of institutionalising private rights to property was to eliminate 
disagreements and to afford individuals the opportunity to work and to take good care 
of resources.  
 
This study notes that Aristotle’s position on the ownership of property and wealth is 
very relevant to the social and economic challenges that confront post-colonial African 
states in particular, and the world in general. In Nigeria and South Africa, for instance, 
as will be considered in chapter five, there are perpetual agitations and unrest, 
especially among the youth and the unemployed as a result of their disillusionment 
with the level of poverty and inequality in the country; the inability of their governments 
to provide them with sustainable means of livelihood and better living conditions 
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(Danjibo, (2011: 127-128); Cilliers and & Aucoin, 2016: 5); and their agitation for the 
expropriation of land without compensation (Mfaise, 2018: 1).  
 
It is noted in this study that any effort to apply the Aristotelian concept of property 
ownership in these countries and in Africa at large will require that the rich are allowed 
to keep substantial portions of their properties, while some of their wealth will have to 
be shared among the less privileged. It is suggested that African states in particular 
and the world in general should embrace a combination of private and communal 
ownership of property because it will produce the kind of outcomes that protect the 
interests of most, if not all their citizens. It is recommended that the state should make 
communal provisions for the less privileged so that even if they fail to harness the 
opportunities given to them by the state, they will continue to have access to basic 
services and amenities throughput the course of their lives. 
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter set out to examine elements of the philosophic ideal state from the 
perspectives of Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes. They all believe in the central role that the 
state plays or should play in bringing about stability, peace and development, although 
they do not seem to agree on a common means of realising that. A foundational 
imperative among these philosophers is the centrality of justice in the realisation of a 
good political society.  
 
Hobbes considers human nature as innately aggressive, chaotic, troublesome, violent 
and filled with fear. He contends that the troublesome pattern of human existence 
makes it impossible for people to live together in harmony. He therefore, concludes 
that if human beings do not refrain from living in this state of nature, then all lives would 
be nasty, brutish and short. Based on the troublesome pattern of human existence, on 
the conflicting nature of human beings to seek interdependence on the one hand, and 
to seek self-preservation, happiness and felicity on the other, Hobbes posits that the 
rational choice is for human beings to seek cooperation with each other by entering 
into a social contract under the authority of a sovereign head.  
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The best system of governance for Hobbes resides with the absolute monarch who is 
the most powerful government, and should administer the commonwealth indefinitely 
with unrestricted powers in order to prevent lawlessness, chaos and anarchy. When 
Hobbes is confronted with the fact that members of the state are not mostly happy with 
the rules of a sovereign, he counters their argument, claiming that it is not possible in 
any case for everyone to be completely happy; and since unhappiness could lead to 
conflicts and chaos, this would bring more suffering to the people. He claims that 
becoming part of the commonwealth in a social contract would ensure that people live 
in harmony with each other.  
 
Hobbes is criticised for placing unlimited powers in one ruler. The excessive level of 
faith and trust that he places in the sovereign head has the potential to create 
discontent and chaos in the state. This research notes that it is risky to confer so much 
power on one individual without the control of oversight bodies in case the leader 
becomes unethical or despotic. In contrast to Hobbes, Aristotle considers a mixed 
regime as the best form of government for being more stable, unlike unmixed regimes 
where factionalism, conflicts and revolution are witnessed as a result of claims of 
injustice. He sees his polity as representing an institutionally mixed regime, in which 
the various laws that oligarchies and democracies typically practice are combined.  
 
Plato and Aristotle agree on the need for an ideal state. They both hold that the goal 
of the ideal state is to promote justice. However, they do not agree on some of the 
elements of such a state. While Aristotle provides a list of virtues that human beings 
need to live by in order to be virtuous, Plato submits that only the virtue of justice is 
required for human beings to be virtuous. For Aristotle, students will need to 
continuously practice these virtues in order to develop good character. Plato on the 
other hand believes that it is not necessary to practice doing virtuous acts; rather, 
students should be trained to develop their knowledge of the good, which once 
achieved would ensure that they choose the good. 
 
Plato believes that the best state is one, which is governed by wise leaders. He 
subscribes to a radical reform by philosophers of everything that goes wrong in the 
state, including the people and their characters in order to create a constitutional and 
ethical state. A number of modern theorists such as Popper criticise Plato’s conception 
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of the just state as petty, immoral and totalitarian for encouraging repression and 
suppressing freedom of expression; for not promoting diversity; for not making a 
distinction between public and private property; and for not promoting either wealth or 
poverty since he considered both of them as resulting in vice. Plato’s ideal state is 
further criticised as unrealistic as his reform process consists of complicated 
programmes that are not achievable. Plato is also aware of the challenges inherent in 
his proposals and therefore submits that the ideal state he envisions may also not be 
realistic, though he would have wished for them to be implemented.  
 
This study submits that although Plato’s proposals may be complicated and almost 
unrealistic, a radical overhaul of the system of governance in the world in general, and 
in post-colonial Africa in particular, is imperative. For instance, the magnitude of 
immorality in the world is overwhelming. This projects a bleak future and requires the 
intervention of renewed ethical consciousness in order to avert future negative 
complications. 
 
Aristotle promotes ownership of property and the use of some private property in 
common. This is in opposition to Plato’s preference for total communal ownership of 
property, which Aristotle considers unjust, impractical and causing dissatisfaction and 
division among people and for its potential to result in civil unrest when people are not 
rewarded in line with their contributions. His supporters accept that private ownership 
of property will promote harmony and commitment to hard work. This research 
subscribes partially to this position, because private ownership of large resources will 
promote inequality, poverty and discrimination. On the other hand, ownership of 
private property is given some measure of consideration on condition that no one is 
allowed to own excessive wealth while the majority of the citizens are wallowing in 
poverty 
 
Some of the issues emerging from this chapter, which hold far-reaching implications 
for the realisation of the ideal state concerns the communism of property that Aristotle 
rejects. The question that needs to be examined is which system of governance is 
most feasible since this research notes that there is no political and economic system 
that appears capable of satisfactorily resolving the concerns of society members. 
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Plato believes in the rule of law and in societal stability. While he considers individuals 
with the qualities of philosopher kings as the right people to rule the state, this study 
notes that in the contemporary era, those appointed to most top positions either as 
politicians or bureaucrats are not qualified or competent enough to successfully 
execute their mandates. The impact of these challenges can be felt in the myriad of 
ethical, social, economic and religious challenges that the contemporary world faces. 
It is imperative that a satisfactory system is galvanised for the betterment of countries 
and their people. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4 ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN CONTEXT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine ethics, morality and the system of politics and governance 
in traditional African societies; and their roles in promoting a moral, just and fair 
traditional African society. Though the concepts of ethics and morality are not exactly 
the same, they nevertheless will be used interchangeably in this research and will 
approximately be taken to refer to the same thing. The chapter will begin with an 
exposition of the Western prejudice towards African traditional ethics, and then 
proceed with an exposition of African ethics and morality, as well as its understanding 
in the precolonial African context. In doing so, the question of identity, individual and 
communal responsibility and their impact on the wellbeing of all the community 
members will be examined as a further extension of African traditional moral practice. 
Put differently, the chapter will further consider the humanistic nature of traditional 
African ethics, with particular reference to the moral theory of Ubuntu as the foundation 
for the traditional democratic practices in Africa. 
 
Regardless of whether scholars generally agree that the indigenous African societies 
are considered radically opposed to western styled ethics and politics or not, the fact 
remains that African societies are generally ethically conscious and inherently 
democratic, and therefore different. There are many scholarly testimonies to this fact 
(Udokang, 2014: 267-268; Bates, 2010: 1134). This is reflected in their various 
(African) practices which promote human relations, such as the humanity with which 
they relate with to each other and a sense of duty (not necessarily in Kantian sense) 
channelled towards communal responsibility.  
 
One of the unending debates regarding the intellectual viability of African thought is in 
connection with the status of the individual amidst the alleged overarching community. 
Although Aristotle had earlier argued that a man is a man only within the context of 
society, many Western-style scholars argue that the individual should be completely 
free because, in their opinion, any freedom hindered is a freedom denied. In addition, 
democracy is nothing but the ability to achieve social cooperation in spite of 
individuality. Therefore, an ideally practical democratic society is one in which 
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individuality is protected while social cooperation in ensured. In this connection, 
though African societies are generally believed to be communalistic in orientation, the 
truth also is that traditional Africans understand morality in terms of the character of 
individuals, in their conceptions of right and wrong, in acceptable social relations, in 
individual attitudes and in the forms of behaviour that the society considers as 
enhancing harmonious and cooperative existence, justice and fairness (Anderson, 
2013: 164; Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya [MK20]2014: 37). 
 
While the early westerners initially denied the existence of ethics and morality in 
traditional African societies as a result of their ignorance of their cultures and traditions, 
some of them eventually realised that there existed well constituted standards of 
morality, a contravention of which attracted severe punishment (Udokang, 2014: 266; 
Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 34). While some theorists consider religion or rational 
thinking as the source of traditional African morality, others consider morality a product 
of society (Anderson, 2013: 165-166; Kazeem, 2011: 265-272). One may add that 
morality is a by-product of both religion and society; and there was no clear distinction 
between religion and moral laws in most traditional African societies.  
 
African worldviews believe that all beings are interconnected, interrelated and 
interdependent in such a way that their existence and flourishing are dependent on 
each other’s success. In fact, human beings, animals, vegetation or the supernatural 
realm are considered to either derive or lose strength from each other (Adedutan, 
2014: 44). As a result, the communal nature of traditional Africans hinges on them 
taking into account the interests of all community members, while their moral obligation 
is to live together in harmony as members of one community, deriving personal 
fulfilment without being selfish, showing care and concern for each other’s quality of 
life, identifying with each other, showing solidarity with each other, respecting all 
existents, and most of all, human rights[MK21]. Ubuntu as representative of the African 
communalism relates to the forgoing, and generally to the humanism with which 
human beings are expected to relate with to each other. 
 
Like the modern democracy, social cooperation plays a fundamental role in the 
governance of African traditional societies. However, unlike the Western style, it is not 
defined by competition for power and dominance among political parties, and unlike 
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the Western majoritarian system which does not give adequate concern to minority 
and opposition parties and which permits adversarial competition among them, the 
emphasis is on going through a far more rigorous process of attaining consensus. 
 
The principle of communal responsibility was embedded in the relations among 
traditional Africans in a way that holds the whole community responsible for the actions 
of individuals. This principle has, however, been condemned by various theorists as 
detrimental to self-individuation and as responsible for many of the challenges that 
confront African societies. The fact however remains that the same principle was and 
still is responsible for ensuring the protection of communal and minority welfare. It is 
worth noting that this chapter will expose the manner in which traditional African ethical 
and democratic practices enabled the precolonial eras to derive more humanity among 
community members than what obtains in the contemporary era where individualism 
and lack of much consideration for the interest of the generality of the people is 
prevalent. 
 
In sum, this chapter is to describe the core features of the  African democratic system, 
previously cynically denied to exist or snubbed for no critical reasons, based on 
ignorance of its features. This chapter therefore defends the view that the indigenous 
democratic governance in Africa is founded on a unique morality established on the 
metaphysical principle, which sees the individual as a unique and irreplaceable part of 
a universal community. 
 
4.2 WESTERN CYNICISM TOWARDS AFRICAN ETHICS AND MORALITY 
The existence of African traditional ethics has been called into question by various 
early westerners coming to the African continent, such as the missionaries, colonialists 
and anthropologists. They dismissed ethics and morality as non-existent in traditional 
African societies; they did not consider any of the indigenous African practices and 
belief systems as good or useful (Dolamo, 2014: 6); and they “ignored and even 
denigrated indigenous African cultures for hundreds of years” (Bell & Metz, 2012: 81). 
They termed Africa a dark continent; and traditional Africans as lost souls, primitive, 
uncivilised, irrational, pagans and backward. As a result, they set out to correct all their 
observations by any means they considered necessary. Their approach resulted in the 
destruction of substantial aspects of African tradition, social life, and family values, 
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which were structured on a moral, religious and communal basis (Dolamo, 2014: 6). 
Nadel (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 34), considered the Nupes of Nigeria as lacking 
any ethical principle or religious doctrine that promote rights, condemns wrong and 
that promises rewards for an exemplary way of life. He perceived their religion and 
other precepts as silent on ethical matters and the consequences of immoral 
behaviour. A number of the early Europeans were sceptical about the existence of 
religion in traditional African society. Emil Ludwig (Ekeopara & Ogbonnayaet al, 2014: 
34) and his counterparts projected the theory that traditional Africans lacked any 
knowledge of God because they were considered inferior, unable to display any 
cognitive capacity and as a result could not conceptualise the ideas of God.  Many of 
like-minded westerners concluded, therefore, that there was no foundation for morality 
in precolonial African societies. 
 
Basden displayed his prejudice and ignorance of traditional Africans when, in contrast 
to his earlier assertion that the word morality had no significance in the vocabulary of 
precolonial Ibos in Nigeria, he later concedes that there are theoretically well-defined 
standards of morality among the Ibo communities (Udokang, 2014: 266), a 
contravention of which attracted severe punishment. He gave instances where 
unfaithful wives and their accomplices were punished by torture or killed (Ekeopara, & 
Ogbonnaya, et al. 2014: 34). By nNoting that transgressors were punished signifies 
the practical nature of the traditional Africans’ and specifically, the Igbo moral code. 
These wrong observations of ethics, morality and religion by the early westerners were 
used to justify their negative perceptions of the moral and psychological characters of 
traditional Africans, whom they considered as crude and ignorant of the differences 
between right and wrong (Udokang, 2014: 266). Perhaps the early westerners held 
their early negative views as a result of their ignorance of the cultures and traditions 
of the traditional African societies (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, et al. 2014: 34).  
 
4.3 INTERROGATING ETHICS AND MORALITY IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN 
SOCIETIES  
The understanding of ethics as the moral ideal of the good can be associated with all 
societies throughout the ages, including precolonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. 
Variations exist in the manner in which philosophers over the ages conceive ethics. 
For instance, Plato considers ethics as concerning a pure idea of the good. Levinas 
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considers ethics as the search for perfection. Benedict Spinoza associates ethics with 
the power of critical thinking. Despite the variations, ethics can be seen as generally 
linked with an appeal to the idea of the good, of perfection, while it is strongly rooted 
in the domain of ideas, principles and values. Most interactions among people are 
rooted in ethics, values, principles and standards, even though human thoughts, 
actions and words are not always ethical. However, they are always assessed on the 
basis of ethics, according to the argument of ethical ubiquity (Sindjoun, 2009: 23- 24). 
 
Ethics in traditional African context relates to the norms, values, principles and moral 
standards that regulate the behaviour of community members (Udokang, 2014: 267). 
It provides the measures of right and wrong conduct for every member of the 
community. The traditional African society considers ethics and morality as relating to 
goodness of character. An individual is considered good if he refrains from bad actions 
and thoughts such as stealing, adultery and cruelty to others. Goodness of character 
also entails the cultivation of virtues such as respect, kindness, compassion, justice 
and obedience to constituted authority (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, et al. 2014: 37). 
Gyekye (Anderson, 2013: 164) considers morality as constituted by social rules and 
standards aimed at regulating the behaviours of community members. These social 
rules and norms, according to him, result from what the people consider as constituting 
good and bad character, right and wrong. He considers morality as social and 
emanating from human relations, which concern themselves with the sense of duty to 
promote and realise cooperative and harmonious coexistence. Bujo (in Dolamo, 2014: 
3-4) considers the humanity with which individuals relate to each other in society as 
the bedrock of morality. He opines that African ethics neither conceives the individual 
as ontological act or as self-realisation. Rather, it conceives the person as a process 
of coming into being in the reciprocal relatedness of society and the person. A person 
can, therefore, not be ethical or moral if he fails to relate well with to other community 
members.  
 
While some theorists posit that African ethics does not proceed from religion, others 
claim that ethics in the traditional African society cannot be separated from traditional 
African religion because most moral precepts have a religious or metaphysical 
undertone, while African ethics hinges on reference to God. As a result, African 
morality relates to the kinds of expected behaviour that would enable humans to avert 
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the wrath of the deities, to be upright and blameless before God, and to attract 
blessings and favours from God (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, et al. 2014: 37-38). This 
debate on the source of African morality will be examined further in the chapter.     
 
An enquiry into the moral language of most traditional and even contemporary African 
peoples and cultures, including the Akan people of Ghana, the Yoruba and Ibo people 
of Nigeria and the Sotho and Shona peoples of Southern Africa,  reveals that ethics 
and morality is expressed and understood in terms of the character of the members of 
a community, their connection to the common good and the ethics of duty. The ethics 
of traditional and contemporary African societies is  
 
embedded in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is a 
good or bad character; it is also entrenched in the conceptions of 
satisfactory social relations and attitudes held by the members of the 
society; it is implanted furthermore, in the forms or patterns of behaviour 
that are considered by the members of the society to bring about social 
harmony and cooperative living, justice, and fairness (Obasola, 2014: 120). 
 
A number of African theorists posit that a clearly outlined and well-ordered system of 
ethics and morality can be found in traditional as well as contemporary African 
societies. Prior to the advent of colonialism and missionaries in Africa, the lives of 
community members were regulated by a properly outlined and regulated system of 
African moral codes and ethical principles. Precolonial African societies possess a 
deep sense of wrong and right, and this has given rise to traditions, taboos, rules, laws 
and customs, which are observable in each society. This singular factor reveals the 
prevalence of African traditional ethics prior to the advent of Europeans to Africa, and 
shows, that the idea of morality in Africa is not merely the creation of Christian 
missionaries and Europeans (Udokang, 2014: 267-268) contrary to what Basden, 
Nadel and other like-minds would want to portray. 
 
The cultures of traditional African societies were subsumed in different customs and 
beliefs which every member of society was expected to adhere to in order to prevent 
curses that could befall them and others for contravening laid down precepts and so 
as to have a long life. The moral precepts of these societies discouraged all forms of 
unethical conduct, including theft and adultery. They also forbade community 
members from causing harm or injuries to others, including foreigners, unless the 
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person was guilty of immoral conduct (Idang, 2015: 104). Mbiti (Udokang, 2014: 104) 
posits that a breach of the moral precepts of each society was considered bad, wrong 
or evil for distorting communally accepted peace and social order. Perpetrators were 
punished accordingly or even ostracised. In cases where a suspect denies the charge 
levelled against him, custom demands that he prove his innocence by either taking an 
oath or being taken to a soothsayer for spiritual divination. For instance, a popular 
means of detecting crime in the Ibibio community was ukang (ordeal). The process 
entailed the boiling of water by the specialist soothsayer, who then throws a stone into 
the hot water and requests the suspect to take the stone out of the boiling water. The 
innocent suspect would retrieve the stone with his bare hand from the boiling water 
without getting hurt or feeling any pain. However, as soon as the guilty suspect 
attempts to remove the stone, the water boils over in a terrifying manner. Such 
deterrents played a significant role in maintaining a crime-free community as no one 
would want to be subjected to such public ridicule, or to being stripped naked and 
paraded around the community (Idang, 2015: 104). 
 
The system of ethics and morals of each community were preserved in their customs 
and traditions, and therefore in tandem with the overall metaphysics and worldview of 
the people. Each pre-colonial African society maintained its solidarity and social order 
through the laws, taboos, customs and prescribed forms of behaviour which became 
ome their moral code. Tempels (Udokang, 2014: 267) notes that the social dimensions 
of morality were well-known to Africans in such a manner that any serious 
contravention of the moral code had serious social implications. All evil acts were 
considered anti-social in nature and as a result, had ramifications for the society at 
large.  African theorists, such as Kalu and Nwosu concur with Tempels’ observations, 
when they claim that the willingness of community members to be guided by the 
dominant norms and values played significant roles in ensuring peace and stability, in 
promoting the welfare of community members and in enhancing the correct functioning 
of society. A violation of ethical norms and standards was also considered a violation 
of the cosmic order, and this would require individual or communal atonement through 
appropriate rituals and good deeds. In the Igbo ethics, for instance, the Igbo people of 
Nigeria enforced conformity to their traditions through their customs (which is are 
referred to in Igbo language as omenala).  
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Omenala is one of the moral precepts in Igboland that symbolise the moral traditions 
of the Igbo people (Okpalike, 2015: 7). In the Igbo customs and traditions, social rules 
are measured through omenala (customs). Omenala is also the measure through 
which the youth are socialised and through which the societal values are extended 
from generation to generation (Udokang, 2014: 267). By adhering to these socialised 
customs and traditions, community members understand their rights and obligations 
to one another. All moral precepts in traditional African societies appeared mostly in 
the form of prohibitions which the ancestral spirits and deities have sanctioned or are 
invoked to sanction (Udokang, 2014: 268). The pre-colonial Nigerian society, 
according to Imhonopi (et al., (2013: 114) was firmly rooted in polytheism. The people 
believed the various deities and gods that they worshiped would protect them from all 
sorts of harm and evil as well as make them prosper. These understandings, for 
Udokang (2014: 268) seem to be the reason why a number of scholars posit that 
traditional religion is the source of African ethics and morality. The Igbos accord 
Omenala (custom) unquestioned obedience because they conceive it as proceeding 
from the goddess of the earth and sanctioned by the ancestors. While it fulfils cultural, 
moral and social functions, Omenala is also religious in nature as the spiritual power 
of the community proceeds from the power of the ancestors and the earth’s goddess 
(Udokang, 2014: 268). 
 
Ala (which means earth in Igbo language) is the custodian of morality and the physical 
manifestation of common humanity. It represents fertility and motherhood, and 
portrays that the fundamental principle of morality in Igbo land requires humans to be 
diligent, cautious, intelligent, respectful, tactful and gracious, among other 
requirements. The Igbos conceive the earth (Ala) as mysterious and therefore a spirit, 
a phenomenon that gives life and the finality of morality. The Igbos deify the earth and 
work towards preserving and sanctifying it so that it can protect as well as provide for 
their daily needs and desires. The Igbos consider Ala to be what the good life 
represents since the good life for them entails ensuring the realisation of  the spiritual, 
social and environmental  well-being of their communities. The absence of the good 
life for them would result in misery for all members of their communities (Okpalike, 
2015: 7). 
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This metaphysical conception of the origin of Igbo ethics and morality can be attached 
to other traditional African societies where morality was conceived as having a close 
relationship with the ontological order of the world. A violation of this order was 
equated with a violation of the order of the universe and resulted in a physical disorder 
through which the fault is revealed. There was no clear distinction between moral and 
religious laws in traditional African societies. Moral and religious values were the 
same. The society rejected what religion forbade, and sanctioned what religion 
approved.  The Yoruba tribes of Nigeria do not distinguish between moral and religious 
values, since doing so would lead to negative consequences. In essence, traditional 
African societies conceive the universe as held together by a worldview that binds 
ethics and religion together in a manner that conceives morality as based on the 
commandment of the deity. Anyone that contravened the moral codes is, as a result 
punished by the Supreme Being, the deities and ancestral spirits (Udokang, 2014: 
268). 
 
A number of theorists do not support the notion of religion as the source of morality. 
According to Anderson (2013: 165-166), Gyekye and Wiredu are some of the 
prominent scholars who have denied the role of religion in moral development. Rather, 
they argue that the morality of a group or community is determined by society and the 
traditions of the people. While Gyekye agrees that religion plays a crucial role in the 
development of the moral life of the Akan people of Ghana, he posits that society and 
not religion shapes morality. In other words, he claims that in the system of morality of 
traditional Africans generally, and of the Akans in particular, the consequences of 
human actions on the society and people determine their morality. By this Gyekye 
means that African morality does not proceed from divine pronouncements, but from 
taking into account the interests and welfare of human beings. He further posits that 
actions are good when they promote the interest and welfare of human beings, while 
the actions that do not consider the interest and welfare of people are bad.  
 
Wiredu neither considers religion or God as the source of morality, nor morality as 
dependent on divine instruction and revelation. He posits that religion was not the 
source of morality for the Akan people of Ghana (Udokang, 2014: 268), claiming that 
although human beings may act ethically in order to avert punishment from the deities, 
this does not confer on them the sense of moral obligation. For instance, he claims 
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that a robber may refuse to commit an offence for fear of arrest; but he would not have 
thought of committing the crime in the first place if he had any sense of morality 
(Anderson, 2013: 166). Wiredu (Udokang, 2014: 268) considers rational thinking on 
what is best for human welfare as the basis of morality. For Wiredu, the Akan people 
did not consider doing good as dependent on God’s directive since they did not have 
a belief in a revealed religion. They never had a set of moral precepts that they 
believed to have proceeded from God to the human race. Consequently, the Akan 
people did not have any inclination of a religious or revealed morality. Wiredu’s treatise 
in this regard amounts to saying that  
 
African ethics is humanised. It is essentially interpersonal and social, with 
a basis in human welfare and well-being. This is why the African man is 
essentially his brother’s keeper and is ultimately concerned about his 
welfare. Community of life or communalism ranked over and above 
individualism; hence the stress on communal solidarity. The African man’s 
concern for the well-being of his brother and neighbour is at the heart of 
traditional ethics and morality (Udokang, 2014: 268). 
 
For Wiredu (Kazeem, 2011: 265), morality is the motivated quest for sympathetic 
impartiality. In other words, human behaviour and conduct should always show 
consideration for the interests of other people. A person is said to have shown due 
concern for the interest of others when in the process of thinking about the 
consequences of his actions on other peoples’ interests, he hypothetically puts himself 
in their shoes. For Wiredu, the principle of sympathetic impartiality is a human 
universal that is applicable to the moral conduct of all the non-brutish human race. In 
other words, he claims that sympathetic impartiality has a universal appeal since all 
societies that prefer nonviolence would subscribe to it. Oruka (Kazeem, 2011: 271) 
disagrees with Wiredu’s moral notion of sympathetic impartiality, claiming that 
sympathetic impartiality may not be necessary because Rawls’ principle of rational 
egoism, which entails calculating impartiality, is a sufficient conceptualisation of 
morality. Rather, he claims that human beings lack sympathetic impartiality in Rawls 
state of nature, while they also fail to acquire it in a civil state, because if they did, 
there would be less need for prisons, class wars and the police force. Although human 
beings remain self-centred, they are still rational; and that is why society has not 
completely degenerated into chaos. 
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Kazeem (2011: 272) believes that contrary to Wiredu’s position, morality is not 
necessarily universal in all communities and is not solely based on the principle of 
sympathetic impartiality. Rather morality may also result from Rawls’ principle of 
calculating impartiality. In Rawls’s theory of justice (Jacobs, 2014: 547) which 
examines how to ensure impartiality in a state in the distribution of social goods in view 
of various moral doctrines competing for prominence, Rawls posits that citizens must 
abstract themselves from their obligations, worldviews, knowledge, moral 
commitments, community affiliations, and any other personal characteristics that allow 
them to be guided by their prejudices. This process would result in an impartial or 
egalitarian distribution of rights, obligations and benefits, and as a result, receive the 
approval of all the citizens. Rawls’ theory of justice will be given more consideration in 
chapter six. 
 
What Kazeem is saying in essence here is that since morality connotes both the good 
and the bad, a universal moral doctrine should be constituted by both sympathetic 
impartiality and calculating impartiality, which together account for the constitutive 
elements of morality. He considers Wiredu’s position as problematic for undermining 
and underestimating the true nature of human beings in the community as rational, 
egotistic, irrational, selfish, altruistic and loving. Morality actually unites these diverse 
human characteristics in order to promote societal good. Therefore, morality for 
Kazeem, attempts to unite the characteristics of human beings for the betterment of 
the society at large (Kazeem, 2011: 272). 
 
In contrast with Wiredu’s notion of sympathetic impartiality, Molefe (2016: 4-12) argues 
that ethics or morality in the African context should be considered as partial in nature, 
because impartiality is not consistent with the level of commitment that various aspects 
of African tradition are subjected to. In defence of his claim, he alludes to three aspects 
that are subsumed in partiality, namely the high value placed on family structure, 
ancestral worship and the idea of personhood; and the high regard that a number of 
theorists place on various aspects of African tradition. These include Wiredu and 
Appiah’s consideration of the family as the best institution for moral education; Oruka’s 
consideration of the family as the best model for the African community; and Ramose’s 
argument for the prioritisation of Ubuntu towards a family member before according 
the same privilege to others. He notes that the African tradition of ancestral worship 
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occurs mainly within a family blood-line or extended relations; while in cases where 
the whole community participates in the celebration, some aspects of the ritual are 
performed in private. He further observes that in the concept of personhood, the 
individual “must prioritise one’s project of self-perfection, achieving moral virtue, and 
one must work hard to take care, firstly of one’s family and then, if possible, the wider 
community” (Molefe, 2016: 16). The point Molefe makes here is that these this 
evidence negate the notion of sympathetic impartiality that Wiredu advances because 
the manner in which Africans attend to these issues are subjective and partial and 
therefore a reflection of the moral framework of Africans. 
 
Molefe makes a critical and valid point regarding the partial outlook of African moral 
thought in the sense that Africans in particular and other races in general are largely 
partial in the manner in which they relate to others. However, the fact remains that 
such moral framework cannot be promoted as the sole basis of African morality, 
especially in view of the extent of atrocities and unethical behaviour that result from a 
partial moral worldview. These include the dispossession of lands from the South 
African black population during the apartheid era, as will be considered in chapter five. 
While human beings are selfish by nature, the only means of ensuring a just and 
ethical society is by promoting an objective and impartial approach to all aspects of 
existence. 
 
Anderson (2013: 165-166) disagrees with Wiredu and Gyekye’s claim that religion is 
not the source of morality. He reasons that by arguing in the manner they did, Gyekye 
and Wiredu are in essence claiming the existence of religious free society in Ghana. 
However, Anderson does not believe that there is any community in Ghana that lacks 
religious influence. Rather, he claims that almost all the traditional societies in Ghana, 
including the Akan societies have religious imports and thrive on religion. In fact, 
Anderson believes that the influence of religion in the Ghanaian societies is so 
prevalent that it permeates every aspect of their life, including the government, the 
dress mode of the people, their speeches and even their food.  
 
Wiredu makes a valid point in rejecting religion as the source of morality. However, 
this is also contestable depending on the perspective from which it this is viewed. It is 
true that a person may be ethical or moral not because he is religious, but because he 
99 
 
believes in doing the right thing and because he would prefer not to be harmed by 
others. This makes the sense of morality universal since all rational beings would 
always want the best for themselves and rationality should prevail on them to treat 
people in the same manner that they would want to be treated.  The problem in this 
case is that human beings are naturally selfish. Many people only want the best for 
themselves without caring about the interests of others or about the consequences of 
their words, thoughts and actions on other people. It makes sense to believe that a 
person can be ethical without being religious, while another person can be moral as a 
result of the influence of religion in his or her life. It is logical to submit here that human 
beings can become ethical as a result of religious, rational and societal influence, 
because they believe in treating people in the same manner that they would expect to 
be treated, and or as a result of their personal convictions. 
 
4.3.1 The Principles of Individuality and Communal Responsibility 
In the traditional African context, human beings are considered social beings since 
they are members of a community or group. This is a view, which much later in the 
Western thought has been attributed to Aristotle. Whether the afroAfro-apologists or 
their opponents are correct, the relationship between community members in the 
African thought system, as well as its associated rights, binds a community together. 
Earthly existence requires that everyone lives together as equal and interrelated 
members in a community. It requires relationships of friendships or fraternity with 
others, especially among those that reside in the same region. The community land is 
considered a measure that guarantees the value of everyone in the community, and 
not merely a symbol of individual fecundity, happiness or prosperity. The realistic and 
just nature of this vision becomes more apparent when in considering the development 
of the contemporary era one notes that while wealth can be a collective or an individual 
acquisition, happiness remains a collective phenomenon. The happiness of an 
individual is mostly attained through collective effort. Furthermore, the realisation of 
prosperity is also connected with the requirement for an ethical and peaceful society 
in the interest of the whole community,  members (Kouassi, 2008: 237-238). 
 
In the traditional African community, the members, according to Onyedinma and 
Kanayo (2013: 64-65), assume collective responsibility in providing for the needs of 
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the less privileged, the old and the weak. In the Igbo community for instance, they note 
that the entire community makes contributions towards providing for the material 
needs of the less privileged. The community would also combine their physical efforts 
in assisting their kinsmen to build their houses or to cultivate their farmlands. Such 
functions are performed happily since participants recognise that they would also be 
assisted by other community members should the need arise. Interdependence is a 
paramount ideology among the Igbo race. The Igbo principle of interdependence 
recognises the enormous strength that proceeds from a united front.  This promotes 
discipline, humanises relations and reduces crime. In the traditional African 
perspective,  
 
what is crucial to the individual in terms of identity and personal satisfaction, 
are not the things that he possesses or even his position, but the warmth 
and security he enjoys because he belongs to and feels secure within his 
village and society. As a result, Africans would not want to  opt out of the 
community by violating the norms of the community because that would 
amount to breaking the integral human relations that holds the community 
together  (Onyedinma & Kanayo, 2013: 65). 
 
Wiredu (2009: 15-16) opines that it can be anthropologically established that 
communalism is the operative ethic in the traditional African society. The 
communalism that permeates Africa is the type of social formation in which kinship 
plays a fundamental role. Individuals are developed right from childhood to cultivate 
the feeling of affinity with all members of their family and extended family. This kind of 
unity begins from the immediate family and transcends to the other relations and 
eventually to the community at large. The individual conceives this kind of close 
association to mean that his or her responsibilities extend to others as well, while the 
other relatives are also expected to accord him the same rights and obligations. The 
sense of connectedness that individuals developed resulted from the reciprocal nature 
of interrelationships, and this seems to be largely absent in the manner in which the 
current era relates with each other, the consequences of which are often unfavourable 
for the well-being of individuals and communities. Wiredu, however, adds that this idea 
of human connectedness goes beyond a mere idea of connection based on kinship 
and rather, fundamentally involves a sense of connection rooted in humanity. This 
shows in the societal ethic that provides for the pursuit of the interests of not only one’s 
relations, but the interests of the community at large. The scope of this practice 
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transcends the imperatives of pure morality which does not require human beings to 
mutually support each other in the pursuit of their private interests such as agriculture. 
The nature of traditional communalism was however, such that members of the 
community supported each other’s private pursuits. What traditional morality however 
prescribes, according to Wiredu, is that human beings should act in the same manner 
that they expect to be treated (Ochieng-Odhiambo, 2010: 171-174). It is worth noting 
at least in passing that this line of thought coincides with what in Western philosophy 
is considered to be the core of Kantianism, namely his categorical imperative 
(Thomas, 2015: 3), but which in Africa is a widespread common knowledge, even in 
precolonial Africa. The manner in which precolonial African societies  were able to take 
care of each other’s needs and recognise everyone as  members of the  same 
extended family  seems to be one of the major reasons  why Nyerere (Ochieng-
Odhiambo, 2010: 174) believes that socialism was a constitutive element of 
precolonial African societies. 
 
The kind of kinship connection that Wiredu refers to can also be found in the Nigerian 
context. Almost all the tribes in Nigeria, if not all of them, continue to hold the same 
values of kinship as was the case in the past. Almost everything they do, including 
traditional and western marriage, burial or naming ceremonies, would involve the 
invitation of close and extended families and community members for support and 
commiseration. Failure to follow this primordial custom is tantamount to rejection of 
one’s people and this could have both unfavourable consequences such as animosity 
and retaliation. This practice is so embedded in the African, and specifically the 
Nigerian culture, that it has become second nature to them. 
 
In traditional African society, the individual and the society need each other for 
survival. This fact is buttressed by a number of sayings across the African continent. 
The Acholi of northern Uganda, for instance, would say ‘two hands are better than 
one’. This means that greater success is achieved when people collaborate than when 
one works alone. Another saying is ‘unity is strength’; meaning that an individual 
derives his strength from the happy, cooperative, collaborative and united association 
with others. As a result, the individual suffers when he ignores his society. The 
traditional African society holds that actions which are taken to promote either 
individual or communal interests are ethically right, otherwise morally evil or unethical. 
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This ethical foundation gives rise to a number of ethical principles, such as principles 
of individual and community responsibilities, which guide the behaviour of traditional 
African community members (Lajul, 2013: 117-118).  
 
The principle of individual responsibility states that a person and his immediate family 
members, not the whole community, are responsible for the actions that the individual 
takes either against other community members or even against themselves (Lajul, 
2013: 121). This principle is in line with the Kantian theory, which holds that the 
individual must assume responsibility for the possible consequences of his actions, 
and not transfer the consequences to someone or something else (Urbanovic & 
Tauginiene, 2013: 72). Some of the possible reasons why individuals should be held 
responsible and accountable for their actions could be because each person 
possesses personal values, which are guided by different factors through the course 
of their lives. While each community or entity also has values which shape the cultures 
or way of life of its members, it is each person through his or her conduct that 
determines if the values, which the community seeks to emulate are in reality 
actualised (ICAS, 2015: 6). 
 
The principle of communal responsibility posits that the actions of an individual impact 
on the community as a whole, while communal actions impact on individual members 
of the community. In other words, the principle holds that an action is right or wrong 
based on its effect on the community (Lajul, 2013: 119). The individual is defined in 
relation to a larger ethnic or social group which covers the living, the dead, the unborn 
and the spirits. The individual is attached to the social or ethnic group in a manner that 
confers his primary responsibility to the clan or his community (Kochalumchuvattil, 
2010: 112). This arrangement has been seen as detrimental to self-individuation. This 
lack of subjectivity has been termed the primary cause of large numbers of the 
challenges and complications that African countries continue to experience 
(Kochalumchuvattil, 2010: 112), such as intertribal conflicts and wars.  
 
Intertribal conflicts result, in many cases, from disagreement among people of different 
communities. The aggrieved community reacts on the basis of communal 
responsibility.  They turn the offending community into a target for retaliation since 
they are all considered as responsible for the actions of their members. This kind of 
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retaliation often results in large scale displacement of the offending communities. In 
the traditional African societies, communal responsibility was acceptable. In the 
contemporary era, however, it is unethical to hold the whole community responsible 
for the actions of an individual or of a few community members. Nevertheless there 
are currently many parts of Africa where the principle of communal responsibility is still 
the norm. In the Rwandan genocide, for instance, the Hutu tribe attempted to eliminate 
all Tutsis in revenge for the killing of a Hutu leader; In Uganda, the year 1966 
witnessed the repression of the supporters of Kabaka Mutesa II. During the reign of 
Idi Amin between 1971 and 1979, the Langi and the Acholi tribes were persecuted 
(Lajul, 2013: 119). This principle holds negative consequences for how people 
conceive right and wrong and for accepting that it is right to seek revenge for deliberate 
murder of any community member. It is also morally right for the community to prevent 
any danger that could result from the actions of an individual through reconciliation 
with the victims before further damage results. Lajul observes that during conflicts or 
unrests in the contemporary period, Africans quickly resort to the communal principle. 
In the process they tend to forget their communal obligations to encourage unity and 
solidarity among the dissenting groups and to rectify the factors that could potentially 
lead to conflict (Lajul, 2013: 119-120). 
 
There are many cynics who reject the idea of communal responsibility. Examples 
include a number of people and movements in the Western thought, such as the social 
deviants and the anarchists who perceive society as a clog or an impediment to the 
realisation of individual happiness. They assume a rebellious lifestyle against society 
and its values. One may attribute such negative attitude towards the community as 
emanating from the apparent individualism that characterises a substantial aspect of 
Western life. The loss of faith in community life becomes entrenched in environments 
where the individuals are no longer able to enjoy the social equilibrium that they had 
become used to, which offered them the space to construe themselves as 
autonomous, supreme and self-governing. In cases where such individuals are not 
able to adequately deal with the problems that confront them, they become worried. 
They develop a sense of abandonment by society and conclude that their world is 
obstructive and an impediment to their happiness. Contrary to these negative 
sentiments, it is unlikely that Africans would succumb entirely to this kind of absolutist 
individualism since they believe that the life of an individual only acquires meaning in 
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the community. In other words, the individual can only realise his wellbeing and social 
aspirations by mutually interacting with other community members (Agulana, 2010: 
287- 288). 
 
Although the principle of communal responsibility is responsible for a myriad of 
challenges that confront the African continent, such as corruption, revenge, rampant 
violence, collective condemnation of specific ethnic groups, and ethnic cleansing, its 
negative aspects must be discouraged and eliminated where possible if there is to be 
any hope of developing the African countries into strong and desirable nation states. 
On the other hand, it is imperative to encourage the positive aspects of the principle 
of communal responsibility, by dissuading tribalism and ethnic affiliations, by 
embracing all members of a given community without any discriminatory practices 
(Lajul, 2013: 120-121). 
 
4.4 THE HUMANISTIC NATURE OF TRADITIONAL AFRICAN ETHICS 
African traditional ethics, according to Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, et al (2014: 39-40) is 
not ideologically individualistic, but communal in nature because it takes into account 
the existence and interest of the individual and other people. It recognises that an 
individual cannot exist alone, but in communion with other human beings. As a result, 
an individual recognises that his existence is not for the purpose of satisfying only his 
personal interest. Rather, he must also ensure that he does not infringe on the 
interests of other people. In view of this recognition, African traditional society is also 
communal in nature. This communalism becomes the foundation of the concern that 
the African person shows for the welfare of his neighbour. The traditional African 
society therefore condemns self-centredness and individualism and promotes 
solidarity as a major virtue on the contrary.  
 
The African traditional ethics promotes humanism as it considers all human beings as 
existing together while rendering complimentary assistance to each other (Ekeopara 
& Ogbonnaya, et al, 2014: 40). African worldviews, according to Murove (2010: 383) 
believe in the interrelatedness, interdependency and interconnectedness of all beings 
in a manner that the flourishing of one entity affects the flourishing of the others. They 
also consider it the duty of human beings to protect nature and the environment for 
the benefit of all. Adedutan (2014: 44) further claims that entities 
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whether human, divine, animal or vegetal, operate within a principle termed 
general laws of vital causality. In this system, a being, by virtue of the 
strength of its force, can either harvest more strength from another being, 
or, in contrast, lose some strength to a stronger being. Man, as a being, for 
example, can either strengthen or weaken the being of another man; the 
being of man can also affect the subordinate being of animal or plant. 
 
4.4.1 The Moral Theory of Ubuntu 
In contemporary Southern African languages, the term Ubuntu or Hunhu denotes 
humanism towards fellow beings. It emphasises the interdependence and common 
humanity of human beings, and the responsibility that proceeds from human 
interconnection (Letseka, 2012: 54). The moral theory of Hunhu or Ubuntu “is not only 
a dialogical African moral theory; it is also a way of life. This means that hunhu/ubuntu 
does not only evaluate and justify moral acts in African settings but it is also a word 
view for the Africans” (Mangena, 2012: 11). As a constitutive element of African ethics, 
Ubuntu is founded on culture and religion. It relates to the dignity and integrity required 
of individuals; it represents what makes an individual human and the elements that 
promote the attainment of individual and communal fulfilment (Dolamo, 2013: 1-3). 
This moral worldview of traditional Southern African communities considers human 
nature as having worth. Pre-eminence is placed on according each other mutual moral 
responsibilities such as collective responsibility, cooperation, solidarity, compassion, 
respect, loyalty, harmony, reciprocity, dignity, care and humanity towards each other 
(Letseka, 2014: 547).  
 
The moral theory of Ubuntu, according to Bell and Metz (2012: 81) shares a number 
of common features with the Chinese moral tradition known as Confucianism. Both 
moral philosophical thoughts recognise the interrelatedness of all beings as well as 
the “the role that ancestors should play in our ethical lives…the value of harmony in 
thinking about our proper relationships to one another, to animals, and to the natural 
environment (Bell and & Metz, 2012: 81). All proponents of the communitarian ethics 
of humanness or Ubuntu believe that the humanity of an individual is premised on his 
acceptance of fellow human beings in their differences and uniqueness. This core 
principle affirms that the identity of a person depends on the community both 
metaphysically as well as causally, while an individual is duty-bound to contribute to 
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the well-being and progress of the community. This communitarian ethics which 
exposes human beings as normative and relational  is gender-neutral because it 
applies to community members irrespective of their gender and accords everyone 
consensual democracy in line with the values of Ubuntu (Oyowe & Yurkivska, 2014: 
86). 
 
Ubuntu also signifies that human beings should attach sacred and premium value to 
human life. In other words, the ultimate goal of a person in life should be to aspire for 
a genuine or authentic lifestyle. By claiming that a person can derive Ubuntu through 
others, one implies that a person has the moral obligation to be the best human being 
possible, living together in harmony as members of one community, and deriving 
personal fulfilment without being selfish. In the traditional Southern African society, an 
individual who failed to relate communally with others or who showed a negative or 
antisocial attitude towards others was considered to be inhuman or an animal. The 
society considered individual actions to be right or as conferring humanness on others 
when members of a community share the same way of life, show care and concern 
for each other’s quality of life, identify with each other and show solidarity with each 
other. The dignity of a person results from his capacity to be friendly, to live 
harmoniously together and to respect human rights (Metz, 2011: 537 - 559).  
 
Although Ubuntu is mostly associated with communalism and interdependency, it is 
not anti-individualistic because the respect that Ubuntu has for the personhood of 
other people also means respect for one self or for individuality. Since a person 
assumes his personhood as a result of his relationship with others, a human being is 
therefore human through others (Letseka, 2014: 548). While the Igbos, for instance 
are known to have strong communal dispositions or attachments, they are also known 
to possess high level of individualism. Scholars have termed this seeming sense of 
contradiction the antinomy of providing a balance between the high level of 
individualism among the Igbos tribes with their strong loyalty to their community. The 
high level of loyalty that the Igbos have towards their community does not take away 
their unique individuality. Neither does it totally submerge them in their communities 
nor does it discourage self-reliance, personal initiatives, or the development of their 
individualities (Agulana, 2010: 293). 
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Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 198) contend that the promotion of the moral theory 
of Ubuntu in South Africa in particular and in Africa in general ought to come to an 
end. They argue that the ideology of Ubuntu “is not well rooted in the ethical 
experiences of modern people qua moral beings; and …that Ubuntu as a conceived 
ethical solution lacks both the capacity and the context to be an ethical inspiration or 
code of ethics in the present context” (Matolino and & Kwindingwi, 2013: 198). They 
consider Ubuntu stagnated as an ethical theory and a way of life, and as a result of its 
complex principles and failure “to transform itself from a descriptive worldview to a 
prescriptive construct adequate for modern extraction of subjectivity” (Chimakonam, 
2016b: 225). Matolino and Kwindingwi, according to Chimakonam (2016b: 227) find 
the rapid decline in the influence of Ubuntu on the moral conduct of contemporary 
Africans to be expected because the socio-cultural context within which Ubuntu was 
accepted as a way of life in the past is no longer the same for the contemporary (South) 
African communities. 
 
Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 197) argue that the aggressive manner in which 
Ubuntu is promoted in post-apartheid South Africa by the new black elite is aimed at 
the creation of a black identity and the restoration of the dignity of the black people. 
They question the need for “Ubuntu as a mark/guide of the spirit of the nation…the 
disjunct that exists between the metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment 
of Ubuntu and the stark ontological and ethical crisis facing the new elite and our 
people” (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 197). According to Metz (2014: 65), Matolino 
and Kwindingwi argue that the conditions in present day South Africa as well as in 
many other parts of the African continent negate any appeal to the moral theory of 
Ubuntu. They contend that the political elites and others  
 
who have most influentially invoked Ubuntu have done so in ways that 
serve nefarious social functions, such as unreasonably narrowing 
discourse about how best to live, while, philosophically, these authors 
contend that the moral ideals of Ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone 
pre-modern age. Since there is nothing ethically promising about Ubuntu 
for a modern society, and since appealing to it serves unwelcome purposes 
there, Matolino and Kwindingwi conclude that Ubuntu in academic and 
political circles has reached its end (Metz, 2014: 65). 
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The most problematic aspect of Ubuntu theory, according to Matolino and Kwindingwi 
(2013: 204), which further negates its relevance and existence as understood in the 
academic and political arenas, is 
 
its failure to strike a coherent balance between its central claims of 
authenticity as a lived-out mode of being and what the circumstances of 
Africans are as moral beings living in the here and now. Its yearning for the 
restoration of a pristine mode of being is disjoined from the reality of 
ordinary people. Although the elite may have political interests in defending 
the project, its efficacy on the broad and general level will never be realised. 
 
For Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 264), Matolino and Kwindingwi seem to have been 
influenced to reach this conclusion on the basis of an event that occurred in South 
Africa in 2012 (which the latter authors alluded to in their paper), in which a taxi driver 
knocked down a pedestrian, got out of his vehicle and savagely attacked him. They 
note that the ethical issues that Matolino and Kwindingwi want to portray dwell on the 
immoral actions of the taxi driver which are contrary to the moral import of Ubuntu, the 
failure of the bystanders to intervene in the attack, and the Police Minister’s clarion 
call to the public to behave in a manner that befits Ubuntu. 
  
In their critique of Ubuntu, Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 198 & 201) claim that while 
Ubuntu could have been the dominant ethic, one of the issues that must be examined 
before it can be considered to be an authentic mode of being African relates to the 
disadvantages of what they term revivalism. By this they refer to the ‘narrative of return’ 
which they consider as the quest by academics, political leaders and others to identify 
past values which they believe are capable of revitalising an obsolete way of life and 
inspiring a better society. They question the revivalists’ articulation of everything 
African as having proceeded from the perfect pre-slavery and pre-colonial Africa and 
they posit that all Africans, including sub-Saharan Africans do not have the same 
conception of what it means to be an African. For instance, they refer to the Police 
Minister’s criticism of the lack of Ubuntu in the case of the barbaric taxi driver, and 
wonder if the various tribes who reside in the area where this act occurred have a 
common understanding of Ubuntu and subscribe to it in their daily lives? They 
conclude that these people probably hold competing values that cannot be interpreted 
on the basis of Ubuntu, and that the philosophy of Ubuntu can only be effective in 
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small and undeveloped homogenous communities. They further claim that through 
mutual interdependence and recognition  
 
members of these communities foster the necessary feelings of solidarity 
that enable the spirit of Ubuntu to flourish…Without the existence of such 
communities the notion of Ubuntu becomes only but an appendage to the 
political desires, wills and manipulations of the elite in the attempt to coerce 
society towards the same ideology reminiscent of the aforesaid earlier 
attempts by some political leaders on the continent (Matolino and 
Kwindingwi 2013: 202).  
 
Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 202-203) criticise the belief that the ‘narrative of 
return’ reflects the best desirable interpretation of reality as not always the case. They 
disagree with the belief that everyone can easily understand this narrative and 
naturally desire to act in line with its provisions and that anyone who tends to act in 
contrast with its dictates is inhuman or un-African. Rather, they posit that the narrative 
cannot be naturally apparent to everyone since such a claim can be interpreted to 
mean that the narrative proceeds naturally from Africans through a supernatural force. 
No one on earth, they claim, is metaphysically inclined to possess any moral quality, 
to be communal, social, antisocial or selfless. Rather, they believe that such qualities 
are motivated by specific objectives and result from specific conditions. 
 
Metz (2014: 65) challenges Matolino and Kwindingwi’s contentions that the current 
state of affairs in contemporary South Africa and in most parts of the African continent 
does not justify any appeal to the moral theory of Ubuntu. Rather, he claims that 
scholarly research into Ubuntu and its the political application thereof has only 
commenced. He considers their arguments as insufficient basis for their conclusions, 
and asserts that the ethical theory of Ubuntu has a significant role to play in the 
development of the morality of people and organisations. Metz, according to Matolino 
(2015: 214), supports his position by trying to show that Ubuntu can be defended as 
both a way of life and as an ethical theory, and reasons that Ubuntu can play a 
significant role in how contemporary (South) Africans conduct themselves. For Metz 
(2014: 71),  
 
Ubuntu, when interpreted as an ethical theory, is well understood to 
prescribe honouring relationships of sharing a way of life and caring for 
others’ quality of life. Sharing a way of life is roughly a matter of enjoying a 
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sense of togetherness and engaging in joint projects, while caring for 
others’ quality of life consists of doing what is likely to make others better 
off for their sake and typically consequent to sympathy with them. 
 
Matolino (2015: 214-219) responds to Metz’s objections, claiming that Metz’s defence 
of Ubuntu is unphilosophical, weak, indefensible and dogmatic. He condemns what he 
terms Metz’s utopian propagation of Ubuntu, as neither new, nor holding any promises 
for Africans. He defends his response by alluding to the failures of the earlier revivalists 
of precolonial African values in his claim that the philosophical flirtations that the first 
wave of African philosopher kings, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Leopold 
Senghor and Kenneth Kaunda, introduced to Africans have only resulted in disastrous 
consequences for post-colonial African states. For instance, he refers to the failures 
of one-party dictatorial governments, which were founded on the need to revive the 
true African identity. 
 
For Chimakonam (2016b: 224-225) the claims by Matolino and Kwindingwi that 
Ubuntu has become obsolete for contemporary patterns of thought processes and not 
capable of future development should not be considered a mere statement of fact, but 
a problematic assertion, the import of which holds far reaching implications for both 
the theory of Ubuntu and the entire sphere of African philosophy. He posits that their 
claims regarding the end of Ubuntu raises a number of fundamental questions such 
as: Is it possible for philosophy to close the door on itself? Can philosophical inquiry 
lose its dynamism? And is it is no longer possible to raise new questions in philosophy? 
He suggests that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s assertions in relation to the first question 
can be interpreted to mean that philosophy has closed its own doors. But he rejects 
this as incorrect since the doors of philosophy are always open. He asserts that the 
implication of their conclusion with regards to the second question is that the theory of 
Ubuntu can no longer generate philosophical questions. However, he believes that 
this cannot be the case since philosophical inquiries are always dynamic, always 
generating further questions, some of which may not be the right questions to ask. The 
concern here for him, is to ensure that the right questions are posed. Furthermore, the 
third question for him may be interpreted to mean that by announcing the end of 
Ubuntu, Matolino and Kwindingwi are implying that appropriate questions are yet to 
be posed in African philosophy. 
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For Chimakonam (2016b: 225-227), the significance of Matolino and Kwidingwi’s 
conclusion regarding the end of Ubuntu lies in its methodical and philosophical import 
as opposed to its validity. It is neither advisable to dismiss their claims, as Metz does, 
nor to accept their conclusions as dogmatic truth. Rather, Chimakonam proffers that 
their claims be considered a philosophical problem or a conundrum that needs to be 
critically examined. He claims that one of the means of adequately evaluating the 
value of Matolino, Kwindingwi and Metz’s arguments is to establish their various 
notions of Ubuntu. He considers these theorists’ conception of Ubuntu as confined to 
what can be referred to as ‘worldview Ubuntu’, which is “an ethnographic description 
of the precolonial/premodern sub-Saharan African outlook to life. This is something 
akin to what Kwasi Wiredu tags ‘community thought’. Matolino appropriately christens 
it narrative of return” (Chimakonam, 2016b: 227).  
 
In their reactions to Matolino and kwindingwi’s critique of the philosophy of Ubuntu, 
Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 274) concede that unethical conduct, violence and crime 
cannot be justified, and that moral persons who possess Ubuntu will abhor wrong 
actions and behaviour. However, they believe that there is no justification for the 
agitation for the end of Ubuntu. Rather, they believe that the moral crisis that confronts 
contemporary African states makes a stronger case for human beings to uphold the 
moral theory of Ubuntu. 
 
Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 275) agree with Metz’s position that Matolino and 
Kwindingwi have not been able to advance valid arguments for the abolition of the 
moral theory of Ubuntu. They further consider their claim pessimistic, an attitude that 
Africans ought to dissuade from their consciousness. Koenane and Olatunji, (2017: 
264) consider Matolino and Kwindingwi’s main criticism of Ubuntu as resting on a 
wrong notion of what Ubuntu means. While they interpret Ubuntu as only a narrative 
of return, they conclude that there is nothing fundamentally African about it; that it has 
become obsolete; that since Ubuntu promotes conformity or collectivism, it 
automatically rejects any other frame of mind / values. In other words, Matolino and 
Kwindingwi contend that as a result of prioritising conformity at the expense of freedom 
Ubuntu encourages conflict and tension.  
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Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 265) disagree with Matolino and Kwindingwi’s line of 
thought, claiming that by contending that Ubuntu promotes conformity, which 
eventually leads to conflict and tension since the communities that subscribe to the 
principles of Ubuntu are among other things, known to be intolerant of other races and 
views, Matolino and Kwindingwi are by inference claiming that Ubuntu communities 
do not appreciate the values of other cultures. For Koenane and Olatunji, this further 
amounts to saying that the recent xenophobic incidents in South Africa resulted from 
the adherence by Ubuntu communities to the promotion of conformity. They reject 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s arguments as invalid because they are comparable to 
erroneously stating that capitalism should be abrogated for resulting in violence, 
terrorism, crime and heightened economic competition; or to claiming that the collapse 
of communist countries invalidates the theory of communism.  
 
In opposition to Matolino and Kwindingwi’s criticism of Ubuntu, Koenane and Olatunji 
(2017: 263) posit that Ubuntu “is still alive, relevant and can play a vital role in civil 
society”. Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263) consider Ubuntu to be an all-inclusive 
worldview, which represents the universalised values of humanness such as respect, 
compassion, honesty, empathy and tolerance and which various cultures have in 
common. They subscribe to Metz’s article in which he claims that Ubuntu is just 
beginning. Contrary to Matolino and Kwindingwi’s misrepresentation of the complete 
notion of Ubuntu, Koenane and Olatunji posit that    
 
Ubuntu is an ethic of becoming: it promotes a certain attitude towards a 
relationship an individual should have in order to live harmoniously with 
others. As an ethic of becoming, the Ubuntu ethic or Ubuntu conduct is a 
continuous process of developing morality and should be promoted 
(Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 275). 
 
This study submits that it is indisputable that the world at large and Africa in particular 
are confronted by a deep moral crisis. The challenge here is to seek adequate means 
of confronting them. The solutions advanced by Metz, which Matolino terms dogmatic, 
do not render them less effective in resolving ethical challenges. Perhaps, the world 
needs to embrace elements of dogmatism and deemphasise some aspects of rights 
and freedom in its quest for an ethical society because it appears as though many 
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people employ the principles of rights, equality and freedom to indulge in unethical 
conduct.  
 
4.5 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Traditional African societies, according to Bates (2010: 1134) were infused with 
democratic culture. For instance, in centralised kingdoms were found prominent fora 
that citizens could utilise to challenge the bureaucrats and the royals. In other 
societies, commoners were appointed to the office of the prime minister, while yet in 
other societies, the council of commoners provided a check on the public 
administration. The masses held strong bargaining powers. Although there was 
inequality in pre-colonial African states, the people that occupied privileged positions 
were required to commit themselves to ensuring that state benefits were dispersed to 
the generality of their community members.  
 
The African traditional system of governance differs from the postcolonial and western 
systems in the sense that while modern elected rulers are elected and vacate the office 
at the end of their terms, traditional African ruler-ship is a life-long appointment to 
remain accountable to both their subjects and their ancestors, 
 
to serve all the needs and concerns of their communities and of future 
generations. Political power and leadership of this kind is not obtained 
through the votes. It cannot be assessed accurately by the standards that 
apply to the exercise of multi-party electoral politics in late capitalist 
societies, as exist in the US and UK (Lauer, 2012: 44). 
 
The system of governance in traditional African context, and in particular, in the 
precolonial Akan society, hinged on a non-party politics, and the choice of the head of 
a royal family who is supported by an advisory council of elders in life-long service.  In 
some traditional African societies, the position of the chief in itself, confers absolute 
authority and dictatorship over his community. This kind of African democracy has 
evolved since the origin of civilization. Decision making was consensual and entailed 
the consideration of the views of all members (Lauer, 2012: 41-44). In the precolonial 
Akan society, the chief as the leader and head of the political structure obtained his 
position through heredity. However, he did not command absolute authority. The final 
decision on matters before the council did not proceed from the chief. Rather, his 
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pronouncements were a reflection of the collective decision of all members of council. 
The position of the chief was also considered both political and religious as he is seen 
as the link between the ancestors and members of the community (Matolino, 2009: 
35). Representatives from various clans within the community constituted the council, 
and through them, the concerns of their specific constituencies were relayed to the 
council. The decisions of the council on matters under discussion were arrived at 
through dialogue. Although voting was not a criterion for arriving at a decision (this 
became a determining factor only after its imposition by the colonialists), the decisions 
reached through logical persuasiveness were owned by all, even if they were not all 
in agreement with it (Matolino, 2013: 140). 
 
It may be erroneous to conclude that traditional African system of governance and 
democracy is undemocratic just because the chief was not elected into office. 
However, in many precolonial African contexts, such as the Akan, the chief neither 
rules in line with his independent discretion nor at will, but always according to the 
advice of the elders of his community. He may also be removed from office should he 
allow his personal choices or his personality to influence the style of administration or 
if he attempts to dominate council proceedings. In the West African system of 
democracy by consensus therefore, the council of elders command an authoritative 
position in policy formation and decision making. This system of governance remains 
a common feature in many contemporary African tribes such as the Igbos, Yorubas, 
Hausas, Akan, Ewe and Dagbon. In most cases these systems are run in parallel with 
the adopted western system of governance, and they are recognised by the national 
governments (Lauer, 2012: 45).  
 
The Akan system of governance is similar to what obtained in the traditional Nigerian 
context and it is still much applicable in the contemporary era. The differences in the 
two contexts however, lie in the fact that in the Nigerian context, and specifically with 
the Yoruba and Igbo races, among others, while the council members contribute to 
decision making through debates, the chief’s pronouncements resulting from the 
discussion and agreements are final. Though the chief cannot ordinarily be removed 
for making decisions that are contrary to that of his council members, he can however, 
be unseated if he continuously does so or takes decisions that bring harm to the 
generality of his people without making efforts to reverse them. 
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In traditional African societies, consensus, for Wiredu, was noticeably evident in most 
adult social relations. Most political and social engagements, decision making 
processes, discussions and interactions among members of society were channelled 
towards achieving consensus. Democracy by consensus for Wiredu entails reaching 
a decision having considered not only the views of the majority, but the will of the 
minority as well (Matolino, 2009: 35). In political terms consensus becomes democratic 
since all stakeholders are expected to physically or by representation participate in the 
decisions that may possibly impact on them. The dual representative nature of 
consensual democracy made it participatory and inclusive of minority groups (Ani, 
2014b: 344). Democracy by consensus, for Wiredu (Matolino, 2013: 138) provides a 
political system that is not defined by competition for dominance and power among 
political parties. It avoids conferment of power on winners based on majority votes.  
 
This differs from the Western majoritarian democracy which is primarily concerned 
with protecting the interests of the majority as well as consolidating their power, which 
is easier to achieve than seeking consensual outcomes (Matolino, 2009: 35). It is also 
in contrast with the Western approach where democracy is conceived as adversarial 
competition among various political parties in a majoritarian system, and which confers 
political power on the party that got majority votes in an election and relegates the 
losers to opposition. He further defends democracy by consensus, because it provides 
the electorate with maximal representation, while the minority may be marginalised if 
the majority party is accorded maximum authority (Matolino, 2013: 138). In most sub-
Saharan precolonial African states, conflicts were resolved by seeking the opinions of 
all adult members of the community until they would come to an agreement. This, in 
line with the sharing notion of Ubuntu, also relates to sharing political power in a 
manner that ensures that decisions are not only to the benefit of the majority, but that 
it they also takes cognisance of everyone’s interests. In precolonial Burundi, for 
instance, a king did not unilaterally determine policy directions. Rather, the task 
belonged to both the king and the group of appointed elders to resolve conflicts in a 
way that is was to the benefit of everyone (Murove, 2010: 384). 
 
Wiredu (Ani, 2014a: 311) anchors the process of consensual decision making on the 
spirit of cooperation that was common in the communal structure of these societies. 
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Although he concedes that consensus was not necessarily a common feature in all 
precolonial African societies, the practice was widespread. According to Wiredu (Ani, 
2014b: 342-343) considerable evidence abounds that African deliberations ended with 
decisions by consensus most of the time.  The evidence he refers to is Kenneth 
Kaunda’s claim that issues in traditional African societies were concluded by 
consensus through a process whereby discussions were held in solemn conclaves 
until all participants in the discussions reached agreements. For Wiredu, deliberations 
in this era were not subjected to voting. Consensus was considered self-evident for 
joint action and was an inherent or immanent approach to relationships among people. 
The import of this immanence for him could be seen in people reconciling not for the 
sake of avoiding punishments and revenge, but the genuine nature of dispute 
resolutions, as opposed to what largely obtains in the current era, where disputes are 
resolved without consequent genuine reconciliation. Ani (2014b: 345-346) objects to 
the manner in which Wiredu attached the doctrine of immanence to consensus. 
Although Ani accepts the merits of consensus as a social and political theory, he 
believes that the idea of immanence can only be attached to human beings in general 
and not only to Africans, because such classification plays no helpful role in dispelling 
or in discouraging other negative biases such as that Whites are inherently superior in 
intelligence to other races. 
 
A number of conceptual factors play a significant role in Wiredu’s conception of 
democracy by consensus. Firstly, in his assessment of human nature, he claims that 
the differences among human beings proceed from a mistaken belief or the failure to 
understand and correctly judge their actual interests. When disagreements arise, the 
parties to the dispute should rather take cognisance of the fact that ultimately they 
share an identity of interests (Matolino, 2013: 140). In other words, consensus hinged 
on the belief that the interests of all members of a community are ultimately the same, 
even though their initial understanding of those interests may not be the same. He 
uses the example of an art motif. In the Akan culture, the Art motif portrays a crocodile 
with two heads but one stomach fighting over food and forgetting that the food is 
destined for the same stomach. Wiredu considers this symbol as capturing the basic 
problem of ethics as well as its solution. The problem that it captures is that while all 
human beings have their specific legitimate interests as depicted by the different 
heads, they can however, lead them to forgetting that their interests are the same, 
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specifically their common well-being, which the same stomach symbolises. The root 
cause of disagreements and conflicts result from losing that notion of common interest, 
“and its restoration should facilitate that agreement on the sharing of assets which 
recognises the interest of all parties concerned” (Wiredu, 2009: 10). 
 
Wiredu believes that human beings are able to work through their differences until they 
arrive at a similar comprehension of their interests through rational dialogue and 
debate. He also believes that consensus can be achieved by people or parties with 
different interests if they are prepared to overlook their views in favour of a persuasive 
alternative view. Participants will be able to notice the persuasiveness of an idea if 
they are willing and prepared to suspend their views in favour of a convincing 
alternative view, and if they are committed to attaining consensus (Matolino, 2013: 
141-142).  
 
Consensus for Wiredu does not mean that all aggrieved parties are in full agreement. 
Rather, consensus presupposes and appreciates diversity and diverse points of view 
and utilises dialogue to bring about results that are acceptable to all concerned 
individuals and groups, giving rise to the willingness to suspend disagreement. This 
will enable them to agree on what will be done, while retaining their personal views 
about what is true or false and about what should be done, despite their differences in 
ethical and intellectual belief. In this case rational people who need to make joint efforts 
and decisions agree to curtail their reservations in order to avoid stalemates (Ani, 
2014b: 343). The fundamental basis of the traditional Akan politics, for Wiredu, lies in 
the ability of the elder council members to reach agreements (the will to consensus). 
Those among the elders holding different opinions can maintain the integrity of their 
opinions while at the same time be willing to make compromises that will promote the 
realisation of a plan of action (Lauer, 2012: 46). The residual minority are usually those 
who suspend their disagreements in favour of    
 
the view of the majority which prevails not over, but upon, this minority to 
accept the proposal in question – not just to live with it, which is the basic 
plight of minorities under majoritarian democracy. Wiredu emphasises that 
all this is made possible by the will to consensus. The feasibility of this 
depends not only on the patience and persuasiveness of the right people 
but also on the fact that African traditional systems of the consensual type 
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were not such as to place any one group of persons consistently in the 
position of minority (Ani, 2014b: 343-344).  
 
Wiredu makes a distinction here between decisional and concessional compromise. 
Decisional compromise requires, as noted above, that we collectively determine the 
course of actions to take in attending to the needs of affected individuals by reaching 
practical compromise. It requires that participants in the discussions or the decision 
making process do not relinquish their personal beliefs and values. Although the elders 
in council can make compromises in the process of determining the course of action 
to take, they are however, not obligated to abandon their personal convictions on what 
is wrong or right or on what should be done. Concessional compromise on the other 
hand relates to abandoning personal beliefs and surrendering one’s values to a 
coercive opposition. This process of decision making requires compromises by 
concerned individuals and communities, though not with the view to suppressing their 
different values and beliefs. Wiredu’s idea of the procedure for concessional decision 
making in traditional African politics does not significantly differ from Eze’s concerns. 
While Eze posits that certain mechanisms should be established to minimise the 
negative implications of suppressing individual beliefs and views in a democratic 
dispensation, Wiredu posits that the fundamental objective of communitarian practice 
in the traditional Akan society lies in giving priority attention to the needs and rights of 
members of the community. Consensual decision making then entails that the council 
equally recognise and accommodate the various interests of members of the 
community (Lauer, 2012: 47). 
 
Wiredu’s preference for democracy by consensus over majoritarian democracy 
attempts to develop an understanding of a state where the majority party does not 
exercise political power while overlooking the opposition and minority parties. He notes 
that such slanted appropriation of power has been a source of problems in Africa since 
the end of the colonial era and the emergence of majoritarian democracy. Wiredu’s 
arguments in favour of consensual democracy also attempts to find solutions to the 
myriad of challenges confronting post-colonial Africa (Matolino, 2013: 138). He 
adamantly criticizes the multi-party electoral processes characteristic of modern 
oligarchies (e.g., the UK and US models) as too expensive and distracting from 
development agendas so critical to modern African citizens’ welfare all over the 
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continent. While he notes the potential of democracy by consensus to enhance the 
realisation of contemporary Africa’s search for ideal democratic order, he also 
advocates the adoption of a modified version of its ideals of good governance for 
contemporary systems of governance and administration in Africa (Lauer, 2012: 42- 
43).  
 
Eze (Matolino, 2013: 140) disagrees with the manner in which Wiredu portrays the 
identity of human interests, wondering if such an identity is realistic and, assuming that 
it were; members of the community may not be positively inclined towards it. It is 
unrealistic for instance, to conceive of the possibility of an identity of interests where 
there are little or no commonalities among warring parties. The case of shareholders 
in Shell Oil Corporation in Ogoniland comes to mind, where the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the community makes it impossible for the two stakeholders to 
share an identity of interests. Eze’s position does not sound very plausible, because 
the fact that the two parties are in disagreement does not mean that they cannot have 
a commonality of interests. Indeed they can share similar interest in the sense of both 
parties assisting each other to achieve their individual objectives of growth and 
development. The duty of shell Shell in this case would be to extract the oil in a safe 
and humane manner without destroying the environment, share the resources 
equitably with the Ogoni people, as well as contribute to corporate social responsibility 
in Ogoniland. 
 
Matolino objects to Wiredu’s idea of democracy by consensus as not different from 
what obtains in a one-party state. Even though it is not Wiredu’s intention to advocate 
for a one party state, Matolino considers Wiredu’s position as tending towards a 
dangerous form of a benevolent one party state (Matolino, 2013: 149). Eze criticises 
Wiredu’s treatise of the Akans’ system of governance and the manner in which he 
ascribes political legitimacy to it as an excessive rationalisation, a misleading 
romanticisation, and a non–party system of politics which can serve the purpose of 
defending the early nationalists’ single party system of politics in which their total 
control of political power did not encourage democratic freedom. In precolonial African 
politics, the indigenous council of elders also showed signs that deter democratic 
inclusion (Lauer, 2012: 41-43).   
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Wiredu (Matolino, 2009: 36) conceives the legitimacy of the chief as residing in the 
eldest member who possessed the desired quality of the power of persuasion and 
critical thinking that guaranteed the attainment of consensus through dialogue. 
Contrary to this position, Eze believes that political power derives its legitimacy from 
other factors that enable consensus building, such as religion and other beliefs since 
they are able to influence the kinds of choices that people make. He does not see 
logical persuasion as a sufficient guarantee for political power since the exercise of 
public power also depends on cultural, social and religious fantasies, myths, the party, 
progress, liberation and freedom, which demand more than less of logic in getting 
people to cooperate and understand each other.  
 
Eze (Lauer, 2012: 49-50) argues that it is inconceivable and impossible to concede to 
the effectiveness of consensual politics in the traditional Akan society on the basis that 
all members of the society shared a rational understanding of the power of reason, 
believed in the persuasive strength of ideas and recognised the commonality of their 
interests. He reasons that the deliberations of the elders were tolerated as a result of 
the mystical powers associated with the rituals of governance which ensured that the 
people naively believed that they were bound together by a mystical force. He further 
posits that such institutions would not be able to function in the contemporary era since 
Africans are no longer naïve. The concerns raised by Eze gains support from a number 
of contemporary African political analysts such as Kojo Amanor and Kwame Ninsin; 
and contributors to American anarchists studies such as Mark Lance and Daniel 
Levine (Lauer, 2012: 42-43), who suspect that Wiredu’s consensus politics can 
undermine the egalitarian ideals and inclusiveness of contemporary representative 
democracy and become a means of hiding authoritarianism, and a very useful 
hegemonic instrument for side-lining opposition. Since the eighteenth century, for 
instance, the deliberative process has been controlled by elites who by means of 
rationalistic standards disqualify the ideas of subordinate individuals and groups as 
subjective and emotional. In the process, the elite render their ideas and demands 
illegitimate, insignificant, and inappropriate for public consideration (Lauer, 2012: 42-
50). 
 
Eze cannot be totally right in his views on the ineffectiveness of traditional institutions 
in the postcolonial era because there are many contemporary African societies that 
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still believe in the potency of mystical powers in governance processes. In the current 
day Nigeria for instance, most tribes including the Igbos, Yorubas and Hausas believe 
strongly in the powers of the deities and in their ability to inflict both blessings and 
curses on people as a result of their conducts. While contemporary African societies 
have been enmeshed in developments and globalisation, the fact remains that 
traditional beliefs are still upheld by many individuals and societies. 
 
The Akan system of politics in Ghana is similar to the Igbo system of traditional 
governance in Nigeria as this system has not substantially deviated from its precolonial 
practice. Looking at most traditional African modes of governance will reveal similar 
traits. In the Igbo traditional system of politics, including the contemporary case, 
members of the council are usually older men who have passed the stage of youthful 
exuberance. One of the shortfalls of this system is that almost all members of the 
council, especially in the Igbo case, are men. The age of westernisation has not been 
able to influence the practice.  One of the main reasons for this trend is probably the 
fact that men in the traditional Igbo culture do not consider it appropriate to include 
women in the council. Women may send representatives to the council if so desired. 
 
Wiredu and other philosophers who support democracy by consensus posit that 
traditional African societies were inherently democratic; they outline the process of 
consensus in the traditional African societies and deduce its desirability as a preferable 
type of democracy in contemporary African political systems. Wiredu’s main treatise 
on African politics proceeds from his evaluation of the traditional Akan philosophy and 
culture, from which he has been able to produce a modern philosophy in the form of 
democracy by consensus that is applicable to contemporary African society. Wiredu 
posits that based on merits and in continuation of the good traditional African 
democratic practices of the Akan and other commendable African societies, such as 
the Igbos, democracy by consensus is a better option than majoritarian democracy. 
He appeals to a return to democracy by consensus because democracy in Africa was 
not imported, but has always been an inherent feature of rule in pre-colonial African 
society, with distinctive advantages over majoritarian rule (Matolino, 2013: 139).  
 
There have been various disagreements among theorists on the political legitimacy of 
the traditional African system of rule and their its relevance to contemporary 
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democracy. The traditional African system of consensus politics which Wiredu alludes 
to has survived for centuries despite colonial interference and the corruption of the 
local traditional authority. While Wiredu promotes non-party politics, Eze promotes 
multi-party politics in Africa. Wiredu’s non-party consensual politics is essentially 
utilitarian, though he has not been able to provide practical processes for its 
implementation, capable of replacing multi-party rule in a large society. Nonetheless, 
Wiredu and Eze are in agreement on a number of areas such as promoting freedom 
of speech and opinion, discouraging autocracy, and encouraging political contestation. 
They both discourage the lust for power, wasteful, extravagant and reckless lifestyles 
which seem to be prevalent in the political life of many oligarchic democracies. They 
both believe that African societies can derive immense benefits from systems of rule 
that have not been perverted by the worste forms of capitalism. However, they both 
disagree on the feasibility of a reformed kind of democracy by consensus as an 
alternative to the excesses of western democratic practices. A substantial aspect of 
the indigenous African system of rule has remained undiluted and effective even 
throughout the colonial era and up to the contemporary period as its intrinsic values 
portray (Lauer, 2012: 54). 
  
4.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored the conception of ethics and moral life, and the system of 
politics and governance in precolonial African societies. The concepts of ethics and 
morality have been used interchangeably in the research as they are taken to refer to 
the same thing. Traditional African societies consider ethics as a measure of right and 
wrong and as relating to goodness of character. Goodness of character proceeds from 
an individual’s development of virtues such as mutual respect, honesty, kindness, 
compassion and justice. A number of theorists do not agree with the notion that African 
ethics originates from religion. There are other philosophers however, who posit that 
ethics and religion are inseparable because most African moral notions have religious 
underpinnings, which compel traditional Africans to be ethical in order not to incur the 
wrath of the gods, the deities, ancestral spirits, and in order to attract divine blessings 
and favours. 
 
The early westerners to the African continent denied the existence of ethics and 
morality among traditional African societies. They also considered their traditional 
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practices and beliefs irrelevant, since they were deemed primitive, irrational, 
uncivilised and pagans. The quest to correct their erroneous conceptions resulted in 
the destruction of substantial aspects of traditional Africans’ social life, culture, 
traditions, and family values, which were founded on communal, ethical and religious 
principles. However many of these westerners eventually realised their prejudice and 
ignorance of the true nature of traditional Africans’ cultural belief systems and admitted 
to the existence of well outlined standards of morality in Africa. There are well-defined 
systems of morality according to various African theorists and philosophers, which 
played a significant role in regulating the lives of community members. However, the 
source of traditional African ethics has been contested by various theorists. While 
some theorists consider religion as the source of African morality, others do not share 
the same notion. As earlier mentioned in this chapter, Wiredu and Gyekye (Udokang, 
2014: 268; Anderson, 2013: 165-166; Kazeem, 2011: 265-271) for instance, claim that 
society and rational thinking, and not religion, shape the morality of individuals. They 
argue that African morality results from occasions when people take into consideration 
the impact of their thoughts, words and actions on others, and not as a result of 
metaphysical intervention. This is what Wiredu terms the motivated quest for 
sympathetic impartiality; he claims that an individual is ethical when he shows due 
concern for the welfare of other people and hypothetically puts himself in their shoes.  
 
Contrary to Wiredu’s position, Kazeem claims that morality is not necessarily universal 
in all communities, and neither is it solely based on the principle of sympathetic 
impartiality. He posits that morality is a product of both sympathetic impartiality and 
Rawls’ principle of rational egoism (calculating impartiality), in which the process of 
determining an impartial principle of justice, which creates an egalitarian and impartial 
distribution of benefits, rights and obligations would require that participants abstract 
themselves from all the factors that allow them to makes decisions on the basis of their 
prejudices. Anderson disagrees with Gyekye and Wiredu’s position, arguing that to 
lend credence to their views would create the impression of the existence of any 
religious free-society in Ghana, or in Africa as a whole. He submits that all societies 
are influenced by religion, perhaps at different levels. He claims that religious 
influences permeate all strata of human social life, including their dress mode, their 
food and even their speeches. Although the debate around the source of morality may 
persist, morality can be said to proceed from either religion, society, or from both. 
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Many societies do not distinguish between religious and moral laws. These societies 
rejected what religion denounced and accepted what religion sanctioned. What 
matters in essence, is that human beings should conduct themselves ethically and 
professionally if there is any hope of realising a just and fair society. 
 
African worldviews believe in the interrelatedness, interdependency and 
interconnectedness of all beings in a manner that the flourishing of one entity affects 
the flourishing of the others. They also consider it the duty of human beings to help 
each other and to protect nature and the environment for the benefit of all. The 
communal nature of traditional African ethics hinges on taking into account the 
interests of all community members. It recognises that human beings can only exist in 
communion with others. As a result the individual recognises that the purpose of his 
or her existence is to take care of both his interests as well as the interests of other 
community members. African traditional ethics as a result, promotes humanism, which 
in the sense of Ubuntu as propagated by Southern African communities,  describes 
the well-being of a person as causally dependent on other people; that a person has 
the moral obligation to be the best human being possible, living together in harmony 
as members of one community, deriving personal fulfilment without being selfish; 
showing care and concern for each other’s quality of life, identifying with each other, 
showing solidarity with each other, and respecting human rights.[MK22] 
 
African traditional societies promote communal responsibility for the welfare of others. 
In this regard, they collectively assist their neighbours to meet their needs, such as 
farming or building of houses. The principle of communal responsibility holds that the 
actions of a person can affect the community as a whole. This culture is often criticised 
as detrimental to self-individuation. It has been blamed for the myriad of problems that 
African countries, which subscribe to this philosophy confront, such as intertribal wars 
and conflicts, where an individual or group or community are is held responsible for 
the actions of their members. An example of such cases includes the Rwandan 
genocide.  Many cynics condemn the principle of communal responsibility, claiming 
that it places an impediment on the realisation of individual happiness. While there are 
negative implications of communal responsibility, there are also positive aspects to it 
such as lack of discriminatory practices, and consideration for the interests and welfare 
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of all members of the community. It is therefore recommended that the negative 
aspects be curtailed, while the positive aspects should be encouraged. 
 
Traditional African societies are considered inherently democratic and always seeking 
all sorts of agreements on most major decisions that impact on citizens. In most sub-
Saharan precolonial African states, conflicts were resolved by seeking the opinions of 
all adult members of the community until they come to an agreement. Political powers 
were also dispersed in a manner that ensured that decisions made were to the benefit 
of both the majority and the minority. Specific attention is paid to consensus as 
essential in reaching just decisions. Democracy by consensus, for Wiredu provides a 
political system that is not defined by competition for dominance and power among 
political parties. It avoids conferment of power on winners based on majority votes. 
Wiredu, further defends democracy by consensus, because it provides the electorate 
with maximal representation, while the minority may be marginalised if the majority 
party is accorded maximum authority. This is in contrast with the Western approach 
where democracy is conceived as adversarial competition among various political 
parties in a majoritarian system, and which confers political power on the party that 
got gets majority votes in an election and relegates the losers to the opposition.  
 
The African traditional system of governance differs from postcolonial and western 
systems in the sense that while modern rulers are elected and vacate office at the end 
of their terms, traditional African rulership is a life-long appointment to remain 
accountable to both their subjects and their ancestors. In some traditional African 
societies, the position of the chief in itself confers absolute authority and dictatorship 
over his community. In other societies such as the Akan society, the chief did does not 
command absolute authority. Rather, his final decision was is a reflection of the 
collective decision of all members of council. 
 
As noted in this chapter, Matolino criticises Wiredu’s idea democracy by consensus 
as capable of leading to the entrenchment of one-party politics. Eze further considers 
Wiredu’s system of governance as a misleading romanticisation, excessive 
rationalisation and a non-party system of politics which can be used to justify the single 
system of party politics of the early nationalists which discouraged democratic freedom 
as a result of their complete control of political power (Lauer, 2012: 41-43). In the 
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traditional African system of governance, the council of elders also displayed 
tendencies of democratic exclusion. A number of philosophers concur with Eze’s 
concerns, claiming that Wiredu’s consensus building processes could become a useful 
hegemonic means of side-lining opposition, an instrument of camouflaging 
authoritarianism, and a means of undermining the egalitarian inclusiveness and ideals 
of contemporary representative democracy. 
 
Wiredu appears to have preferred democracy by consensus over Western majoritarian 
democracy as he subscribes to the kind of political system which does not promote a 
winner takes it all philosophy, but which equally provides for the needs of all society 
members, irrespective of their political affiliations. This is the kind of system that should 
be encouraged in Africa, since history shows that the majority party tends to take a 
scornful approach to the contributions of the minority or opposition parties. The latter 
also tends to largely employ an adversarial outlook to the implementation of policies 
by the ruling party. This contentious approach does not make the political climate in 
most cases conducive for effective management and administration of the state. 
Therefore, while it is noted that there are merits in the views of Matolino and Eze, the 
benefits of democracy by consensus should be further explored so as to guarantee 
the realisation of the kind of state that all its members desire, a state free of favouritism 
and bias and which is structured on the disposition towards a just and reasonable 
treatment of all community members. 
 
This chapter has shown that the system of ethics and politics in the indigenous African 
context largely differs from what obtains in the contemporary era, where almost every 
facet of life seems to be characterised by moral laxity, including rivalry, contestations, 
individualism and secularisation. As noted in this chapter, a number of theorists, such 
as Matolino and Kwindingwi have assumed a defeatist attitude towards the myriad of 
ethical challenges that the current era faces. They have called for the end of Ubuntu, 
claiming that as an ethical solution, it does not possess the context and the capacity 
to represent an ethical inspiration or moral code in the contemporary era. Despite their 
disillusionment, their claims, as Chimakonam proffers, should be considered a 
conundrum that needs to be critically analysed with the view to redressing noted 
challenges. Koenane and Olatunji also submit that while moral laxity cannot be 
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condoned, there is no justification to call for the end of Ubuntu; rather, the moral crisis 
that Africa faces is an impetus for human beings to uphold the principles of Ubuntu.  
These suggestions must be given comprehensive consideration if there is any hope 
of realising a desirable ethical and ideal postcolonial African state. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 FAILURE OF POST COLONIAL AFRICAN STATES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I have examined the inextricable nexus between the 
indigenous system of politics and governance in traditional African societies, and how 
ethics, though an autonomous concept, has in practice permeated all aspects of the 
indigenous system in Africa. In that chapter, some theorists have argued attractively 
that Africans are naturally religious, because many scholars wrongly or rightly seem 
to believe that morality is an aspect of religion. Without making any judgement of the 
relationship between religion and morality, the chapter concentrated on carefully 
tracing the link between the indigenous political system of Africa and morality as a way 
to prepare the mind towards appreciating the scholarly position to be canvassed in this 
chapter (five). This position is that the failure of post-colonial political system in Africa 
is a necessary fallout of the extrication between the ‘modern’ political system and the 
naturally moral African society. The chapter examines the moral status of post-colonial 
African leadership which appears largely questionable. That is, examining  why 
leaders and managers  find it overwhelmingly unattainable to create the kind of 
organisations, and by extension, society that is inspiring, ethical, immune to 
bureaucracy, and capable of excellent economic performance. 
 
5.2 CONCEPTUALISATION OF A FAILED STATE 
The challenges confronting post-colonial African states include erosion of African 
values, cultures and traditions which had hitherto been founded on the type of morality 
which scholars have described as communalistic in nature. This has resulted in decline 
in the efficacy of traditional African authority, customs and traditions, and consequently 
enthroned deterioration of African politics; social, political and economic difficulties 
such as poverty; unemployment; underdevelopment; homelessness; illiteracy; 
diseases; famine; wars; individualism; economic mismanagement; bad leadership; the 
negative impact of colonialism; the threat of globalisation; and the failure of individuals 
and groups to play their part in creating an ethical and just state. The endemic 
problems that confront post-colonial African states render the future of democracy in 
Africa uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation, unless adequate 
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measures are implemented for the realisation of the desired state. In sum, the situation 
has resulted in to seemingly failed states on the continent of Africa. 
 
There are a number of understandings of what a failed state means. Bah (2012: 71-
72) makes a distinction between state failure and state decay, arguing that state decay 
is not state failure, but a precursor to and the root cause of state failure. He considers 
a failing or failed state as characterised by civil war and or political instability that result 
from social, political and economic challenges that undermine the stability of the state. 
He considers state decay as a process of decline in the material well-being of the 
citizens, and a reduction in political and civil liberties. This process of decline leads to 
the citizens’ social, economic and political dissatisfaction and eventually turns to 
political violence that makes it impossible for the state to fulfil its duties. 
 
The comparative approach to identifying failed states differs from Bah’s 
characterisation of such countries. For Hill (2009: 41), failed state analysts who 
subscribe to the comparative approach consider failed states as those that the 
international community recognise as sovereign but which are not able to provide their 
citizens with necessities such as good governance, security, law and order. While 
Jackson considers failed states as those that are not able to guarantee basic civil 
conditions for their population, Rotberg (Hill, 2009: 41) considers failed states as 
dangerous, highly conflicted, tense and associated with bitter contestations among the 
warring parties. For Gros (Hill, 2009: 41), failed states are associated with societies 
where the governments do not fulfil their parts of the social contract; and Zartman (Hill, 
2009: 41) considers failed states as those that are no longer able to exercise the basic 
functions of the state. Each of these conceptions of a failed state is underpinned by 
an understanding of the functions of a state, of what constitutes a successful state, 
and the areas where the state has failed to perform as expected. 
 
This study does not share Bah’s notion of a failed state. Rather, it subscribes to the 
comparative conception of a failing or failed state, and argues here that failing or failed 
states are those that derelict their constitutional obligations, or that have not been able 
to govern their territories in a manner that meets the needs and aspirations of their 
citizens. These are states that despite all the human and natural resources at their 
disposal, have failed to use them optimally for the benefit, welfare and development 
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of their population and countries. States where corruption and moral laxity have 
negatively impacted on their ability to promote a better life, equity, justice and fairness 
are failed states. War is not the only manifestation of state failure, because there are 
countries in Africa and in other continents (such as Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and 
Iraq), where the impact of the level of poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, 
diseases, illiteracy and marginalisation, among other ills, on the lives of their citizens, 
is comparable to what obtains in a state of war. When the conditions in a state have 
degenerated to the extent that some of their citizens ransack the dustbins for food, 
even though this could be avoided if the government conducted its affairs differently, 
it is a failed state.  
 
5.3 CHALLENGES CONFRONTING POST COLONIAL AFRICAN STATES 
As has been mentioned above, and as the examples of South Africa and Nigeria will 
show, post-colonial African states suffer many challenges and setbacks. The 
challenges in question are arguably applicable to each of the countries in Africa. 
These, according to the Saylor Foundation (2012: 1), include erosion of African values, 
cultures and traditions, socio economic crisis, leadership failures, corruption, 
authoritarianism and military intervention. For Ogbogbo (2011: 1), the challenges 
include the negative impact of colonialism, ineffective and unethical leadership, 
globalisation and failure of citizens to play their part in creating the desired state. Mann 
(2012: 2) considers these challenges  to include poverty, homelessness, the high cost 
of owning a property, unemployment, illiteracy, drugs, health challenges, low levels of 
education and literacy, low access to clean running water, high famine rates, and 
which are generally at the lowest in terms of development in comparison with other 
parts of the world. These countries are further confronted by wars, diseases, 
individualism, economic mismanagement, greedy and politically ambitious individuals 
and leaders who inflict harm on their citizens as a result of their selfish interests. The 
following sections will specifically examine some of these challenges. 
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5.3.1 Erosion of African Values, Cultures and Traditions  
The activities of westerners in Africa have been blamed by a number of theorists, 
including Wiredu, Dolamo, Igboin, Chimakonam, Ezenweke and Nwadialor, as largely 
responsible for the large scale distortion and erosion of the value that Africans 
attached to human life, to identity and the originally-held sense of humanism among 
Africans. This sense of humanism or Ubuntu is reflected, according to Shutte (2009: 
98), in the manner in which human beings value others in the same way that they 
value themselves and in their embodiment of the wholeness of character. This all-
inclusive worldview according to Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263) “stands for 
universalised humanness (ubuntu/botho) values, which are shared across all cultures, 
and which include care, respect, tolerance, honesty, hospitality, compassion and 
empathy”. This African moral theory, according to Metz (2009: 342) “prohibits people 
not only from isolating themselves from others…but also from not caring about others”. 
Though there are a few theorists such as Matolino and Kwindingwi, as noted in the 
previous chapter, who oppose this very idea, but whosetheir arguments are not very 
tenable because they are mostly based on selected events or judged on the logic of 
Western rationality. However, other theorists such as Igboin, Idang, Wahab, 
Mabovula, Omale and Amana contend that there are other factors as well which 
contribute to the things that have gone wrong in Africa. Their views will be considered 
in this section. Let us proceed by firstly considering the views of those who contend 
that colonialism and western influences are largely responsible for the distortion of 
African values, cultures and traditions. 
 
For Dolamo (2014: 5-6), the westerners were bent on transforming all aspects of 
African life to their own conception of what human identity, proper practices and beliefs 
should be. This included religious practices, intellectual orientation and the 
replacement of traditional African names with their western imports. Their influence 
has dramatically affected and eroded the communal orientation of traditional Africans 
and   replaced it with the kind of individualism that permeates almost every aspect of 
human life, including the social life, family orientations, values and the mode of worship 
which were initially based on moral, religious and communal structures. 
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Ezenweke and Nwadialor (2013: 61-62) also observe the negative implications of the 
erosion of African communalism and its replacement by individualism. They posit that 
while the African cultural belief systems and way of life in general was were largely 
anchored on the sense of community, on a chain of societal interrelationships, more 
than individualism, and on the understanding of the individual as existing in 
communion with others, the westerners ignored these tenets and instead proceeded 
to implement their own conceptions of a proper society. The Western ideology portrays 
the person as existing for himself, as autonomous and who in the process of realising 
the self, may choose to have relationships with others.  
 
Chimakonam, Agu & and Agbo (2014: 145-146) contends that the individualistic 
orientation of western liberal democracy, which Africa subscribes to is not suitable for 
the largely communal nature of African societies. They posit that the individualistic 
ontology that the West propagates, which places the individual ahead of the 
community, is in contrast with the African ontology, which while not denying the 
individualistic nature of the person, places the community ahead of the individual. The 
consequences of the western individualistic ideology, for Ezenweke and Nwadialor 
(2013: 61), are problematic for the human race because if the “individual is prior to 
society, and if society emerges through the voluntary contact of individuals trying to 
maximise their self-interests, the survival of both the individual and the society 
becomes problematic” (Ezenweke and Nwadialor, 2013: 61). Some of such 
unfavourable consequences manifest themselves in the extent of selfishness, greed, 
corruption and war that Africa in particular and the world at large contend with. 
 
Igboin (2011: 101) notes that colonialism impacts negatively on the traditional moral 
practice of Africans through its destructive influences. The colonial intervention 
paganised the African values and depersonalised the African person. Colonialism also 
dislodged the African political value and replaced it with their imported ideas. 
Ezenweke and Nwadialor (2013: 62) condemn the negative influences of colonialism 
in their observation that the African family and social life was were fractured by the 
processes of urbanisation and industrialisation and its consequent detribalisation, 
while the African way of life, religion and morality became secularised. These 
westerners failed to acknowledge that there were specific networks of relations and 
value systems that had to be respected. Rather they suppressed the indigenous 
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modes of human relations, including traditional forms of education and literature. While 
Igboin (2011: 101) observes that they promoted their values and morals as better than 
those of Africans, Dolamo (2014: 5-6) further notes that they fashioned their education 
in a manner that portrayed the westerners as superior to Africans through the process 
that enabled the colonised Africans to willingly devalue their own beliefs and to freely 
adopt the western culture since many of them had also come to accept that the 
authenticity of a person depended on rejecting the African way of life and adopting the 
colonisers’ mentality. 
 
The negative impact of colonialism, for Igboin (2011: 101-102) resulted in the neglect 
or abandonment of African values by many Africans. The cherished values have 
deteriorated to such a length that they have been largely replaced by lack of integrity. 
He observes that the importation of foreign ideas has turned most Africans into double 
personalities who on the one hand are Africans by nature and westerners by ideas, 
mentality and skill. The kinds of changes that colonial rule and westernisation as a 
whole instigated on African values, cultures and traditions have resulted in oppression, 
discrimination, capitalism and corruption. Igboin (2011: 102) further notes that 
globalisation is eroding the African values that were cherished in the past and 
replacing them with insatiable appetites for worldly materials, with greed and loss of 
community orientation. The erosion of values has also infiltrated governmental 
departments, parastatals and the private sector in such a manner that their activities 
have come to be largely characterised by corruption, dishonesty, inefficiency, bribery, 
organised crime, harassment, favouritism and cronyism.  
 
Western influence in Africa through globalisation, for Chimakonam (2016a: 1-9) poses 
a number of challenges to the conception of and the relationship between human 
beings. While it seems to constitute the world into a global village, promotes a sense 
of belonging, social and cultural integration of individuals and nations, harmonious 
relationship among human beings and cooperation. theThe expected global 
consciousness produces intended and unintended states of discrimination or biases 
in the human conception of and attitudes towards other races and cultures and results 
in the perpetuation of tensions in human relations. As a result, globalisation has failed 
in some of its objectives because human beings and cultures, according to the 
phenomenon of concealment are inadvertently or intentionally, perpetually in conflict 
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with each other in their daily quests. The collapse of cultural boundaries as a result of 
globalisation has not been able to dissuade individuals from their prejudices or from 
intentionally or unintentionally judging other cultures from their individual cultural 
orientations. In their associations with other people, rather, they tend to always 
prioritise their personal, group or racial interests. This tension results in the erosion of 
the individual’s ability to correctly understand and relate well with other people. 
 
The phenomenon of concealment adequately encapsulates what obtains in reality, 
whereby human beings are naturally biased towards those they are not familiar with. 
This tendency is largely responsible for the discriminatory attitudes of some people 
towards other races and cultures that in some cases lead to violence and war. It is 
noted that western influence has inflicted so much harm on most aspects of African 
life. However, it has also contributed to Africa’s minute progress in areas of 
development, although it appears that most Africans seem to have excessively 
imbibed these external influences to the detriment of their wellbeing and a desirable 
society. A question that one may pose here is how could Africans have allowed 
themselves to be so corrupted by westernisation to the point of losing their identity and 
values? There must have been those among them that resisted such invasion of their 
values and beliefs. Many of them however, would have been unable to withstand the 
western threat since the colonisers were prepared to use any means necessary to 
achieve their objectives, including threats and violence. 
 
While the scholars examined above largely consider colonialism and western influence 
as responsible for the erosion of African values, cultures and traditions, various 
scholars disagree with this trend of thought. Rather, they argue, as will be exposed in 
the following section, that Africans have largely contributed to this development in 
ways such as their leadership styles, embracingement of foreign products and 
lifestyles, and in the lack of humanity towards other people. 
 
Igboin (2011: 101) notes that colonialism and western imports cannot be solely 
responsible for everything that has gone wrong in African societies because 
colonialism has produced some positive changes for African states, while there are 
those traditional Africans who did not always adhere to their values prior to the advent 
of colonialism. While the early westerners to the African continent are blamed for most 
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of the negatives influences that characterise contemporary Africans, he claims that it 
is worth asking if there are other factors such as internal revolution that could have 
negatively affected the values of Africans. It is not feasible to conclusively posit that 
such a revolution would have occurred as a matter of certainty. However, since life is 
dynamic and the only thing constant in life is change, he concludes that it is safe to 
proffer the possibility of changes taking place in Africa at varied speed and magnitude.  
 
Omale and Amana (2014: 3) contend that the examples set by African leaders indicate 
that Africans are personally responsible for the challenges that confront their societies, 
including the erosion of African values, cultures and traditions because most of these 
leaders do not live lead by example. They describe the leadership styles in larger part 
of the African continent as   
 
that of personal politics, personality politics and politics by leadership …the 
centralisation of all political power in the executive…In Nigeria, for example, 
the personalised nature of the political arena is evident in the domination 
by a powerful ‘godfather’ at the apex of a vast patronage network at  federal, 
state and local level (Omale and & Amana, 2014: 3) 
 
The phenomenon of ‘god-fatherism’, according to Olarinmoye (2008: 70) is so highly 
entrenched in the Nigerian society that in most cases the ‘godfathers’ determine who 
occupies the most strategic positions in Nigeria, including the presidency. As a result 
of the level of control that he has over the party’s structure, “he becomes the sponsor 
of  politicians…He uses his control of party machinery to impose his clients as  party 
candidates for elective office and ensures their electoral success through  activities 
which have been characterised as electoral corruption” (Olarinmoye, 2008: 70). This 
political ‘kingmaker’ referred to as godfather in Nigeria “has created a lot of problems 
in the Nigerian democratic process. It is one of the biggest dangers to democracy in 
Nigeria” (Ebegbulem, 2012: 226). With this kind of political configuration, it is not 
surprising that such a society cannot produce credible election results and public office 
holders who will be committed to putting the interests of their country first. The kinds 
of values, cultures and traditions that will emerge in such a country can only be 
unsuitable for the realisation of an ethical and just state. 
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Idang (2015: 107) attributes the factors that are responsible for the erosion of African 
values, cultures and traditions, not necessarily to western influence or colonialism, but 
to the “intentional borrowing of cultural traits from other societies with which the 
beneficiary comes in contact, or an imposition of cultural traits on one society by a 
stronger society intending to assimilate the weaker society” (Idang, 2015: 107). 
Wahab, Odunsi and Ajiboye link the erosion to the  
 
ease and frequency with which people move around the world, and 
improvements in communications and the global marketing of styles, places 
and images…People are  no longer confined to  developing identity based 
upon the place in which they live, but can choose from a wide range of 
different identities. They now adopt clothes, ways of speaking, values, and 
lifestyles of any group of their choice (Wahab et al., 2012: 6).  
 
The difficulty for most contemporary Africans as a result of the embracingement of 
western cultures and values is that they “find it difficult to adjust between their primitive 
beliefs in certain aspects of their culture and the supposedly modern mode of accepted 
behaviour” (Idang, 2015: 107) and way of life. This is further complicated  as a result 
of the lack of adequate measures, programmes and systems to bridge this gap so as 
to produce a balance between the conflicted western and African orientations. In order 
to preserve the African identity, Africans cannot afford to lose their values, cultures 
and traditions. Therefore, adequate steps must be implemented by various African 
societies to preserve their uniqueness. While it is acknowledged that it may be difficult 
to ignore the external influences, conscious effort is required on the part of Africans, 
especially the parents, teachers and leaders, to preserve those aspects of their values, 
cultures and traditions that promote authentic existence.  
 
While the erosion of  African values, customs and traditions by westernisation is 
acknowledged, it is however, noted that some of the traditional African values, 
customs and traditions  have been violated by Africans themselves in a manner that 
has impacted negatively on various aspects of their lives. For instance, part of the 
African worldview is to care for the environment, respect it, and protect it. This belief, 
according to Idang (2015: 108),  
 
had a way of preserving and conserving nature…the society was 
guaranteed an increase in agricultural productivity, which was the mainstay 
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of the traditional economy. Today, with the violation of these customs and 
myths, we suffer low agricultural productivity […] because the traditional 
values that safeguarded the land, have been watered-down and we do not 
have the technological know-how to replace these beliefs that have been 
abandoned (Idang, 2015: 108). 
 
Mabovula (2011: 39) delves into the manner in which traditional Africans, both in the 
past and currently, rallied around each other with the view to finding solutions to 
emerging problems and to promoting peace and wellbeing. HShe[MK23] notes that the 
erosion of the traditional African sense of humanism by Africans has resulted in 
unstable societies as members of society no longer trust each other, while aggression, 
violence and crime are no longer condemned in the strongest terms.  
 
It is glaring from the philosophers examined here that both Africans and the westerners 
have contributed in certain measures to the erosion of African values, customs and 
traditions. Ezenweke and Nwadialor (2013: 62) observe that despite the attempts by 
the westerners to erode everything African, their efforts were not totally successful 
since African traditional value systems and way of life have to some extent continued 
to thrive in most contemporary African societies. Despite Ezenweke and Nwadialor’s 
claims, it cannot be denied that substantial damages have has been effected in thisese 
regards as shown by the myriad of problems confronting the African continent as a 
whole. Contemporary Africans cannot continue to blame western influence for their 
problems. Rather, they need to be sincerely committed to rectifying the negative 
implications of colonial influences in their societies, and to take corrective actions in 
minimising reducing to the barest minimum, their personal contributions to the 
problems that confront their societies. 
 
5.3.2 Decline in the Efficacy of Traditional African Authority, Customs and 
Traditions 
Africans, according to Eze (Lauer, 2012: 48-50), generally no longer believe in their 
common identity as a result of the predatory, migratory and culturally challenging way 
of life that they confront. He claims that Africans no longer value the sacred powers of 
the chiefs, which were believed to have proceeded from the ancestors and which as 
a result, legitimised the chiefs’ authority.  He posits that the traditional African system 
of governance is no longer relevant to the contemporary era because the traditional 
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bases of consensual politics are no longer valid as a result of factors such as religious 
proliferation and secularism. Eze claims that Africans currently have a varied 
understanding of themselves and of the conflicts that confront them, different from the 
way they understood these factors during the precolonial era. He sees post-colonial 
Africans as enlightened and prepared to fight for theirs and other human rights issues 
that confront their communities.  
 
Lauer (2012: 50) disagrees with Eze’s analysis in this regard, claiming that the 
historians and political analysts who examined the decline of chieftaincy noticed that 
traditional rulers in West Africa, for instance, lost the confidence and respect of their 
community members as a result of the worsening economic conditions of the 
population. The traditional elites were corrupted and pauperised when they colluded 
with the colonisers to dispossess the inhabitants of their resources. Furthermore, 
people who lacked ancestral or historical lineage to traditional authorities were 
installed as chiefs. 
 
Wiredu (Ani, 2014b: 342-344) further disagrees with Eze’s reasons for the erosion and 
irrelevance of the traditional African system of governance in the contemporary era. 
Rather, he considers the currently conventional majoritarian democracy as largely 
responsible for the incessant conflicts that pervade African states, for the political 
instabilities in many contemporary African societies and for making it impossible for 
some minority groups to assume political power. He finds multiparty democracy 
divisive, aggressive and adversarial, and resultsresulting in competitive struggle for 
power, eventually causing harm to the people. He refers to the political nature of the 
United States of America (USA) as an example of where the checks and balances 
may not produce the envisaged balance and where opposition often makes it 
impossible or difficult for the government to implement its policy proposals. This 
situation tends to lead to the disenfranchisement of large sections of society since both 
the supporters of the government and the opposition are many. He therefore 
condemns it as promoting disharmony, incompatible with the aspirations of 
communalism and characterised by the colonial mentality. In his search for an 
alternative paradigm, he peruses the African traditional past and argues in favour of 
democracy by consensus, which he considers as not based on political party 
organisation.  
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Wiredu, according to Matolino (2013: 142-143) neither subscribes to multi-party 
politics nor to a one-party system of governance which he considers as not promoting 
human rights. He does not believe that one-party politics originates from the traditional 
African society, especially not from the Akan system, which was also neither multi-
party nor a one-party rule. He condemns the one party state, which the first post-
colonial African leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah 
and Kenneth Kaunda endorsed in one form or the other under the banner or pretext 
of returning to various forms of pre-colonial African traditional systems of governance.  
These leaders argue that their reformed systems of governance brought unity to the 
fragmented African societies that were divided along racial, religious, regional and 
political lines, while remaining loyal to the traditional set up of society. A superficial 
consideration of theirse reasons reveals a measure of merits. However, the 
implementation process became corrupted by authoritarian rulers and politicians who 
were more interested in furthering their personal quests for power and self-enrichment. 
As a resultConsequently, the a one-party system became the dominant form of 
governance for specific individuals and groups who were opportuned to take charge 
of the highest echelons of political office and wanted to remain in power for as long as 
they possibly could. 
 
Eze (Lauer, 2012: 47), does not see any fundamental difference between Wiredu’s 
rejection of early multi-party politics and the ideological defence of one-party 
democracy by the early African nationalists. He considers Wiredu as  belonging to the 
camp of the  early nationalists such as Nkrumah, Senghor, Nyerere, Kenyatta, Toure, 
and Cabral, who criticised electoral politics as un-African and multiparty democracy as 
a camouflage intended to gain popular support and to discourage or prevent 
opposition politics, while supporting  communalism in order to promote their selfish  
interests. These nationalists  
 
proposed the resurrection of African identity and depended upon 
themselves to lead a return to the essential, original African harmony and 
unity that had been trampled by colonialism. And since history shows that 
the myth of lost African unity was used as a rhetorical justification to 
suppress political association and press freedom, critics regard both 
models as equally dangerous vehicles of tyranny through the exclusion of 
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individuals or groups who fail to embody the essence of the community 
(Lauer, 2012: 47-48). 
 
The reasons given by Eze, Lauer and Wiredu for the decline in the efficacy of 
traditional African authority and the conflicts in postcolonial African states are not 
individually sufficient. Rather all their reasons can be said to be collectively responsible 
for the complications that confront Africa currently. The decline can be attributed to 
both the impact of modernity, the western liberal democratic system of governance, 
as well as the loss of confidence in traditional authority. While the efficacy of traditional 
African authority may not be as strong as it was in the precolonial era, its role in the 
current era cannot be underestimated, because the institution of traditional leaders is 
still very much in place in most contemporary African societies, where the prominent 
ones are recognised by their governments and are accorded the social, political and 
material benefits that accompany their office.  
 
Koenane (2017b: 1-3) gives credence to the continued relevance of the system of 
traditional authorities in Africa generally and in South Africa in particular in his claim 
that the institution of traditional leadership remains valuable  in South Africa and can 
make positive contributions to the development of the  country as a whole and the 
development of  rural communities in particular. He notes that over the years debates 
on the relevance of traditional authorities in contemporary South African society have 
persisted. Those who consider traditional authorities authority as irrelevant in the 
contemporary era argue that its structure is not democratic. However, those who 
consider the institutions of traditional leadership relevant in the contemporary era, 
especially those who dwell in these areas, believe that it is unlike the municipal system 
of governance which is both ineffective and corrupt. Koenane considers the traditional 
system of governance to be more accountable, based on the kind of consensus that 
defines ethics and politics in indigenous African societies, more tolerant and 
consequently more effective than contemporary systems of liberal democracies 
democracy, which are intolerant of the views of opposition parties. 
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5.3.3 Deteriorating African Politics  
A number of reasons have been alluded to by various theorists and institutions as 
responsible for the deteriorating condition of politics in contemporary African societies. 
The Saylor Foundation (2012: 1) notes that as most African countries got closer to 
independence between the 1950s and 1960s, the African leaders who led the agitation 
for independence neither gave comprehensive thought to the post independence 
period, nor put comprehensive plans in place to manage the governance processes. 
On the other hand, the departing colonisers did not properly prepare the African states 
for post-independence. Rather, according to Cheeseman Iet al., , Anderson & 
Scheibler (2013: 404), they hastily assembled institutions and democratic constitutions 
that did not include sufficient input from the local population. France and Britain, 
according to the The Saylor Foundation (2012: 1), appear to be the only ones that 
made attempts to put in place the kinds of skills and institutions necessary for 
successful self-governance. Aiyede (2009: 262) further observes that during the 
transition period, which involved a change of leaders, the dominant elite employed a 
strategy of predatory rule, which enabled them to manipulate the system to suit their 
selfish agendas. 
 
The independence of African states attracted immense celebration and hope for a 
better life among the citizens. Contrary to these expectations, the The Saylor 
Foundation (2012: 1) notes that their hopes were however, short lived as the social, 
economic and political changes did not materialise. Instead, the political leadership 
soon realised the enormous challenges they faced in the areas of state consolidation 
and socio-economic development. The interplay of these challenges, political unrest 
and selfish ambitions gave rise to a worsening state of African politics. The African 
governments became increasingly authoritarian just as the colonialists were, and 
unable to maintain the system of democratic politics. 
 
The racial division of postcolonial African states, such as Nigeria, into ethnicities, 
according to Aiyede (2009: 262), served the intended and unintended consequence 
of confining the citizens into indigenes and settlers for those who choose to reside 
outside their allotted ethnic areas. This system of predatory and bifurcated rule has 
enabled the privileged elite to consolidate their power base since its notion of indigene 
and settler created a fragmented and antagonistic group of citizens at the national, 
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state provincial and local levels of government. In the long run, the system of 
bifurcation enabled the postcolonial state to indulge in wide scale corruption, service 
delivery failures and underdevelopment.  
 
On the broadest terms, African states, according to Harbeson (2013: 84) received their 
independence without making any significant effort to transform or reconstruct the 
states they received from the colonialists. This seems to partly explain the reasons 
why they have not been able to make significant change in the conditions of their 
countries. They were more interested in their selfish ambitions to consolidate their 
powers and to derive undue benefits from state resources. Ogbogbo (2011: 1) takes 
this line of thought as well when he posits that a major factor for the perpetual crisis in 
Africa can be attributed to “the failures of those who have superintended over the 
affairs of African countries and peoples since independence”. Cheeseman et al., 
Anderson and Scheibler (2013: 404) further comments that political rivalries along 
ethnic lines, weak state institutions,  and lack of commitment to and experience with 
governance processes and democratic procedures by  the elite in the main, resulted 
in partial entrenchment of democracy and  its disruptions through coups, counter-
coups, wars and dissent. Democratic governments were soon replaced by autocratic 
and military regimes. During the cold war when super power rivalry was at its peak, 
the western states, especially France, the United States and the United Kingdom paid 
little attention to Africa’s internal governance processes, including human rights 
abuses, corruption and other excesses. Their focus was mainly geared towards 
Africa’s foreign policies and  ensuring that their African allies did not fall into the hands 
of the Soviet Union. 
 
While there are merits in some of Cheeseman’s, Anderson’s and Scheibler’s claims, 
his their reference to the inability of the former colonialists to watch over the 
governance processes in post-colonial African states cannot be considered to be an 
explanation justification for the failure of the independent states. Since African 
countries agitated for their independence and they eventually received it, they should 
have adequately prepared and equipped themselves to handle their own internal 
affairs. A person who seeks freedom should do so because he believes that his current 
situation is not the best that it can be and that given the desired independence he 
would be able to optimally conduct his affairs. Therefore, the former colonialists should 
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not be blamed for the inability of African states to effectively govern themselves. 
Moreover, African states are endowed with well-educated individuals who know and 
or should know what is right, but fail to conduct themselves ethically and in other 
appropriate manners. African leaders have been very unethical and unprofessional in 
their conduct and approach to public office. The question is why are the citizens not 
doing much to hold them accountable as in the case of Nigeria and many other African 
countries? These leaders have been able to behave in such a destructive manner 
largely as a result of 
 
a relative lack of democracy (or to Single party dominance) in Africa. There 
has been little bottom-up pressure on leadership to make better choices, 
although there has been encouraging growth in civil society in parts of the 
continent…This apparent passivity of the populace in the face of bad 
leadership must, at least in part,  be attributed to  a neo-patrimonial culture. 
In that culture, the ‘big man’ rules and dispenses favours. He uses all the 
tools to bolster his rule – from traditional governance structures and kinship 
ties to witchcraft and the church (Mills, 2010: 4). 
 
The negative influence of both ‘god-fatherism’ and the ‘big-man’ syndrome on the 
realisation of an ethical and just African society has been noted in this chapter. This 
phenomenon poses a huge impediment to the citizens of affected countries and for 
democratic consolidation in Africa. It appears as though South Africans may be able 
to demand better accountability from their government, as a result of their militant 
approach to holding their government accountable (though the extent of their protest 
actions are often extreme), than Nigerians who are more passive in their demand for 
better governance. 
 
5.4 DEMOCRATIC FAILURES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND NIGERIAN 
CONTEXTS  
Although all the social, political and economic challenges identified in the previous 
sections are largely linked to ethics and morality, this section looks at specific ethical 
challenges confronting South Africa and Nigeria. While it is noted that all the 
challenges examined in this section are applicable to both countries, some of the 
issues which seem to be at the forefront of the complications confronting each country 
will be considered. In the South African context, the agitation for land will be examined, 
while the issues of corruption and underdevelopment will be given further attention in 
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the Nigerian context. However, it is noted that corruption is also a source of concern 
in South Africa as both the private and public sectors are largely affected. 
 
5.4.1 The Land Question, Political Instability and Underdevelopment in South 
Africa 
One of the major challenges confronting post-apartheid South Africa that emanate 
from the injustices of the apartheid government, according to Kloppers and Piennar 
(2014: 677), is how to redress the imbalances in the unequal distribution of land. It is 
a source of concern because while South Africa is endowed with considerable 
landmass, sufficient to guarantee every citizen plots of land, a large percentage of the 
population neither have access to it nor are able to afford it. The cost of land and 
property is so exorbitant that one wonders how property owners could be so 
insensitive to the plight of the less privileged. The “state owns some 22% of the land 
in the country, including land in the former homelands, most of which is occupied by 
black subsistence farmers…This leaves around 78% of land in private hands […],” 
(South African Institute of Race Relations, 2016: 5). One wonders why the owners are 
more so interested in maximising profit at the expense of the poor.  
 
Land ownership in the country, according to the South African Human rights 
Commission (SAHRC, 2013: 5) has generated disharmony for a long time among the 
victims of land dispossession, of racially skewed distribution, and of forced removals. 
A number of declarations and as well as legislation have been adopted in the country 
with the view to redressing this historical injustice. The South African Freedom Charter 
(South Africa - Republic, 1955: 1), a statement of core principles and visions of the 
kind of new society envisaged for the country, for instance, provides that unused land 
and housing space shall be given to those who need it. According to the Freedom 
Charter (1955: 1), “Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and 
all the land re-divided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land 
hunger…All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they chose”. The Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa (1996, 25(7)) further provides that : “A person or 
community dispossessed of property after June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress”. 
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Kloppers and Piennar (2014: 677) note that the South African government has 
committed itself to rectifying the historical injustices and inequalities and has been 
making every effort to implement a comprehensive programme of land reform based 
on legislative provisions. However, the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC, 2013: 5) notes that despite the various attempts made by the government to 
adhere to these legislative provisions; such as the settlement of land claims by cash 
payments, the more complex cases, such as the restitution of land and other property 
that were was forcibly dispossessed from the rightful owners through discriminatory 
laws remains unresolved. 
 
The slow pace of the land reform programme, according to Kloppers and Piennar 
(2014: 678), is one of the challenges that confronts the programme. Anseeuw & and 
Alden (2011: 28) posit that the slow pace of the land reform programme has created 
the kind of discontent among the affected and underprivileged South Africans, that 
many of them have resorted to violence against the white farming community. Many 
of the white farmers and their families have been murdered with increased frequency 
since 1994. They are apprehensive that the constitutionally negotiated process of 
‘willing buyer willing seller’ that the government committed itself to is no longer 
acceptable to both the blacks and the government. Rather, the government has 
recently adopted “the resolution for expropriation of land without compensation, 
despite its lack of clarity […],” (Mfaise, 2018: 1). Although it is not established that the 
ruling party - the African National Congress (ANC) - is complicit in these crimes,  
 
many in the white rural community remain convinced that there is an ANC-
led plot to drive  them from the land…Moreover even if the motives of these 
attacks are diverse, their importance as an indication of the breakdown of 
the social order in rural South Africa is evident (Anseeuw & Alden, 2011: 
28-29). 
 
The other problem that the land reform programmes faces, according to Kloppers & 
and Piennar (2014: 678) is that that more than 90% of the agricultural lands that were 
distributed to a number of the previously disadvantaged groups and individuals have 
not been optimally utilised. The implications of this development included threat to 
food security, increasing levels of unemployment and poverty. These difficulties are 
further compounded by the recent pronouncements of some politicians, in which they 
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incite landless South Africans to illegally occupy any land of their choice that belongs 
to white farmers.  
 
While it is necessary for the government to fast-track land redistribution in the country, 
one wonders if it is in the best interest of the country and its citizens to embark on the 
process of land expropriation without compensation. According to Mfaise, (2018: 3),  
 
Expropriation without compensation may make much sense politically. 
However, whether sacrificing existing and protected constitutional rights to 
property, to achieve political expediency and political gain, is justifiable in 
an open democratic country founded on the values of human dignity, 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedom remains to be 
seen and possibly determined by the courts. 
 
It is acknowledged that the imbalances in the distribution of land in the country 
impedes the social and economic growth of the affected citizens and the country’s 
ability to generate more resources for the development of the country. However, this 
research submits that the expropriation of land without compensation is not the most 
viable route to take in the quest to redistribute the land because this kind of process 
could be unfavourable for the economic development of the country in the sense that 
the whites may garner international support that can negatively impact the economy 
of the country. This could lead to the devaluation of the country’s currency, prevention 
of foreign direct investment, loss of employment opportunities and capital outflows. It 
appears that the expropriation of land without compensation hinges more on the 
appeasement of the previously disadvantaged individuals, without taking into 
consideration the long term impact on the development of the country. All affected 
stakeholders need to seek amicable means of resolving this challenge.  
 
Gibson (2008: 277) notes that in South Africa land grabbing has become a source of 
concern as many poor people who move from other towns and rural areas to the big 
cities are not able to afford decent accommodation, they and thus resort to land 
grabbing, taking over any piece of vacant land they come across and erecting squatter 
camps in the process. The lands in question belong to either the government or private 
individuals. While land grabbing poses a serious ethical dilemma for the government, 
the landowners and the homeless, he notes that it also 
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presents intriguing theoretical issues because it so clearly pits alternative 
conceptions of justice against each other. On the one hand, the sanctity of 
private (or state-owned) property may justify removing the squatters from 
their perches. On the other hand, the dire need of the squatters may make 
land grabbing fair, especially in the context of the historical injustices of 
apartheid and colonialism, and to evict people from their newly constructed 
homes is to consign them to live on the streets or worse. Squatting is 
classically an example of a clash of values…a clash of judgements of what 
is fair (Gibson, 2008: 700).  
 
In the South African context, distributive justice, for instance would require that the 
government take possession of all the country’s resources and share it among the 
population, especially the needy. Retributive justice would demand that the 
government expropriate all the resources and land that the minority acquired during 
the colonial era without compensation and share it among the citizens, especially the 
disadvantaged groups and individuals. The application of these theories of justice in 
this manner raises further ethical questions and dilemmas regarding the justifiability of 
such action. The minority land owners could claim that they or their ancestors acquired 
these lands many years ago when there were no indigenous people dwelling on many 
of them. They could also claim that they had invested human and material resources 
on the land and that they legitimately acquired the said properties. The actions that 
the government takes in this regard would have to be carefully considered in order to 
avoid any unintended negative consequences, such as the collapse of the economy.  
 
What do philosophers say about property rights and how do we reconcile that with the 
ethical dilemma of collecting lands from the whites and giving them to the homeless 
people, or of collecting large tracks of lands that the descendants of the former colonial 
masters took from the blacks and returning them to the original owners? What are the 
consequences of land restitution for food security and sustainability of the national 
economy, bearing in mind that most of the blacks to whomse lands were returned have 
not been able to turn them into profitable ventures, while most of them remain unused?  
 
John Locke’s theory of property, according to Wilderquist[MK24] Widerquist (2010: 3-5), 
though subject to various interpretations as a result of its ambiguities, is relevant to 
contemporary philosophical debates on freedom, property rights, equality, and the 
legitimacy of government’s powers of regulation, taxation and redistribution. Despite 
the ambiguities in Locke’s theory of property, he is widely acknowledged and 
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recognised for his idea of unilateral appropriation, in which he posits that there is 
something that a person can do on his own to secure rights over natural resources, 
which other human beings are morally obligated to respect. Various theories have 
been developed in response to Locke’s proposition. Locke’s theory is considered by a 
number of scholars as either inconsistent or ambiguous. Others who have attempted 
to clarify his theory have produced irreconcilable interpretations. For instance, C.B. 
Macpherson interprets Locke’s theory as the foundation for class-based capitalism; 
Richard Ashcraft terms it a revolutionary theory; a number of right-libertarians consider 
it liberal individualism with astrong focus on natural rights to property; Matthew Kramer 
considers it communitarian; John Dunn interprets it as property rights with a strong 
obligation to charity; Leo Strauss does not associate it with any appeal to natural law; 
other scholars  attach limited and regulated rights to property; and James Tully 
interprets it as dependent on the extent of rights to property that a society chose to 
give. [MK25] 
 
Looking across the world in general and Africa in particular, one is bound to note 
elements of these interpretations in how property rights are dispensed. In the South 
African context, unilateral appropriation can be interpreted to mean that one can 
secure a property for himself without taking into account the concerns and interests of 
others who might be affected by the acquisition. This appears to be the strategy that 
the apartheid era applied in dispossessing the indigenes of their lands. While it is 
acknowledged in this research that it is unethical and immoral for a few groups of 
people to own most of the country’s resources, it is imperative that the government 
implements a redistribution strategy that would not result in the collapse of the 
economy of the country. All affected stakeholders need to ensure that resources are 
not merely redistributed for the sake of redressing the injustices of the past, but to 
ensure that beneficiaries of the resources are equipped to use them for the progress 
and development of the country. 
 
The South African government has a primary role to play in ensuring that its citizens 
have access to this basic requirement of human existence, by ensuring that there is 
enough land available at affordable prices. If the private sector owns most of the land, 
the government should play a role in ensuring that the cost of the lands  are is cheap 
low, either through subsidisation or to buy them from the owners and sell them at 
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affordable rates to the people. The lands that are is currently fully utilised for 
agricultural purposes should not be taken away from the minority white. Rather, the 
government should facilitate a contract that ensures that the original owners receive 
between ten and twenty percent of the profit after tax annually.  
 
5.4.2 Corruption and Underdevelopment in Nigeria 
Corruption is one of the major ethical ills confronting the Nigerian state from the time 
of its independence. Corruption, for Omenka (2013: 40) manifests itself in various 
forms such as fraud, inflation of government contracts, bribery, pervasion of justice, 
fabrication of accounts, collusion and smuggling. It relates to actions and behaviours 
which violate moral and legal standards, which are contrary to public interest, which 
negatively affect the economy and policy implementation. In consequence, these 
factors inflict direct or indirect harm on relevant stakeholders, on society and on the 
development of the country. Atakpa (2017: 163) construes corruption as the lack of 
integrity through moral laxity, favouritism, and betrayal of trust. It involves the process 
of wrong transactions which alters the moral course of events and negatively impacts 
on positions of trust and judgements. For Koenane (2017(a): 9), “corruption does 
undermine many other aspects of governance, especially in cases where those 
involved are people entrusted with public trust and public resources”. 
 
According to Omenka (2013: 39), corruption undermines the integrity of public and 
private institutions. It is so endemic in all sectors of the Nigerian society, including the 
churches, the family and traditional systems, that one can almost conclude that it has 
become a way of life. Oluwaniyi (2011: 187) observes that Nigeria appears to be one 
of the few countries in the world where the government and the citizens are largely not 
concerned about the source of an individual’s wealth. Once an individual is able to 
give out a substantial amount of money indiscriminately, he secures free access to the 
leaders of the country, he is rewarded with chieftaincy titles, and the churches reward 
him with prayers. This appears to send a public message to the poor and less 
privileged that it is okay to acquire wealth irrespective of the means employed. 
 
Some of the causes of corruption in Nigeria according to Atakpa (2017: 164) include 
dishonest leadership, poor government control of the economy, internal and external 
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pressure and influence, Llack of commitment or political will to curb corruption and 
irregular payment or non-payment of salaries. Other causes of corruption for Omenka 
(2013: 39&41) are weak institutions of government, failure of government to fight 
corruption, poverty, distorted values and cultural beliefs of the people. He observes 
that while all the successive coups in Nigeria were blamed on government corruption, 
the military governments themselves cannot be absolved of from the same malaise as 
they also engaged in large scale corruption through the looting of public coffers, their 
unethical conduct and bad governance. Danjibo (2011: 127) criticises the style of 
leadership of  all successive governments in Nigeria, claiming that while the eras of 
military dictatorship were marred by human rights abuses and failures to contribute 
positively to the growth of the country, the civilian governments’ performance were 
neitherwas not impressive as welleither. 
 
The Nigerian civil service, which is responsible for the implementation of government 
policies is confronted by the challenges of corruption and other ethical ills, some of 
which according to Adebayo (2014: 410) include indiscipline among government 
workers, unprofessional attitudes to work, mismanagement of public resources, and a 
lazy attitude to work. Beetseh & and Kohol (2013: 19) observe that theorists such as 
Ake, Hembe and Balewa posit that while the Nigerian state was created by the British 
imperialists, the Nigerian civil service is also a creation of the British colonialists. As a 
consequence, they notes that other scholars such as Agishi, Adebayo and Edoh 
concur that the corruption, lack of accountability and other unethical conducts that 
pervade the Nigerian civil service originates mainly from the society’s colonial 
experience. Moreover, the problems of ethics and accountability have widened in 
scope as a result of the lack of concrete efforts by successive governments to cleanse 
the polity of this malaise.  
 
Omenka (2013: 41) considers most governmental institutions in Nigeria to be weak in 
the manner in which they enforce control measures. This creates opportunities for 
corruption to thrive when the rules are not enforced as stipulated. Rather many public 
and even private officials would rather provide avenues for clients to circumvent the 
rules in exchange for bribes. The culture of the society appears to generally condone 
corrupt practices. Atakpa (2017: 164) argues in the same line when he claims that all 
successive governments in Nigeria have largely been unethical in their leadership and 
151 
 
management roles. Most of them have either appropriated national wealth that they 
are not entitled to, or have placed personal interest above the national interest. The 
economy of the country which is largely managed and dominated by the government 
has not been adequately handled by those given the responsibility to do so. Rather, 
many of them have treated these as their personal fiefdom to be used as they deem 
fit without stringent accountability measures in place. He further notes the impact of 
communalism on corruption in his claim that the communal and extended family 
system has not been eroded by westernisation. As a result, public and private officials 
are often either under pressure or influence to favour their families and friends even 
when they are not qualified to receive such benefits. Such pressure exacerbates the 
ills of corruption. Many of the public officials, including the executive, legislature, 
judiciary and security forces do not display a high level of commitment to fighting 
corruption. Their nonchalant attitude fuels the flames of corruption and their reluctance 
to thoroughly fight cases of corruption, especially those involving influential people, 
results in the failure of the government to record much success in their anticorruption 
efforts. 
 
Aiyede (2009: 256) gives instances of the recklessness with which Nigerian 
government officials embezzle public coffers. For instance, he notes that between 
1960 and 1999, more than $380 billion was stolen from the public coffers by public 
officials. From 1985 to 1993, when General Ibrahim Babangida was the head of state, 
about $12 billion disappeared from the oil revenue. During the four years 
administration of General Abacha, he was believed to have stolen between one and 
three billion dollars. 16 billion dollars that was allocated for power generation by the 
Government of Olusegun Obasanjo was squandered without any substantial 
contribution to the national integrated power projects. Unspent budget allocations are 
in most cases not returned to government coffers, but shared by government officials. 
When the government began to insist on the return of unspent budgetary allocations, 
only a fraction of it is was returned to the fiscus. The Nigerian state is rich in oil 
resources, while all the states in Nigeria, according to Abolurin (2008: 14), depend 
largely on the proceeds of oil that mainly come from the South-South geopolitical zone 
for their sustenance. Although the Nigerian state derives huge income from oil 
revenue, Aiyede (2009: 254) observes that the funds have not been channelled 
towards the development of the country. Rather the Nigerian state has found itself 
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moving from the prospects of rapid development in the 1970s to one of 
deindustrialisation in the 21st century.  
 
The moral laxity that permeates every part of the Nigerian life has, according to 
Ogechukwu (2013: 38) also impacted on the police force and the financial sector, 
including the commercial banks. He notes that the public at large and the clients in 
particular are of the view that the bank staff, insiders and some customers, connive to 
perpetrate dishonesty and bank fraud. The public is gradually losing confidence in the 
Nigerian banking system as a result of the widespread unprofessional and unethical 
conduct among all levels of bank officials. Oluwaniyi (2011: 187-194) suggests that 
the responsibilities of the police to, among other things, enforce the law, protect lives 
and property, and prevent crime is are afflicted by corrupt activities and motives, which 
further exacerbates the insecurity and  threat to human life and property. The 
unfavourable conditions of service in the police force, their low salaries, poor 
management, lack of access to weapons, and their use by some politicians to harm 
their enemies and opponents have also contributed to the high level of corruption in 
the country. 
 
While many theorists claim that the high level of corruption in Nigeria can be attributed 
to the influence of colonialism, it is over 50 years since the country attained its 
independence. Therefore it would be fruitless to blame external factors for the lack of 
ethics and integrity in Nigeria, because this has to do with individual dispositions to do 
the right or wrong things. Each person is responsible and accountable for his conduct. 
Therefore it is claimed here that the lack of ethics and integrity in the Nigerian society 
is as a result of individuals not willing to do the right thing.  Until the individual 
recognises his or her obligations to be ethical, to engage in renewed moral 
imagination, the problem of immorality will persist. 
 
The impact of corruption in Nigeria can be seen in the inability of the government to 
contribute meaningfully to the welfare of its citizens. For Omenka (2013: 39), 
corruption impedes the development of the country as shown by the inability of 
successive governments to either complete many of the programmes and projects 
they embark upon which could have contributed to alleviating poverty in the country. 
Danjibo (2011: 127-128) notes that the lack of development in Nigeria also reflects in, 
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among other things, the lack of progressive and sustained economic growth; poverty; 
unemployment; inadequate provision of basic amenities such water, electricity, 
healthcare and good roads. The inability of the country to provide adequate and 
sustained water and electricity makes any prospects of sustainable development 
impossible. Moreover, the resources that have accrued to the country’s coffers since 
its independence is so vast that the government has no excuse for failing to deliver 
good governance to its citizens. 
 
It is noted that the non-payment of worker salaries contributes in large measures to 
the scourge of corruption because such affected workers seek other ethical or 
unethical means to fulfil their human needs. For many decades in Nigeria, both the 
state and federal governments have failed to pay workers their salaries regularly. 
Some workers are not even paid for many consecutive months as a result of the 
misappropriation of funds or embezzlement. The sufferings that these workers go 
through is unimaginable. One wonders how any government official responsible for 
ensuring that workers get their wages can fail to fulfil this mandate, especially when 
the funds are available, and not be concerned about the plight of the workers. This is 
the height on of inhumanity of man to man and it is condemned in the strongest terms. 
Morality, according to Bujo (in Dolamo, 2014: 3-4), relates to the humanity with which 
human beings treat each other. Koenane and Mangena, (2017: 61-68) consider 
democracy, accountability and ethics as inseparable and as the foundations of good 
governance. In this case accountability relates the duty that public officials have to 
report on how they have exercised the powers and responsibilities given to them; 
taking responsibilities for their failures and making amends; and the obligation to 
resign in the face of gross misconduct. Based on the forgoing, it is submitted here that 
the insensitive manner with in which affected Nigerian leaders treat their workers 
shows their lack of ethics and morals. Therefore, they should either resign or be 
relieved of their positions. 
 
Successive governments in Nigeria have embarked on numerous anticorruption 
programmes. However most of these processes have been largely unsuccessful 
perhaps as a result of the insincerity of many of the officials and bodies involved in the 
initiatives or because it is proving largely difficult to repatriate the huge sums of money 
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that corrupt government officials hide in different banks and offshore accounts. Many 
of these corrupt individuals use parts of the money stolen from the national fiscus to 
fund their defence in the courts. These measures often prolong the cases while the 
culprits continue to enjoy the ill-gotten loot and perhaps look for other means of hiding 
them. The accountability of the government that embarks on recovery of public funds 
also comes into question because it appears as though the public is not given  
sufficient information on  the recovered amounts and what they are used for 
eventually. Omenka (2013: 43) observes that in Nigeria, it appears as though 
corruption has defied all the mechanisms employed to combat it because many of the 
individuals tasked with combating corruption are also corrupt. Most of the 
anticorruption strategies of successive governments in Nigeria have not been 
executed honestly, including the 1966 Public officers’ Investigation of Assets Decree, 
the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975, the Ethical Revolution of the 1980s, the War 
against Indiscipline of the 1980s, and the current legislation on Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences.  
 
While the various anticorruption measures that were established by successive 
governments in Nigeria did not achieve much success, Ngwube and Okoli (2013: 101-
104) posit that the government of Olusegun Obasanjo made the anti-corruption 
campaign one of his administration’s priority objectives. In that regard, the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was instituted with the objectives of 
enforcing anticorruption regulation, preventing, investigating, prosecuting and 
penalising corrupt individuals and entities, among others functions. The commission 
has recorded a number of successes, including the identification, seizure and freezing 
of the proceeds of terrorism; conviction of pipeline vandals and their beneficiaries in 
the Niger delta region; and the recovery of some of the proceeds of fraud and theft. 
The successes recorded by the EFCC have made the country an attractive business 
destination. However, while the effectiveness of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission in discharging its functions in Nigeria cannot be overlooked, many people 
perceive the Commission as a tool for the government to persecute its perceived 
enemies and opponents. The Commission is also accused of contravening the law in 
the exercise of its functions.  
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There are merits in this perception because there are individuals in the past and 
current leadership of the country who are accused of corruption but who remain in 
power. One would expect the presidents who appointed such persons to openly take 
steps to investigate the allegations in order to be seen as just and fair. The Buhari-led 
government should have been the most successful regime in the anticorruption 
programmes, bearing in mind that he was widely accepted as the leader that would 
bring corruption to a halt, going by his previous reputation as a military ruler who was 
intolerant towards corruption and indiscipline. However, it has emerged that being a 
military ruler is different from being a civilian ruler. As a military dictator, he was feared 
for his tough stance against misdemeanours and he would have used the military 
might to enforce ethical behaviour. However, as a civilian ruler there are so many 
bottlenecks in place, such as the courts, that he cannot could not arbitrarily enforce 
his rules. His current term in office has so far failed in making economic progress. 
Rather the inflation rate in the country is very high and so many people are suffering 
as a result of the impact of economic meltdown. While various reasons may be 
advanced for the current sorry state of the economy, such as the fall in price of crude 
oil in the international market, and perhaps the unattractiveness of Nigerian oil to 
international buyers, the fact is that many Nigerians are disillusioned. The kind of state 
that Nigerians desire appears to be currently far from their reach. 
 
5.4.3 Africa in Sum 
Post-colonial African states generally seem not unable to properly govern, manage 
and administer their territories, despite the vast human and material resources at their 
disposal, and despite their abilities to formulate admirable policies and laws. Most of 
them adopt the Western liberal democratic style of governance. However, they have 
largely failed to successfully implement the principles that promote ethical leadership, 
integrity, accountability and care for the people. The leaders, according to Mkandawire 
(2015: 5), seem unable to implement sound economic policies that have been 
successfully embraced by other successful parts of the world. Rather, they have 
implemented policies that impoverish their population. This has resulted in chronic 
economic failures.  
 
Since independence, according to Ogbogbo (2011: 2), developments in African states 
appear to have stagnated, while there is little or no hope that these failures willould be 
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resolved. Although Africa is a rich continent, it is also the poorest as a result of its 
inability to optimally harness its wealth. Instead, the continent exposes itself to foreign 
exploitation. Chimakonam, Agu and Agbo (2014: 146) also delve into the impact of 
western influence on the African continent in his their contention that the combination 
of western democracy and individualistic capitalism that was unleashed on Africa 
through Globalisation has resulted in the kind of political and economic system that is 
detrimental to post-colonial African states. African states are currently governed and 
administered by unethical leaders who use their powers to marginalise their subjects. 
Mkandawire (2015: 5) further alludes to the immorality of leaders, who in many African 
states, act on behalf of factions such as ethnic groups, social classes and military 
cliques. They often involve themselves in the distribution of national wealth among the 
rich to the detriment of the less privileged members of society and economic growth. 
This conduct discredits the governments’ conviction that they are agents of public 
interest. 
 
Chimakonam, Agu and Agbo (2014: 146-148) submits that while the western system 
of capitalism is dominant in African states, it is full of injustices. He They considers this 
a contradiction to what capitalism and liberal democracy represent since capitalism is 
the economic demonstration of the principles of equality and liberty that the democratic 
system of governance projects. He They contends that both the western liberal 
democracy and capitalism have failed the majority of Africans and Africa as a whole 
for promoting individualism, marginalisation, class segregation and injustice, in 
opposition to the dominant political, social and economic systems in Africa, which in 
Nigeria’s Igboland for instance, promote consensus, deliberation, consultation, 
egalitarianism, equality and communalism. 
 
Tilley (2016: 745) lashes into the injustices associated with capitalist tendencies in his 
assertion that the economic and political systems that characterised colonialism 
disrupted the lives and livelihoods of Africans, and resulted in sustained inequalities 
that created the foundation for more damage. For instance, their export economies in 
areas such as mining, agriculture or infrastructural projects led to increased migration 
of labourers, while it did not in many cases put adequate protective mechanisms in 
place for the workers. Many workers in Southern Africa succumbed to diseases such 
as tuberculosis and waterborne infections as a result of the altered environments. In 
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reaction to the atrocities associated with capitalism and liberal democracy., Mann 
(2012: 1) posits that in the past poor families were not able to give their children quality 
education. This was mainly the preserve of the rich and powerful families. However, 
people of various backgrounds are currently able to access education, even though 
many of them are not able to secure meaningful jobs after their education. Many of 
those who are able to find work are paid low wages, while many African countries do 
not have the market for professional or highly skilled labour. This has contributed to a 
brain-drain as many of these unemployed seek greener pastures either in larger cities 
or in other countries. 
 
The implications of the foregoing include the fact that western liberal democracy is 
causing more harm than good to Africans for by promoting a system of governance 
that lacks consideration for the interests of others. This is almost like going back the 
Hobbesian state of nature where the weak is always at the mercy of the strong and 
life is nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes, 1968: 186). The manner in which governments 
and bureaucrats in post-colonial African states are is generally neither able to deliver 
on their mandates nor able to ensure the realisation of a society where justice, 
fairness, and socio economic benefits are dispersed to the advantage of all members 
of society, makes it seem as though it is impossible to seek the ideal. While it is noted 
that it might be difficult to have a perfect world, it is possible to implement a functional 
state if the leaders and their agents are willing and committed to doing so. 
 
The inability of post-colonial African states to institute systems and strategies that 
adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens has created chaos 
and anarchy that in a number of African countries could be likened to the Hobbesian 
state of nature. In the Rwandan genocide, for instance, the Hutu majority attempted to 
annihilate the Tutsis. In Nigeria, the menace of the Boko Haram insurgents has led to 
the killing, maiming and displacement, of thousands of people in the Northern region 
(Arendas, 2016: 40). The Movement for the Restoration of the Sovereign State of 
Biafra continues to agitate for self-determination, for the creation of an independent 
state, not minding that the same region was at war between 1967 and 1970 for the 
same cause and lost over a million of their people as a result (Julius-Adeoye, 2017: 
15-16). The chaos in Libya led to the destruction of the country’s developed 
infrastructure, “and the outbreaks of violence within the country and spilling over from 
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its borders into neighbouring, and similarly fragile, North African states” (Sharqieh, 
2013: 1) to the death of thousands of the population and of the country’s leader 
Muamaar Gaddafi. The intermittent unrest in South Africa results from the decline in 
the country’s “rank of governance effectiveness and control of corruption since 1996” 
(Cilliers & Aucoin, 2016: 5), the agitation for better condition of life, such as provision 
of adequate basic services, employment opportunities, free and affordable education.  
 
Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, the country has been struggling to come to 
terms with the colonial policies that divided the country along ethnic line. The policies 
that its government implements since this period have been to the detriment and 
dissatisfaction of Southern Sudan. Unbalanced projects were pursued by the state in 
favour of the North (Tawil, 2011:1). Successive Sudanese governments attribute their 
misfortunes to their colonial history. However, the leaders have had sufficient time 
since the country’s independence to use their diversity to the advantage of their 
country in terms of development and cultural harmony. Rather, successive regimes be 
they socialist, democratic, theocratic or dictatorial, failed to do that. The diversity was 
almost destroyed, while the hegemony of the minority northern population was 
imposed over the other sections of the country (El-Tom, 2009: 1). The partition of 
Sudan into two states as a result of the conflicts and wars that have persisted for over 
half a century has not succeeded in resolving their internal problems. Rather, 
disagreements, lawlessness, revolutionary protests, difficulties in maintaining internal 
control and the rule of law, poverty, spiralling inflation, and a proxy war within and 
between the regions have persisted (Verhoeven, 2012: 1-2). 
 
In all these wars and violence, peoples’ lives, livelihood, resources and infrastructure 
are destroyed; and many people are displaced, giving rise to further problems. 
Successive governments and their stakeholders are unwilling or unable to resolve their 
differences with viable methods of conflict resolution. Ajayi and Buhari (2014: 153-
154) note that in the precolonial era, conflicts were largely resolved through peaceful 
means. However, the advent of colonialists corrupted, adulterated, or even in some 
places eliminated the traditional African means of managing, preventing, monitoring 
and resolving conflicts, thus hindering peace and confidence building processes. 
Nonetheless, many contemporary African societies still employ such methods of 
conflict resolution in on a limited scale. Conflicts in the contemporary world are largely 
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resolved through structures such as the law enforcement agencies, local and 
international courts. These measures do not in real terms result in sincere restoration 
of peace and forgiveness. Dialogue among aggrieved parties has been replaced in 
many cases by fighting, while the elders’ mediatory roles and other peace-making 
structures such as the age-grades have been replaced by protracted court processes 
and military interventions. These have contributed to underdevelopment and 
instability. 
 
(Ogbogbo, (2011: 2-3) notes that it is increasingly becoming increasingly apparent that 
Africa may implode if nothing substantially concrete is done to turn its cracking 
structures around. The Mmajority of the structures, institutions and spheres of 
governance in contemporary African countries are either malfunctioning or non-
functional. The social, political and economic instabilities instability, which has resulted 
as a consequence of this collapse has further contributed to cycles of violence in many 
African countries, and in the process, turning the African continent to the highest 
producer of refugees as well as the top receiver of foreign financial and technical 
assistance.  
 
African states, according to Idowu (2012: 150-158) are not only confronted by the 
search for external financial assistance, they are also  challenged by additional 
external pressure from the West, the international financial institutions and the donor 
agencies who are demanding restoration of democracy or democratic reform as a 
prerequisite for foreign aid and support. A question that needs to be asked here is that 
dowhether African states need foreign aid and support.? It is not apparent that foreign 
aid contributes to humanitarian assistance or the development of the recipient 
countries. While  
 
some authors argue that aid leads to growth…A second group of authors 
argues that aid’s ability to engender growth is conditional on some key 
feature; for instance, aid works if it is provided to countries that implement 
good policies...or if the climatic environment is appropriate…A third group 
argues that aid is counterproductive…Some authors argue that aid should 
be stopped altogether (Pedrosa-Garcia, 2017: 2).  
 
Currently, the general consensus among many scholars is that “aid is underused and 
badly targeted. There is too little aid and too much of what is provided is weakly linked 
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to human development” (Njoroge, 2014: 66). It is further observed that foreign aid does 
not usually go to countries that implement good policies or countries whose 
environments allow for the proper implementation of good policies (Njoroge, 2014: 64). 
 
As a result of these observations, it appears that the lack of effective policy 
environments and the corrupt nature of politicians accounts in large measure for the 
failure of the aid recipient countries to effectively utilise these funds for the 
development of their countries. This study submits that most of the countries that 
receive foreign aid do not need such assistance if they judiciously utilise their national 
resources for the development of their countries. Perhaps these countries may accept 
technical support from the West to enable them to implement good policies and 
initiatesinitiatives. 
 
Although the West has played a significant role in Africa’s inability to effectively 
manage its territories, Friedman (2011: 27-29) criticises African states for appearing 
largely incapable of taking charge of their countries and implementing a constructive 
and effective system of governance that can turn them into model Statesstates. While 
significant progress has been made in the process of bringing Africa into the 
democratic line through the present attempt at democratisation, he considers the 
future of democracy in Africa to be uncertain because the efforts do not seem capable 
of resolving the problems hindering enduring democratic consolidation in Africa.  
 
5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the failure of post-colonial African states from the ethical, 
social, political and economic perspectives; the factors responsible for the inability of 
post-colonial African states to effectively govern their territories and provide for the  
needs of their citizens, given the vast human and material resources and international 
best practices at their disposal. The chapter has examined the moral character of 
leaders: why their conducts are is largely questionable and unethical, resulting in their 
inability to fulfil their constitutional obligations. The chapter has also considered why 
the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current efforts at 
democratisation. 
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There are numerous challenges confronting postcolonial African states. These include 
erosion of African values, cultures and traditions.; The decline in the efficacy of 
traditional African authority, customs and traditions; deterioration of African politics; 
social, political and economic difficulties; poverty; unemployment; underdevelopment; 
homelessness; illiteracy; diseases; famine; wars; individualism; economic 
mismanagement; bad leadership; the negative impact of colonialism; the threat of 
globalisation; and the failure of citizens to play their part in creating the desired state.  
 
The colonial influence has been blamed for the large-scale erosion of African values, 
cultures and traditions. It has negatively affected the communal orientation of 
traditional Africans and   replaced it with the kind of individualism that permeates 
almost every aspect of human life. While the African cultural belief systems and way 
of life in general was were largely anchored on the sense of community, and places 
the community ahead of the individual,  the western ideology places the individual 
ahead of the community and portrays the person as existing for himself and who may 
choose to relate with other human beings if he so desires. The implications of this 
western ideology is are unfavourable when  individuals are given the sole liberty to 
determine how to relate with others because it gives rise to selfishness, lack of 
consideration for the well-being of others, corruption and war, among other ethical 
problems.  
 
Globalisation assumes some of its benefits to be the promotion of a sense of 
belonging, harmonious relationships, social and cultural integration. The reality 
however, is that it fails to achieve some of these objectives because human beings 
according to the phenomenon of concealment are naturally in conflict with each other. 
They are also naturally biased in their conceptions of others and this often leads to 
discrimination among various races. The collapse of cultural boundaries as a result of 
globalisation has failed to dissuade individuals from their prejudices towards other 
cultures. In their associations with other people, human beings mostly prioritise their 
personal, racial or group interests.  
 
Theorists such as Igboin reject the idea that colonialism is solely responsible for all the 
challenges that confront post-colonial African states because there are some benefits 
that result from western influence. They claim that other factors such as internal 
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revolutions could have contributed to the erosion of African values. They therefore 
suggest the need for internal reflection, to establish root causes of current challenges 
and how to resolve them. It is also noted that despite the negative impact of 
westernisation on African values, customs and morality, these have continued to thrive 
in most African societies, though at various speeds. 
 
The decline in the efficacy of traditional African authority, customs and traditions is 
considered one of the contributory factors to the failure of post-colonial African states. 
Eze posits that Africans no longer have strong faith in their common identity or in the 
sacred powers and authority of the traditional leaders because the traditional 
foundation of consensual politics has been lost to religious proliferation and 
secularism. Lauer however, disagrees with Eze’s contention, claiming that traditional 
leaders especially in West Africa lost their authority for colluding with the westerners 
to dispossess their people of their property. In the process the leaders became corrupt 
and eventually lost most of their wealth and influence. It is however noted that the 
reasons given by various philosophers in this regard are not in themselves sufficient 
for the decline in the efficacy of the traditional system of leadership. Rather all the 
reasons should be considered collectively. While it is acknowledged that the traditional 
system of governance has lost a measure of its efficacy, it is however, noted that this 
system continues to thrive in many African countries for the role it plays in enabling 
the delivery of basic services to the rural population. 
 
The deteriorating state of African politics has played a major role in the failure of 
postcolonial African states. The process of decline commenced during the transition 
from colonial to postcolonial rule because the African leaders who led the agitation for 
independence did not put adequate mechanisms in place that would guarantee 
successful post-independence rule. They failed to make any significant effort in 
transforming the states that the colonialists handed over to them. Rather, they were 
more interested in installing mechanisms that would enable them to manipulate the 
governance structures to suit their selfish agendas. The social, political and economic 
challenges confronting post-colonial African states result from the inability of the 
leaders to implement sound policies based on best practices and honestlyhonesty. 
Instead the policies that they implement have impoverished their countries and 
resulted in economic failures. Furthermore, the combination of western democracy 
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and individualistic capitalism negatively impacts on African states’ social, political and 
economic systems for in promoting individualism, discrimination, and marginalisation, 
in contrast with to the dominant socio-political and economic system in Africa, which 
promotes consensus, communalism, deliberation, equality and egalitarianism. 
 
In consideration of specific cases of democratic failures in Africa, this chapter has 
examined the ethical problems associated with the uneven distribution of land in South 
Africa and corruption and underdevelopment in Nigeria. However, it is noted that 
corruption is also a source of concern in South Africa. One of the major challenges 
that South Africa faces is how to redress the imbalances in the unequal distribution of 
land, which results from the apartheid era’s racially skewed distribution of land and 
forced removals. Despite the various attempts made by the government through 
regulations to address these imbalances, the land reform programme remains largely 
unresolved. While this research notes that it is unethical for few members of the 
country to own most of the land irrespective of how they acquired it, it is imperative 
that the process of land redistribution does not compromise the peace, security and 
sustainability of the country.  
 
Corruption is so endemic in all sectors of the Nigerian society that one can almost 
conclude that it has become a way of life. The country appears to be one of the few 
places in the world where the citizens are largely not concerned about the sources of 
an individual’s wealth. All successive governments in Nigeria have largely been 
unethical in their leadership and management roles. Most of them have either 
misappropriated the national wealth or have placed their selfish interests above the 
national interest. Most institutions of government in Nigeria are weak in their 
enforcement of accountability measures. This creates opportunities for corruption to 
thrive. Corruption impedes the development of the country as revealed by the inability 
of successive governments to successfully implement developmental projects and to 
enhance the welfare of its their citizens.  
 
While all the successive governments’ anticorruption strategies have been mostly 
unsuccessful as a result of the insincerity of many of the officials and bodies involved 
in the initiatives, the current Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has 
recorded a number of successes, including the identification, seizure and freezing of 
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the proceeds of crime. The successes recorded by the commission have lifted the 
image of the country and made it an attractive business destination. However, while 
the effectiveness of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is noted, it is 
perceived by large sections of the population as a government’s means of victimising 
its perceived opponents. While there are merits in this perception, the onus lies with 
the presidency to transparently investigate all allegations of corruption and other 
unethical conduct in order to prove its objectivity, sincerity and commitment to justice 
and fairness.  
 
In consideration of why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite 
the current efforts at democratisation, the chapter notes that it will be impossible for 
African states to realise a just and fair society if its leaders continue to engage in all 
forms of bad governance and unethical conduct such as corruption, greed and moral 
laxity. While the leaders must thread tread the path of morals, the other members of 
society must also conduct themselves ethically. In this way, all members of society 
would be playing their part in the realisation of a good society.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6 A NEW FRONTIER IN PROMOTING THE ETHICAL AND IDEAL  
POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN STATE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter dealt with the failure of postcolonial African states. It found that  
most institutions in these states have either collapsed or are collapsing. Most of their 
systems and structures are characterised by social, political and economic instability. 
These have produced cycles of violence, conflicts, wars, corruption, debt burdens, 
underdevelopment and erosion of values, customs and traditions, among other 
challenges. These failures are largely attributed to the shortcomings of the leaders 
and managers who have superintended over the management and administration of 
these states. Based on these difficulties therefore, this study posits that the 
perpetuation of bad governance and immorality will hinder the realisation of an ethical 
and ideal democratic African continent. 
 
This chapter will establish how leaders, bureaucrats, corporate executives, managers 
and community members can contribute to the realisation of the ideal state, which is 
able to meet the needs and expectations of postcolonial African societies. In that 
regard, the chapter will consider Rawls’ attempts to define perfectly just institutions; 
and the role of ethical leadership in fostering a more result-oriented system of 
governance. The chapter will examine the kind of leadership that Africa requires;, 
especially political, directive and values -driven leadership will be considered; the role 
of leadership in conflict management; and how to consolidate the gains of democracy. 
The chapter will further consider the options for alternative democratic order for the 
African continent, bearing in mind that previous and current political systems, including 
capitalism, communism and socialism have not yielded expected results in changing 
the lives of African people for the better. According to Rawls: 
,  
fundamental to justice, is the concept of fairness which relates to right 
dealing between persons who are cooperating with or competing against 
one another…The question of fairness arises when free persons, who have 
no authority over one another, are engaging in a joint activity and among 
themselves settling or acknowledging the rules which define it and which 
determine the respective shares in its benefits and burdens. A practice will 
strike the parties as fair if none feels that, by participating in it, they or any 
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of the others are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims, which 
they do not regard as legitimate (Rawls, 1999: 59). 
 
The above statement relates to the need for an arbitrator or authority of some sort 
since competing parties cannot fairly rule against each other. This is to avoid what 
Thomas Hobbes calls the state of nature. Further, for Rawls (2001: 39), “justice as 
fairness is framed for democratic institutions”. In other words, a democratic state must 
place justice as fairness at the centre of its management and administration. Rawls 
also posits that one of the practical objectives of justice as fairness is:  
 
to provide an acceptable  philosophical and moral basis for democratic 
institutions and thus to address the questions of how the claims of liberty 
and equality are to be understood. To this end we look to the public political 
culture of a democratic society, and to the traditions of interpretation of its 
constitution and basic laws, for certain familiar ideas that can be worked up 
into a conception of political justice (Rawls, 2001: 5). 
 
The primary subject of political justice for Rawls is “the basic structure of society, that 
is, its main political and social institutions and how they fit together into one unified 
system of cooperation” (Rawls, 2001: 39-40). The most fundamental idea in Rawls’ 
understanding of justice as fairness, in which the other ideas are systematically linked 
is his explication of society as a system of fair social cooperation among citizens 
across the epochs (Rawls, 1993: 15; 2001: 5). In this conception of justice, he 
combines the idea of members of society cooperating with each other as free and 
equal individuals with the idea of a society that is well ordered and adequately guided 
by a public idea of justice (Rawls, 2001: 5). He argues that for citizens to be able to 
make proper judgements about basic rights and liberties, they must acquire and 
comprehend the meaning of the common good, political justice and the policies and 
institutions that promote these political views (Rawls, 2007: 5).  
 
Since Rawls considers the ideal society as a system of fair cooperation among equal 
and free citizens, he outlines the principles that will provide solutions to the economic 
and social inequalities that negatively affect their chances of living fulfilled lives (Rawls, 
2001: 41). For Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 723-729), the veil of ignorance, the original 
position, and the principles of justice are fundamental elements of determining the just 
state. The principles of justice, according to Rawls (Berkey, 2016: 707), provide social 
167 
 
institutions with the modalities for distributing fundamental rights and obligations, 
benefits and burdens. Consequently, he posits that the principles of justice expects 
institutions of the basic structure of society to make provisions for the protection of 
fundamental human rights. 
 
Sen (2009: 96-102) criticises Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism which sets out to 
define perfectly just institutions, claiming that human beings should not pursue perfect 
institutions since it is not possible to define anything perfect. Rather, he proposes the 
comparative approach to justice which instead of restricting its analysis to a 
transcendental quest for a perfectly just society, seeks to identify and abrogate 
observed injustices. 
 
The role of leadership, irrespective of the kind of system of governance that prevails 
in each country in the realisation of a developmental, harmonious and ethical 
postcolonial African society is noted. Despite the fact that members of society 
generally perceive most political leaders in a negative light, they are however, 
expected to be authentic, strong, ethical, transformational, decisive, and to strive to 
rise above the shortcomings associated with political office (Kenny & Pearce, 2014: 
122-124).  
 
This study recognises that there are various forms of leadership in the world. However, 
it considers political, directive and values -driven leadership as styles that postcolonial 
African states must adopt over and above any other forms of leadership that they may 
prefer. This will enable them to derive a balance between soft and hard power;, to 
achieve specified goals; and to ensure that human behaviour and governance 
processes are underpinned by good values and morals. 
 
The inability of contemporary African states to effectively and efficiently govern their 
territories calls into question the need to seek alternative systems of governance. 
Wiredu (2009: 10) notes that African states have so far not been able to devise 
appropriate systems of rule that are suitable for the African people and their way of 
life. He therefore urges African states to examine the precolonial African systems of 
governance with the view to extracting aspects that can be translated into adequate 
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forms of rule, especially those that are democratic and consensual, in their processes 
of decision-making. 
 
This study contends that the failure of post-colonial African states to attain democratic 
consolidation after several years of independence has resulted in their inability to 
protect their democratic systems of governance in a manner that leads to the 
realisation of their constitutional objectives such as economic, social and political 
development. Therefore, the following factors will be examined with the view to 
enhancing a consolidated system of rule: the quality of public institutions, affluence, 
economic performance, access to land and a favourable international climate. 
 
6.2 RAWLS CONTRACTIAN THEORY OF JUSTICE  
A number of factors have been alluded to in this research, especially in chapter five, 
as responsible for the failure of post-colonial African states to effectively govern their 
territories and turn themselves into desirable states despite their exposure to 
international best standards. These include erosion of values, selfishness, greed, 
corruption, impact of globalisation, individualism, and tribalism. These failures can be 
categorised as largely relating to lack of justice and fairness in the governance and 
administration of the state, in the dispersal of benefits and burdens, in the manner in 
which societal members interact with each other and in the discharge of their the 
constitutional mandate.  
 
This section begins with a consideration of Rawls’ determination of the nature of the 
just state, with the view to extricating useful insights that can be applied in the quest 
for the realisation of the ideal post-colonial African state. His quest for solutions to the 
problems of justice in the state gives rise to his idea of justice as fairness, from which 
emanates his principles of justice (Rawls, 1993: 5). He considers justice as mainly 
pertaining to the virtue of social institutions, and he refers to this kind of justice as 
political justice in a democratic society (Rawls, 1999: 47).  
 
Rawls poses the following fundamental question that concerns political justice in a 
democratic state: “how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society 
of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (Rawls, 1993: 4). This question results from his 
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realisation that there has not been any democratic thought in history (including Locke’s 
property rights and Rousseau’s value of public life) that has found lasting solutions to 
societal challenges (Rawls, 1993: 4-5).  
 
This study agrees with Rawls’ concerns above, because all the challenges that have 
been examined in this thesis, including the current complications in the Nigerian and 
South African states have not been adequately resolved in most cases, as noted in 
chapter five, as a result of factors similar to the ones posed by Rawls, such as divisions 
and racism. Therefore, Rawls’ fundamental questions remain valid even for the 
contemporary world at large and for postcolonial African states in particular. In 
response to these questions, he posits that “justice as fairness tries to adjudicate  
between these contending traditions, first by  proposing two principles of justice to 
serve as guidelines for how basic institutions are to realise the values of liberty and 
equality” (Rawls, 1993: 5). The fundamental elements of his political philosophy in 
ensuring a just society are the veil of ignorance, the original position, and the two 
principles of justice. He first espoused the veil of ignorance and the original position in 
his work the Theory of Justice, while in his later work Justice as Fairness, he extends 
and clarifies his thoughts (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 723-729).  
 
6.2.1 The Veil of Ignorance and the Original Position 
Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1) suggests that since all human beings are biased as a result 
of the situations in which they find themselves, all treatises in political philosophy are 
primarily concerned with the fact that individual assessments of justice will be 
influenced by the condition in which he an individual finds himself or herself in society. 
He therefore suggests that discussions and assessments of justice should be held 
behind a veil of ignorance (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 725), in which “they do not know how 
the various alternatives will affect their particular case and they are obliged to evaluate 
principles solely on the basis of  general considerations” (Rawls, 1972: 136-137). He 
posits that the reason why the original position with the features that he refers to as 
the veil of ignorance must not be influenced by societal contingencies is because 
 
the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice 
between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages 
that inevitably arise within the background institutions of any society from 
cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies. These contingent 
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advantages and accidental influences from the past should not affect an 
agreement on the principles that are to regulate the institutions of the basic 
structure itself from the present into the future (Rawls, 1993: 23). 
 
Put differently, the only means of securing agreement on a ‘social contract’ to govern 
how society or the world should function is for human beings to imagine that they are 
sitting behind a veil of ignorance which prevents them from knowing their true identity 
and personal circumstances (Praxent, 2017: 1). According to Rawls, people under the 
veil of ignorance know neither the generation in which they belong nor the 
demographics of their society (Muldoon et al, 2014: 379). Rather they only possess 
basic knowledge of physics, economics, biology, and other well-established scientific 
knowledge. As a result, the veil of ignorance obstructs the possibility of people 
understanding specific interests that could influence their judgements in their 
discussions on society’s basic structure. The veil of ignorance ensures that moral 
decision making processes are not influenced by unnecessary moral ideas. It ensures 
that our reasoning is not influenced by our self-interests.  
 
The original position for Rawls (1972: 17) “is the appropriate initial status quo which 
insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields the 
name justice as fairness”.  In other words, the original position for him, guarantees fair 
conditions that enable representatives of the citizens to reach consensus on the terms 
of social cooperation that are considered fair (Rawls, 2001: 80). Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 
1) views the original position as relating to the point of view of the person who hides 
behind the veil of ignorance. He posits that as a result of being ignorant of who we are 
and our circumstances, our conceptions of justice will not be influenced by the different 
inequalities that are caused by historical accidents (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 726); and we 
will be able to establish what true justice is and more objectively determine how society 
should operate (Praxent, 2017: 1).  According to Rawls (1972: 19),  
 
the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights 
in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit 
reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these 
conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral 
persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a 
sense of justice.   
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The veil of ignorance or the original position, according to Bird-Pollan (2013: 725) is a 
fundamental component of Rawls understanding of equality of opportunity and the just 
distribution of societal goods because behind the veil of ignorance is also hidden the 
individual’s economic conditions, his gender, race, educational background and 
geographic location. He posits that the justice inherent in any process of sharing 
wealth and other qualities that are beneficial to members of a community has to be 
assessed prior to a person understanding his place in a particular community. This is 
a means of ensuring that all members of society, including the least advantaged 
person will have a position that receives the acceptance of other members of society. 
Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 725-726) posits that it is possible for human beings to 
employ critical thinking in arriving at objective and informed decisions about what 
constitutes a just social structure when they are not influenced by prejudices stemming 
from their individual conditions in life. In the original position, everyone is equal and 
they develop fair rules no matter the kinds of conditions that they face in their individual 
lives. These are the same rules that each person would choose no matter what else 
they would have preferred in the world. From the original position, Rawls proceeds to 
formulate a social structure that complies with what justice entails. The title of his last 
work, Justice as Fairness, proceeds from this process (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 725-726). 
 
6.2.2 The Principles of Justice 
The principles of justice for Rawls (2001: 41) are aimed at clarifying the nature of the 
just society, how citizens can be considered equal and to regulate the economic and 
social inequalities that confront members of society. The question that the principles 
attempt to address is 
 
once we view a democratic society as a fair system of social cooperation 
between citizens regarded as free and equal, what principles are most 
appropriate to it? Alternatively: which principles are most appropriate for a 
democratic society that not only professes but wants to take seriously the 
idea that citizens are free and equal, and tries to realise that idea in its main 
institutions? (Rawls, 2001: 39).  
 
The two principles of justice, for Rawls are the liberty and the difference principles 
[MK26](Rawls, 2001: 42-43). He supplements his ‘veil of ignorance’ with these primary 
principles of justice (Praxent, 2017: 1); and he describes the two principles as follows: 
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First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all (Rawls, 1972: 60).  
 
Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1) claims that these principles of justice for a political society 
that represent the notion of freedom emanate from the discussions around fairness in 
society that take place behind the veil of ignorance. Therefore, he asserts that they 
“should be standards that its individual members would choose behind a veil of 
ignorance for their advantages, disadvantages, and the specific contents of their life 
goals” (Miller, 2012: 297). These principles, for Rawls: for him, 
 
are designed to form the social world in which our character and our 
conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our comprehensive views 
and their conceptions of the good, are first acquired, and in which our moral 
powers must be realised, if they are to be realised at all. These principles 
must give priority to those basic freedoms and opportunities in background 
institutions of civil society that enable  us to become free and equal citizens 
in the first place, and to understand our role as persons with that status   
(Rawls, 1993: 41) 
 
For Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 727-728), the kinds of social structure that constitute a 
just system are founded mainly on the two principles. The first principle of justice 
relates to the equal liberty that a person must derive from his society for it to be 
considered just. All members of society must enjoy this same liberty regardless of 
whatever condition they may face in life. The liberty principle, according to Rawls 
(Praxent, 2017: 1), provides that the social contract must ensure that every individual 
is given the maximum liberty possible, while at the same time ensuring that the 
freedom of others is not infringed upon. In the first principle, Rawls (Sen, 2009: 59) 
prioritises equal personal liberty for everyone over the demands of the second 
principle for the equality of some general opportunities and for equity, not equality, in 
the distribution of general goods and services. 
 
The second principle of justice permits economic and social inequalities in a just 
society, according to Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 729) “only to the extent that the 
positions with which the inequalities are associated are open to all and the inequalities 
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are such that they improve the position of the least well off”. The difference principle, 
for Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1) provides that the social contract must ensure that 
everyone is given an equal opportunity to prosper, while everyone should be given the 
opportunity to derive any advantages that exist in the social contract. This is what 
Rawls means by fair equality of opportunities which “require not merely that public 
offices and social positions be open in the formal sense, but that all should have a fair 
chance to attain them” (Rawls, 2001: 43). He believes that the application of these 
principles through a veil of ignorance would enable society to justly attend to tough 
issues in deciding more fairly the best ways to structure the rules of society. 
 
Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 724) supports equality of opportunity, as opposed to an 
equality. In other words, he endorses the equality of societal members from the 
beginning, and not if there exists unequal distribution of societal assets at any other 
period. This distinction has a lot of implications. For instance, in order to ensure that 
goods and services are equally distributed to members of a society, an egalitarian may 
require a continuous redistribution process. However an equality of opportunity theory 
would not require such redistribution. If the distribution of economic and non-economic 
assets were was sufficiently equal from the beginning so as to enable everyone to 
achieve success, then there would be no need for redistribution later. Any uneven 
distribution that results later would be considered to have emanated from the 
variations that individual efforts produced. The theory of equal opportunity would not 
request for alterations since every member of society commenced from the same 
position. The equal opportunity proposal proceeds from the principle that every 
member of society is equally valuable. If the principle of the equal worth of everyone 
is the belief of all societal members, then every individual’s choices and aspirations 
should also receive equal value. However, the proposal for equal opportunity does not 
require that a person’s choices be rewarded equally throughout the course of his life 
regardless of the value that the market attaches to such choice. Rather, 
 
the equal worth of all individuals is reflected by the assurance of equal 
opportunities and the freedom to engage in those opportunities for all 
individuals from the beginning….an individual will not be restrained from 
acting in accordance with her wishes. That kind of negative freedom does 
not ensure any true opportunity if the individual in question has significantly 
fewer material goods than other individuals. Instead, material resources 
must be made available  to all individuals in approximately equal amounts 
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before it can be said that true equality of opportunity has been attained 
(Bird-Pollan, 2013: 724-725). 
 
This research notes that the theory of equal opportunity for everyone sounds like a 
perfect means of ensuring a just society. The reality however, is that even if all 
individuals are given the equalised opportunities from the beginning to succeed, many 
of them will not succeed since human beings do not possess equal capacities and 
capabilities to succeed at equal rates. Some people would squander the opportunities 
that they get, while others out of sheer laziness, lack of commitment to work hard and 
lackadaisical attitude would not make any meaningful effort. This would in the long run 
result in burdens placed on the state to assist unsuccessful individuals materially, 
physically and even psychologically. 
 
6.2.3 The Rawlsian Transcendental Institutionalism  
One of the most influential claims that Rawls makes about justice, termed 
institutionalism, is that the principles of justice for institutions do not directly apply to 
the behaviour of individuals in specific circumstances. Rather, they only apply to the 
institutions of the society’s basic structure (Berkey, 2016: 707). In other words, “the 
primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in 
which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls, 1972: 7). Rawls 
summarises the basic structure of society as the arrangement of major societal 
institutions into one systematic plan of cooperation (Melenovsky, 2013: 600). By major 
social institutions he refers to 
 
the political constitution and the principal economic and social 
arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty 
of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of 
production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social 
institutions. Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define 
men’s rights and duties and influence their life-prospects, what they can 
expect to be and how well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the 
primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present 
from the start (Rawls, 1972: 7). 
 
Rawls posits that the principles of justice prescribes objectives “that must guide the 
process of structuring the institutions of the basic structure, as well as the policies and 
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practices of those institutions. They are not, however, aims that individuals must 
directly promote in their personal conduct” (Berkey, 2016: 707). Furthermore, Rawls 
(Berkey, 2016: 707) asserts that these principles determine the manner in which 
fundamental rights and obligations should be distributed by societal institutions. The 
principles of justice therefore, require that institutions of the basic structure of society 
are organised in a manner that ensures the protection of specific fundamental human 
rights and that the distribution of benefits such as wealth and income are in accordance 
with the provisions of the principles. In view of the claim that the principles of justice 
are not directly applicable to individual conduct, wealthy individuals are not required 
to share possessions with the less privileged. As a result, the institutionalists’ position 
here is that the onus lies more directly with institutions, and not individuals, to ensure 
that justice is dispersed.  
 
Berkey (2016: 708) notes that while a  number of philosophers consider 
institutionalism plausible for partly not putting any direct obligations on the rich in 
societies constituted by an unjust basic structure and societies that condone  
inequalities and marginalisation, to share their wealth with the less privileged; other 
philosophers such as reject the conception of justice that institutionalists commit 
themselves to. Murphy (Berkey, 2016: 708) claims that while the Rawlsian 
Iinstitutionalism has gained widespread acceptance in contemporary political 
philosophy since the Rawls’ Theory of Justice was published, the view appears 
indefensible for a number of reasons such as what the responsibilities of wealthy 
people in unjust societies with unjust basic structural institutions should be. For 
Berkey, the motivations offered by Rawls and others for institutionalism do not 
provided compelling basis for the acceptance of institutionalism partly because their  
positions on institutionalism appear to  have a wrong conception of what the 
fundamental concern for justice relates to (Berkey, 2016: 708). 
 
Melenovsky (2013: 600) criticises Rawls’ description of the basic structure of society 
for not resolving a number of important issues, and for relying on intuitive ideas of 
social institutions and of which of such these institutions are paramount. Cohen 
(Melenovsky, 2013: 600) further disagrees with Rawls’ conception of the basic 
structure of society, claiming that a major fracture in the Rawlsian methodology leads 
to a dilemma for Rawls position on justice from which it might not be possible to 
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extricate itself. This fracture becomes obvious when in the process of explaining what 
constitutes the basic structure of society, Rawls is not able to give a satisfactory 
answer without contradicting other aspects of his theory. Cohen contends that limiting 
the basic structure of society to the coercive legal framework can only be carried out 
in a random or inconsistent demarcation process. It would also result in the disregard 
of other areas of society that have a deep and widespread impact on our lives. 
However, if the basic structure of society is not limited to the coercive legal structure, 
then it would not be possible to exclude the personal choices of each person from the 
basic structure’s scope. This result would be in contrast with the position taken by 
Rawls that personal decisions are not affected by the principles of justice. Cohen, 
therefore, contends that the basic structure of society cannot be explained in a 
principled manner since there are complications associated with either way of 
resolving the issue (Melenovsky, 2013: 600). 
 
Rawls (Hsieh, 2009: 400) does not consider any conception of the good as a basis for 
evaluating law, rules or economic institutions. Rather, he posits that in the process of 
formulating legislation and policies, the liberal state has to remain neutral in regards 
to various conceptions of the good. In other words, no particular idea of the good must 
influence the state in its decisions. This is a tough position that Rawls has taken if no 
specific conception of morality forms the basis of state policies and rules. The question 
becomes: that on what basis will the liberal state make its decisions? Rawls replies 
that “the reasons given for an institutional requirement or policy must be public - that 
is, they must appeal to citizens’ free status as free and equal persons and cannot 
depend, for their acceptance, upon a belief in some conception of the good” (Hsieh, 
2009: 400). 
 
Rawls appears to have been convinced by some of the views of his critics in such a 
manner that in The Laws of Peoples, he proceeds to propound rules of international 
law and practice that could bring about a world community of decent and liberal 
individuals. His proposals here are considered to be a realisable utopia for combining 
justice and wisdom with conditions that could enable citizens to attain their primary 
desires and for extending what was considered as the limits of practical political 
philosophy. In the proposals which he hopes would galvanise the attainment of his 
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realistic utopia, Rawls modifies his original position and provides the following eight 
principles of justice for democratic and free people: 
 
 Human beings are independent and free, while their independence and 
freedom must be respected by others; 
 Undertakings and treaties must be  observed by people; 
 Human beings are equal, and they must uphold promulgated rules and 
legislation; 
 Human beings have an obligation of non-interference in the affairs of others; 
 Human beings are entitled to the right of self-defence, but they do not have the 
right to cause violence or war except on the account of self-defence; 
 Everyone is duty bound to respect human rights; 
 Everyone must comply with specified restrictions in times of war; 
 Human beings have an obligation to assist others whose unfavourable 
conditions make it impossible for them to derive a decent or just social and 
political society (Corlett et al, 2010: 460-461). 
 
The eighth principle of justice which obligates human beings to assist others contrasts 
with Rawls earlier claim that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of 
the basic structure of society, and not to the conduct of people in a manner that 
obligates them to promote it in the way they conduct themselves. This claim is 
considered by the critics of Rawlsian institutionalism, such as Berkey, as having a 
wrong notion of what the fundamental concern of justice should be (Berkey, 2016: 
707-708). However, Rawls seems to have taken the views of his critics into account in 
finally conceding that human beings should be of assistance to the less privileged. 
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6.2.4 The Comparativist Critique of Transcendental Institutionalism 
Sen (2009: 96-102) outlines a pragmatist view of social justice that questions Rawls 
quest for a perfectly just society. While Rawls sets out to define the ideal state or to 
define perfectly just institutions, Sen terms it problematic, claiming that as humans we 
are unlikely to ever define anything perfect. Therefore, human beings should not 
pursue perfect institutions. Rather, they should have mechanisms for identifying gross 
injustice and addressing the injustice when they it arises. These mechanisms may not 
be perfect but we would have eliminated those injustices in a very pragmatic sense. 
 
Sen (Clare and Horn, 2010: 74) makes a distinction between two schools of thought 
on social justice that emanated from the Enlightenment period, namely transcendental 
institutionalism and comparative justice. Sen terms the social contract theory 
transcendental institutionalism - an arrangement-focused approach that proceeds 
from theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls. Sen further claims that 
this school of thought has become the dominant paradigm of contemporary political 
philosophy. Their primary objective is to establish what ideal institutional arrangements 
should be rather than looking into actual societies and people (Labude & Pogge, 2010: 
609). Their approach aims to examine the ideal locations of institutions and rules, and 
to develop an ideal state, which as a result of its effectiveness, results in the realisation 
of ‘pure’ justice (Biondo, 2012: 557). The transcendental approach for Sen, consists 
of two elements:  
 
First, it concentrates its attention on what it identifies as perfect justice, 
rather than on relative comparisons of justice and injustice. It tries only to 
identify social characteristics that cannot be transcended in terms of justice, 
and its focus is thus not on comparing feasible societies, all of which may 
fall short of the ideals of perfections. The inquiry is aimed at identifying the 
nature of ‘the just’, rather than finding some criteria for an alternative being 
‘less unjust’ than another. Second, in searching for perfection, 
transcendental institutionalism concentrates primarily on getting the 
institutions right, and it is not directly focused on the actual societies that 
would ultimately emerge (Biondo, 2012: 556). 
 
Sen (Clare & Horn, 2010: 75) rejects Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism. Rather, 
he proposes the comparative approach to justice, which instead of restricting its 
analysis to a transcendental quest for a perfectly just society, is rather, realisation -
focused, and aims at eliminating observed injustices from the world (Clare & Horn, 
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2010: 75). He criticises what he considers as Rawls’ institutional approach and posits 
that the conditions in which people find themselves must be a fundamental concern 
for a theory of justice (Maffetome[MK27], 2011: 119). For Sen, the foundational difference 
between Rawls ideas and his approach  is that while Rawls’ approach is 
transcendental, his approach is comparative as it concentrates on comparing feasible 
social alternatives without necessarily attempting to pronounce on what the ideally just 
society should be. As a comparativist, Sen associates himself with the tradition of 
thinkers such as Adam Smith, Marx and Condorcet, all of whom instead of limiting 
their investigations to the transcendental quest for a perfectly just society as the 
Rawlsians did, rather engaged in comparing already existing societies or such 
societies that could emerge (Labude & Pogge, 2010: 609). The primary interests of 
the philosophers that concentrated on realisation-focused comparisons are to 
eliminate observed injustice that they observe in the world. They concentrate on the 
means of achieving justice. In that regard, they lay emphasis on the practical 
achievements of these objectives in the society under focus, and not only on rules and 
institutions (Biondo, 2012: 556-557).  
 
Although Sen (Clare and Horn, 2010: 75) notes a number of common features in 
between transcendental institutionalism and comparative justice, he further makes 
distinctions between them, while also claiming that transcendental institutionalism is 
inadequate for guiding reasoned choices of institutions, policies and strategies. For 
Sen, 
 
Transcendentalism simply addresses a different question from those of 
comparative assessment – a question that may be of considerable 
intellectual interest, but which is of no direct relevance to the problem of 
choice that has to be faced. What is needed instead is an agreement, based 
on public reasoning, on rankings of alternatives that can be realised (Sen, 
2009: 17). 
 
Sen (Weale, 2013: 17) argues that in the process of locating a theory of justice around 
a hypothetical contract, the Rawlsian approach lays excessive emphasis on the idea 
of an ideally just society and less focus on the comparative analysis of the extent to 
which various societies are able to attain justice.  Sen (Labude and Pogge, 2010: 609) 
notes that the process of clarifying some of the assumptions of the transcendental 
approach reveals inherent fundamental errors. He refers to one of such flaws as the 
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indeterminate ideal problem. He contends that contrary to Rawls’ original position, it 
is likely that no reasoned agreement may be reached even in the face of open -minded 
scrutiny and under strict conditions of impartiality on the form of the just society. 
Furthermore, the ideal contractualist fails to consider that disagreements could take 
place in the original position since participants could have different opinions and as a 
result arrive at varied principles of justice. As a result of this factor, the requirements 
of justice could only be evaluated by means of public reasoning.  
 
Sen (Weale, 2013: 17) further claims that although democracy and justice are closely 
related, the foundation of our account of justice should proceed from the practice of 
democracy rather than using the original position as a means or designing economic 
and political institutions. From this perspective, he posits that the high level of 
abstraction contained in the hypothetical theory of social contract as opposed to what 
happens in the actual realm of deliberative democracy makes a satisfactory discourse 
on justice impossible. It also does not contribute anything to deliberative accounts of 
democracy. Therefore, the idea of a social contract is not a prerequisite for 
comprehending justice. Rather, what are needed are the practices of deliberative 
democracy (Weale, 2013: 17). In Rawls’ theory, it is assumed that:  
 
in a hypothetical situation, such as in the ‘original position’, the participants 
would agree to a unique set of principles of justice with a lexicographic 
order. As a result, there is only one kind of impartial argument that satisfies 
‘the demands of fairness’, shorn of vested interests. But according to Sen, 
this is a mistake, since there can be other principles of distribution than can 
be justified on the same impartial grounds. It is implausible to think that 
different possible reasons ‘would allow one unique set of principles of 
justice to emerge in the original position. However, it is undeniable that by 
accepting the possibility of rational disagreement about a set of principles 
of justice, the institutional arrangement provided by a transcendental 
approach is doomed to indeterminacy (Biondo, 2012: 557-558).  
 
Sen (Biondo, 2012: 558) is convinced that it may not be possible to have a perfectly 
just social arrangement, which is capable of producing impartial agreement. Rather he 
posits that one problem or issue may have a number of different solutions. He finds 
the transcendental approach not feasible, and redundant, because there is no need to 
identify a very just social arrangement in order for a theory of justice to guide reasoned 
choices of institutions, strategies and policies. However, he submits that it may be 
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possible to establish a ‘conglomerate theory’ that simultaneously provides a 
transcendental identification and comparative assessment among alternatives. 
However, it is not possible that this theory will be able to resolve the dilemma of 
choosing among non-transcendental alternatives. He claims that in the process of 
determining one pure just alternative, the likelihood is that this may have various 
dimensions which are all morally relevant, such as equality of resources, protecting 
individual rights and exercise of basic capabilities; all of which cover the distance 
between the real and ideal alternative. As a result, even in cases where it is possible 
to reach consensus on the nature of the ideal society, the challenge of determining the 
various distances from the real to the ideal society remains. It is not clear, for instance, 
according to Sen (Biondo, 2012: 558-559) 
 
how to measure the distance from the ideal society in the presence of 
multiple violations of liberties, or when diverse distributive principles are not 
respected, as is usually the case. The conclusion is disheartening. 
Transcendentalism is of no assistance in our everyday life. It does not 
indicate the best choice among the alternatives we face in our non-ideal 
existence, since the choices really available to us are different from what 
the ideal theory provides. Furthermore, it does not give us guidance as to 
how to enhance justice, since transcendentalism provides us with an 
account of an ideally just society, though it does not tell us how to reach 
this goal from a non-ideal situation (Biondo, 2012: 558-559).  
 
Alternatively, Sen (Clare & Horn, 2010: 75-76) proffers that comparative justice in the 
state requires that consensus be reached based on the ranking of achievable options 
and on public reasoning. He divides his theory of comparative justice into two areas, 
namely: the materials or objects of justice and the process of comparative evaluation 
of justice in public discourse. The capabilities or materials of justice has have to outline  
the relevant informational focus on the society, while the process of comparative 
assessment, otherwise referred to as open impartial deliberation, has to outline 
objective means of  evaluating  the materials of justice. Sen defends capabilities as 
the proper features of the world we need to focus on in the process of judging a 
community or evaluating justice and injustice. The main point Sen makes here is not 
whether a particular approach is able to compare two options, but whether it is able to 
make appropriately directed and well thought out comparisons. The capabilities of 
human beings relate to their inherent freedoms to choose the way of life that they 
prefer, and what they can do and become. It dwells on the actual opportunities at a 
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person’s disposal to enable him achieve to his objectives. This capability approach, 
for Sen, is merely a general approach for comparing individual advantages, and not 
for proposing specific socio political designs. 
 
Clare and Horn (2010: 74-76) criticise Sen‘s capability approach for instead of giving 
a concrete explication of the core capabilities, he offers what he terms open impartial 
deliberation, as a means of establishing the content of capabilities. These authors find 
Sen’s open impartiality too open. Instead, they proffer a less open process irrespective 
of the means of execution as more effective. They further criticise Sen for arguing 
against the possibility of reaching contractarian agreement as undermining his own 
effort to find solutions to the question of justice. Weale (2013: 17) partly rejects Sen’s 
critic critique of the Rawlsian social contract theory, claiming that although Sen could 
be correct about the disadvantages associated with the hypothetical social contract, it 
is not plausible to simply exchange sustitute the ideas of political discussions and 
public reasoning for a social contract. Democratic processes, deliberations or political 
negotiations can either occur in contexts, which could either be conducive or not 
favourable to justice. For Weale, (2013: 17), 
 
The crucial distinction is not that between those theories of justice that 
make political deliberation and negotiation foundational and those that do 
not. Rather, it is between those theories in which deliberation and 
negotiation take place in circumstances of unequal power and advantage 
on over the other. 
 
According to Biondo (2012: 555), Sen offers a limited exposition of Rawls theory as a 
result of his rhetorical strategy that portrays Rawls theory as more transcendental than 
is really the case. Secondly, Biondo contends that the distinction that Sen makes 
between the transcendental and comparative approaches to the issue of justice 
appears misleading in a number of aspects since both elements of both 
transcendentalism and comparative approaches are required in any plausible moral 
theory. Moreover, transcendental elements become necessary in order to avoid the 
kind of confusion that may arise in the process of accepting a principle, norm or value, 
and its justification. A comparative position, for Biondo (2012: 555) 
 
highlights the conditions of application of the doctrine to the real world, 
taking into account the possibility of moral dilemmas, evaluative 
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disagreements and limited resources, while proposing possible 
provisos[MK28] and caveats to the risk of the doctrine being self-defeating. 
Third, although the transcendental approach is useful, it is argued that in 
elaborating this dichotomy Sen overlooks  the merits of the third way 
between  comparative and transcendental  doctrines, what he calls 
’conglomerate theory’, and also the possibility that his doctrine (the 
capability approach) might be considered as an example of such a theory.  
 
From the forgoing, Biondo (2012: 555) concludes that the aim of the conglomerate 
theory is not to produce a complete moral framework, but to generate a weak 
transcendentalism in the form of a comparative approach that includes transcendental 
elements.  
 
This Study contends that Sen’s ideas are a bit limiting, slightly ambitious and difficult 
to comprehend or implement on some practical levels but it may be possible to partially 
implement some of them in the post-colonial African contexts. This research also notes 
that Rawls’ veil of ignorance brings to mind the prejudice that exists in the world, which 
continue to largely determine the manner in which states and individuals relate to 
others in every aspect of life. A vital point that post-colonial African states can draw 
from the veil of ignorance is the extent of injustices that individuals, groups and 
governments perpetrate on others on the basis of biases, prejudice and assumptions. 
This also manifests itself as shown in the previous chapter, in discriminatory practices 
against others; in the unequal distribution of resources; and in the corruption and land 
problems in South Africa and Nigeria, in other parts of the African continent and the 
world at large. This prejudice has resulted in immense harm, immorality and injustice 
in the world. The veil of ignorance is very critical to ensuring that the states and their 
citizens treat each other well, with respect and objectivity; in the appointment of 
leaders and workers, not based on subjectivity, but based on merit. Employing this veil 
in decision-making will ultimately result in growth, development and better relations 
among individuals, community members and nations. 
 
One of the thought-provoking insights in Rawls’ principles of justice is the provision 
that the rich are not obligated to direct some of their resources for the benefit of the 
less privileged. There are many people who have more resources than they can ever 
need in their lifetime. Some of them use part of it to assist the disadvantaged members 
of society to lift them out of poverty. Many others do not care about using part of their 
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wealth for the benefit of others. It is encouraged that the privileged use part of their 
wealth for the benefit of others because this will contribute to alleviating many of the 
societal ills which contribute to the destruction of societal values, security and 
wellbeing. 
 
Rawls’ principles of justice does not place direct obligations on individual conduct. 
Rather, it places the distribution of rights and benefits in the sphere of the major social 
institutions. This does not mean that individuals do not have a central role to play in 
the wellbeing of society. Rather, all societal institutions have to be organised in a 
manner that ensures their efficiency and effectiveness. It means that the right people 
in terms of competence and morality, who are not necessarily concerned with self-
enrichment, but who care more for the development and welfare of their societies, are 
appointed to critical and sensitive positions. This will ensure that justice and fairness 
become the hallmark of each state. 
 
6.3 THE ROLE OF ETHICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
STATE 
A number of challenges are noted in this study, especially in chapters four and five, 
which make the future of democracy in Africa uncertain. This chapter posits that 
leaders, managers and members of society have a central role to play in bringing 
harmony, development and contributing to the realisation of the ethical and ideal post-
colonial African states. All political philosophers, including moral philosophers, 
according to Agbelengor (2012: 2-3) recognise the centrality of good leadership in the 
attainment of national development, irrespective of the form of governance in place, 
be it capitalism, communism, socialism, feudalism, constitutionalism or liberalism. The 
differing factor among them is that while some of them place leadership in absolute 
individuals, others confer leadership on citizens, in institutional development or in 
constitutionalism. He observes that in Hobbes’ treatise on the state of nature, (as also 
noted in chapter three), Hobbes (1968: 186) shows how solitary, nasty, brutish and 
short human life is until the adoption of the Leviathan through a social contract. This 
in turn brings order, development and progress to the state. Agbelengor (2012: 3) 
further observes that Plato recommends philosopher Kings whom he considers to be 
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beacons of societal growth and progress, and capable of providing the kind of 
leadership that will lead to the realisation of the just state. 
 
Machiavelli (Agbelengor, 2012: 3) also realises the importance of good leadership for 
the development of the state. As a result, he outlines the measures that a good leader 
should embrace to ensure success. He considers the importance of leadership so vital 
that leaders must apply cleverness, boldness and even deception if and when the 
situation demands. Internal and external problems, for him must be handled with both 
hard and soft power, or tricky diplomacy and coercive force. He considers such policy 
measures as capable of enabling the leader to eliminate his detractors and to attract 
friends.  
 
This study concedes that there are merits in Machiavelli’s expose on leadership. 
However, it finds some of his pronouncements to be extreme, especially his reference 
to deceptive leadership. Good leadership does not require deception and liars. Rather, 
a good leader should always act in an honest and trustworthy manner by always telling 
the truth no matter how hard it can be, and being transparent in his leadership and 
personal commitments. Failure to act in this manner will only attract loss of faith in the 
leader.  
 
A key feature of political leadership, according to Helms (2014: 264) pertains to the 
relationship that it has with power. While some theorists such as Ikenberry (Helms, 
2014: 264) associate leadership with power, there is a wider agreement among 
various theorists such as James MacGregor Burns (Helms, 2014: 264) that although 
leadership relates to power, all power relationships do not signify leadership. In this 
regard, a distinction is made 
 
between hard and soft power, which eases  the conceptual tension between 
leadership and power. Whereas hard power relies heavily on the possibility 
of coercing people, soft power co-opts people rather than coerces 
them…and its use effectively involves a change from power over others to 
power with others…In such a relationship, domination and coercion are 
being replaced by attraction and persuasion (Helms, 2014: 264-265). 
 
This study contends that only soft power alone is not suitable for the African continent, 
where many people only comply with set norms and standards out of fear of reprisals 
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and not because they believe in doing the right thing. Omotoso (2014: 134) notes that 
the Ghanaian public service is more effective than the Nigerian civil service despite 
the fact that they share similar colonial experience. The social, political and economic 
condition in Ghana was previously very bad. However, the country has made 
significant improvement, mainly because of the intervention of Jerry Rawlings, a 
military ruler who eventually became the civilian president. He was known to have 
“deliberately wiped out the majority of the supposedly corrupt elites in the country and 
instituted  reforms  to engender good governance, which successive governments  
have continued to build upon; this is how impunity was banished in the country” 
(Omotoso, 2014: 134). 
 
This study notes that while Rawlings was able to transform his country’s socio-political 
and economic conditions using hard power, it is questionable if whether he had to go 
as far as eliminating all the top politicians and bureaucrats that contributed to the 
collapse of his country’s economy in order to achieve his objectives. This study agrees 
that it is better to remove all corrupt and ineffective leaders and civil servants and 
replace them with ethical individuals in order to purge the political system of bad 
influences. It is recommended that all African states should follow the example set by 
Rawlings in order to ensure the realisation of a better state, not by killing the culprits, 
but by sending them to jail and recovering all the country’s resources that they have 
misappropriated. While preference is not given to suppression, coercion or 
domination, it is recommended that both hard and soft power should be the norm. 
 
While most politicians are perceived in a negative light, the citizens in the current era 
demand authentic, decisive, transformational and strong political leaders who are able 
to overcome the limitations and compromises of politics. They expect these leaders to 
understand the concerns of their people and respond accordingly. On the other hand 
they also require the leaders to be ruthless in their decision making process when the 
situation demands, to be totally in control of their governments, parties, cabinets and 
colleagues. This means that for the world at large, and Africa in particular to attain the 
kind of transformation that it hopes for, leaders and the citizens are expected to be 
accountable and responsive to the needs and expectations of their stakeholders 
(Kenny & Pearce, 2014: 122-124).  
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The pertinence of directive leadership, according to (Gosling & Sutherland[MK29], at al, 
2012: 40-41) is recognised by various leaders and heads of departments. He They 
notes that many leaders realise the importance of employing leadership styles such 
as coaching and mentoring which are channelled towards extracting the innate 
capabilities of workers; to make them more discerning; to support and encourage team 
members; for the delegation of authority; and the allowance of individual autonomy. 
However, these leaders also realise that in order to attain specific short term goals, it 
is imperative to employ the directive method of leadership which is more controlling 
and compels workers to execute leadership instructions as directed. The Americans, 
among other nations, are particular about this form of leadership, and it has brought 
their systems of governance and enterprise immense success (Gosling & Sutherland, 
et al, 2012: 41). 
 
This study subscribes to the directive form of leadership for the African continent 
because many community members and workers tend to not to take their duties very 
seriously when they are given the freedom to use their initiatives. Although the 
importance of individual initiatives and the coaching or mentoring styles of leadership 
is are acknowledged, it is proposed that state institutions must prioritise the directive 
leadership style. This is because this form of leadership requires “a concentrated level 
of detailed hands-on focus, personal control, clear direction and daily monitoring to 
provide precise evidence of what was going on in every aspect of the business” 
(Gosling & Sutherland, et al, 2012: 41). Moreover, since directive leadership 
contributes immensely to the success of the American system of enterprise and 
governance, it will should also enable African states to be more successful in their 
mandates. 
 
Values -driven leadership, according to Evans & and Hargreaves (2010: 42-46), 
relates to having a clear understanding of one’s values and being true to them always. 
It realises that behaviours are underpinned by values, that human instincts on wrong 
and right conduct are driven by values and that a harmonious and successful society 
results from subscribing to these values. The value of trust is critical to the success 
and well-being of any society and organisation, and it relates to keeping one’s words 
and promises, and being consistent.  
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Blakey (2016: 43) considers the three pillars that inspire trust as ability, benevolence 
and integrity. Ability for him refers to the professional competence of officials to 
successfully executive assigned responsibilities, while frequent failure to fulfil such 
responsibilities will negatively impact oninfluence one’s trustworthiness. He considers 
benevolence as showing concern for the welfare of other people by being kind, caring 
and generous. Integrity, according to Cohen (2010: 11) “means doing the right thing 
regardless of the circumstances or inconvenience to the leader or the organisation”. 
While leaders are expected to conduct themselves with integrity, it is the responsibility 
of both leaders, employees and members of society at large to consistently act with 
integrity. The promotion of integrity in organisations: 
 
involves developing and maintaining a professional and respectful 
workplace. It involves ethical leadership, active management and 
supervision, the right people, effective processes and confident 
professional reporting…is about creating a workplace that demonstrates 
the values of the organisation (Office of Police Integrity, 2009: 4) 
 
This study considers ethics and integrity as interrelated in the sense that it is one’s 
integrity that enables her or him to be ethical and to comply with rules and regulations 
sincerely, not because one is compelled to do so, but because one believes that it is 
the right thing to do. For Choi et al., (2015: 356), the level of morality within an 
organisation is affected by the ethical practices of that organisation. He They further 
notes as follows:that the   
 
ethical leader empowers employees to make democratic/participative 
decisions in which they prioritise morality, social values, and the collective 
interest of the company. In this regard, ethical leaders encourage 
employees to suggest creative and ethical solutions to the problems 
encountered in the decision-making process to reach the organisational 
goal effectively and ethically. Such leader behaviours also encourage 
employees to follow ethical practices in performing their work and thereby 
strengthen the moral base from which employees operate (Choi et al., 
2015: 356) 
 
In order for post-colonial African states to successfully transform, this study 
recommends that they embrace the political, directive and values-driven forms of 
leadership, over and above any other styles of leadership that they may subscribe to. 
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They should also employ both hard and soft power to ensure balance in the manner 
in which they execute their functions. 
 
6.4 THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
This study notes that the extent of the conflicts on the African continent currently can 
derail the realisation of an ethical and just society. In that regard, leadership has a 
fundamental role to play in seeking adequate means of managing such conflicts. 
Western countries  largely employ law enforcement agencies, judicial systems 
presided over by judges and lawyers to detect crime, for settlement of disputes and 
dispensation of justice; whereas traditional African societies  relied mostly on  
divination, oath taking, people’s assemblies, king’s courts and the council of elders 
(Ajayi & Buhari, 2014: 153). Chiefs, prominent leaders, respected and morally upright 
persons, performed conflict management, because they were considered trustworthy 
(Tafese, 2016: 22).  
 
In traditional African societies, the objectives of conflict resolution were to understand 
and eliminate the root causes of disagreements and conflicts; to genuinely reconcile 
the aggrieved parties; and to create happiness, harmony and peace among the 
disputants. Conflict management was also channelled towards the promotion of good 
governance, development, security, collective well-being and conducive social 
relationships (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014: 154). A number of principles guided the resolution 
of interpersonal and inter-communal conflicts. These include the requirement that the 
aggrieved individuals or groups must trust and have confidence in the structure 
mandated to resolve the conflict. A major factor in dispute resolution, according to 
Ajayi & and Buhari (2014: 142), is for the aggrieved parties to be completely truthful 
as this is confirmation to the disputants that the process would be impartial and fair. 
The sincerity of the mediator or the judge must be beyond reproach; and “they should 
have both worldly and esoteric social wisdom” (Kouassi, 2008: 240). 
 
In the current era, according to Werner & Bagrain, et al (2016: 332), conflict 
management is also the role of leaders, managers and affected stakeholders. They 
are all expected to understand how to manage conflict in their environments, to realise 
set objectives and in a manner that it becomes a driving force for change; and they all 
190 
 
require emotional intelligence in order to effectively manage conflict. Leaders and 
managers who possess a high degree of emotional intelligence have the capacity to 
keep their emotions in check, comprehend others’ emotions, “and react appropriately 
to them. They are able to understand the different perspectives that  people bring to a 
situation and can therefore facilitate  the search for common ground” (Werner & 
Bagrain,et al, 2016: 332-333).  
 
This study notes that a number of lessons can be learned from the manner in which 
conflicts were resolved in the precolonial era where the methods employed resulted in 
sincere resolution of disagreements, unlike in the contemporary era, where conflict 
resolutions do not in many instances influence the willingness of affected individuals 
to readily forgo the bitterness that they continue to carry around with them. The system 
of conflict management in traditional African societies played a significant role in 
creating societies that valued their members by ensuring that individuals took extra 
care in respecting the rights of other people. The system made the most of the people 
more sincerely than is the case with contemporary societies where lack of genuine 
care and respect for others has become more prevalent. The set-up of the traditional 
communities instilled the value of consideration for others into people. It is 
recommended that contemporary leaders and managers examine the manner in which 
conflicts were resolved in the pre-colonial era with the view to adopting those elements 
that can contribute to genuine conflict resolution. 
 
The myriad of conflicts and wars that confront African countries such as Nigeria, South 
Africa, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to Wani (2014: 8) impedes the 
continent’s prospects of development, peace and unity. He suggests that while the 
continent embarks on the search for tolerance, unity and peace,  
 
Africa has to learn lessons from its past mistakes […]. Our efforts towards 
the promotion of African unity will not achieve the intended results unless 
they are supported by a culture of peace and tolerance. It’s crucial to work 
even more sedulously at promoting inter cultural communication and civic 
educations, schools, as basis on which to build a culture of peace and 
cooperation (Wani, 2014: 8-9). 
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Wani (2014: 10) further adds that the extent of the conflict on the African continent can 
be drastically minimised if every community in Africa is treated with justice and 
fairness; and if the majority members of the community respect the minorities. This 
research adds that it is also incumbent on the minority to respect the majority and to 
treat them in a just and fair manner. 
 
6.5 OPTIONS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DEMOCRATIC ORDER 
The failure of the democratic system of governance in post-colonial African states, as 
noted in the previous chapter, raises the question of what system of governance will 
work best in contemporary African societies. For instance, various theorists, such as 
Cupido and de Kadt, (2016:17) have called the strength of democracy in South Africa 
into question. They contend that “Ordinary citizens are growing increasingly 
dissatisfied with political leadership and government performance and this has 
negatively affected perceptions of democracy” (Cupido & de Kadt, 2016: 17).  
 
As a result of the political challenges confronting post-colonial African states, Wiredu 
(2009: 10) contends that it is “impossible to reflect on the African political scene without 
developing the suspicion that we have not yet found the system of governance most 
suited to our culture”. He argues that there must be something in the traditional African 
culture, which post-colonial Africans are failing to notice in their political endeavours, 
probably as a result of western influence; but which are is conducive to good 
governance. He concludes that contemporary Africans can derive a number of lessons 
from the traditional and non-technological era because technological advancement 
does not necessarily improve ethical wisdom (Wiredu, 2009: 10). 
 
Wiredu (in Matolino, 2009: 34) further claims that “the adversarial nature of western 
democratic practices along party political lines may not be well suited for African 
politics”. As a result of the harmful political experiences which emanate from the 
Western system of multiparty democracy, Wiredu (in Ani, 2014a: 311) proposes that  
post-colonial African states reconsider specific elements of the traditional African 
system of governance which are consensual and democratic in their decision making 
processes. He argues: that  
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this system (the multiparty democracy) is malfunctioning elsewhere (he 
uses gridlock to imply the United States experience) and must thus be 
responsible for the spate of  conflicts on the African continent […].This leads 
him to reject the competitive and adversarial outcomes of  the multiparty 
democracy as too  premature for the nascent transition to democracy in 
Africa (Ani, 2014a: 311). 
 
Wiredu[MK30] notes that all the evils associated with party politics proceed from the 
powers of the winning parties who proceed to form the government. The evils of party 
politics contribute to the life and death struggles of general elections among parties 
taking part in the election. He therefore considers it necessary to abrogate political 
parties so that power struggles and mutual hostilities among contending parties can 
abate or minimise and in order that political leaders can be properly sensitised, while 
political discussions can take place in a more civil manner. He observes that the 
disappearance of political parties will not discourage the citizens from participating in 
party politics, unless the state were totalitarian. Rather this will only curb the fanaticism 
and the irrational exuberance that people often exhibit in party political activities 
(Matolino, 2013: 143). He further notes that the elimination of political parties will not 
have any negative impact on condition that the affairs of the community are presented 
in an objective manner; addressing the specific needs and concerns of the citizens; 
and giving the citizens the opportunity to participate and or contribute to local 
government affairs (Matolino, 2013: 143). 
 
While Wiredu proposes the adoption of a modified version of the ideals of consensual 
democracy, Eze and other theorists disagree on its feasibility as an alternative to the 
excesses of western democratic practices, as alluded to in chapter four. Nonetheless 
Wiredu and Eze are in agreement on a number of areas such as promoting freedom 
of speech and opinion, discouraging autocracy, and encouraging political contestation. 
They both discourage the lust for power, wasteful, extravagant and reckless lifestyles 
which seem to be prevalent in the political life of many oligarchic democracies. They 
both believe that African societies can derive immense benefits from systems of rule 
that have not been perverted by the worste forms of capitalism (Lauer, 2012: 54). 
 
This study agrees with Wiredu’s contentions that post-colonial African states need to 
find a system of governance that best suits their unique conditions since all the 
systems of governance that contemporary African states practice have failed to 
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delivered good governance that meets the expectations of the citizens. It is proposed 
here that Africans need to embrace the good aspects of both the Western and 
traditional African systems of governance, guided by values, objectivity and a genuine 
intention to serve their citizens in honesty, fairness and integrity. 
 
This study recommends that only the elite and individuals with tertiary qualifications 
be allowed to vote in the election of leaders and their representatives in government. 
This proposal is made on the basis that most of the people who are elected by the 
population at large are not usually the most competent in terms of qualifications, 
experience and values. The least educated members of society tend to elect public 
officials on the basis of prejudice and emotion; these are usually officials that they 
believe they can better relate with and who can best understand their conditions. They 
seem to find the more educated and more qualified people unapproachable or out of 
touch with their reality. This results in the occupation of public office by people who 
are incapable of delivering good quality service to the generality of the people and 
ultimately to in the failure of postcolonial African states. Furthermore, the masses tend 
to agitate for unsustainable and unjustifiable things such as the expropriation of land 
without compensation, which could become a source of conflict in a country, if not 
managed with utmost sensitivity to the concerns of all relevant stakeholders.  
 
This study acknowledges that many of the more educated and more qualified 
individuals often make bad choices, act irrationally, and even choose leaders and 
bureaucrats not on the basis of their values and competence, but on the basis of 
subjective and selfish considerations. Many of their actions and behaviours are wrong, 
biased and internally driven. However, many of them are better equipped to deliver 
better service than the least qualified members of society. These people are supposed 
to know and act better as a result of the level of educational exposure that they have 
acquired.[MK31] 
 
6.6 PROPOSALS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN AFRICA 
Democratic Consolidation implies that the inauguration of democracy does not 
automatically result in consolidation. Rather this is achieved as a result of the 
deliberate efforts of leaders and the governed to “protect democracy, and to nurture it 
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until it firmly becomes rooted and eventually matures to the point where it is able to 
withstand whatever shocks may come about” (Ngòma, 2016: 109). This research 
submits that all the factors responsible for the failure of postcolonial African states as 
referred to in chapter five are also some of the reasons for the inability of African states 
to proceed to the level of democratic consolidation, especially their failures to 
engender economic, social and political development. For instance, Isumonah (2012: 
65) posits that the politics of survival which most African leaders preoccupy 
themselves with prevents them from giving in-depth consideration  to consolidating 
their countries’ hard won democracy, for from resuscitating their economiesy and 
turning them into  fruitful ventures capable of changing the conditions of their citizens. 
The following measures are proposed for enhancing democratic consolidation in post-
colonial African states:  improved quality of public institutions; overcoming inequality; 
enhancing economic performance; easy access to Lland; and promoting a favourable 
Iinternational Cclimate. 
 
Strong or adequate institutions for Gustavson (2014: 1-2) refers among other things 
to different institutional arrangements such as rules and code of conduct, good quality 
of public service and administration, independent judiciary and secure property rights. 
He submits that consistently good and sound societal institutions have over the ages 
provedn to be the catalyst for the development of the state. He further notes that the 
quality of public service delivery is also essential for the development of the state, for 
economic growth, for the benefit of the entire population, for the reduction in income 
inequality, poverty alleviation, improved health among the population, higher quality of 
education, higher life expectancy and reduced infant mortality. Some scholars attribute 
the underdevelopment of most African countries in areas such as poverty reduction, 
literacy, health, income inequality and life expectancy to the low quality of public 
institutions.  
 
The former  president of the United States of America, Barak Obama (Ogbogbo, 2011: 
1-2), posits that as a result of the underdevelopment that pervades post-colonial 
African states, what Africa needs is not strong men but strong institutions. Ogbogbo 
(2011: 2) contends that contrary to Obama’s position, a critical evaluation of the 
current crisis reveals that what Africa needs in its quest to resolve its challenges and 
to strengthen its democratisation processes are strong men; strong institutions; a 
195 
 
critical, politically conscious and enlightened population that are prepared to sacrifice 
for the realisation of the desired change. He further submits that Africans must be 
ready and willing to challenge the inadequacies and excesses of the leaders and 
bureaucrats whose failures have kept the African states in their perpetual state of 
failures.  
 
This study concedes that Obama makes a valid point in noting the importance that 
strong institutions’ structural designs and effective policy agendas bring to the 
promotion of a better condition for the population. However, it is argued here that 
Ogbogbo’s position which includes both strong institutions and strong men brings 
more certainty to effective and efficient implementation of government’s mandates in 
the sense that leaders can adopt not only soft power, but also hard power in ensuring 
that their objectives are properly executedachieved. As noted in this chapter, other 
philosophers such as Machiavelli also note the need for boldness and coercive force 
in leaders. However, the concern here is that leaders should ensure that they do not 
abuse their powers. 
 
The level of inequality in Africa is a concern for the promotion of justice and fairness. 
While the continent, according to Odusola (2017: 1) “had six out of the ten fastest 
growing economies in the world during the first decade of the 2000s and seven of the 
ten projected fastest growing economies between  2011 and 2015 […] Iincome 
inequality…is very high in Africa”. In South Africa, “inequality has increased over the 
post-apartheid period, both on aggregate and within each racial group” (Leibbrandt et 
al., 2012: 19). In Nigeria, “inequality in its various dimensions, has been rising […] 
since the 1990s” (Aigbokhan, 2017: 15). It is recommended that the gap between the 
wages of top and lower level public and private officials be bridged by reducing the 
wages of top executives and leaders, and increasing the income of disadvantaged 
workers. A large portion of national income should be channelled towards uplifting the 
welfare of the disadvantaged members of society and towards other corporate social 
responsibility projects.  
 
The level of economic growth that Africa has had in the past two decades has not 
translated into meaningful change in the lives of the people as alluded to in chapter 
five, even though “Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a stellar economic growth over the 
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past decade. The resounding economic growth performance made it the second 
fastest growing region in the world…” (Odusola, 2017: 1). The government should take 
full control of its natural resources and lease them out to the private sectors for 
effective management and development. Alternatively, those individuals who have 
been opportuned over the decades to own vast resources and have made substantial 
profit from them should either relinquish these properties to their governments, or enter 
into partnerships with their governments. Greater share of the proceeds should go to 
government coffers for the betterment of the country. This research submits that it is 
immoral for individuals to own so much wealth while most of the population is poor. 
The governments should put adequate control mechanisms in place to ensure that the 
national wealth is channelled towards developing their countries for the benefit of all 
members of society. 
 
In the South African context, the land question continues to be a source of 
disagreement and agitation among the previously disadvantaged groups and the 
colonial beneficiaries, as alluded to in chapter five. The South African government 
needs to intervene in finding solutions to this matter in a manner that does not 
compromise the security, economic development and sustainability of the country. It 
is proposed that the white beneficiaries of the land under the colonial and apartheid 
regime should not be dispossessed of the lands that they are using for agricultural and 
other business developments in order not to compromise food security and other 
economic and social growth. Rather, the government should enter into partnership 
with them, which will ensure that seventy percent of the profit that the businesses 
generate goes into the government coffers both for the benefit of the previous owners 
of the land and the country at large. The government should ensure that some of the 
unused lands in the country are is channelled towards developmental projects that will 
ensure that the cost of food in the country is lowered. Every citizen who desires a piece 
of land and is able to develop it either for business purposes or as a private homes 
should be given a piece of land at affordable rates.   
 
The negative influence of westernisation, globalisation and capitalism on post-colonial 
African states, such as that of inequality, individualism, and lack of concern for the 
welfare of others, have been noted in chapter five. However, Africa is part of the global 
community and cannot successfully transform itself by overlooking international trends 
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and developments. Deloitte Africa (2017: 15) notes that African governments, 
especially of those countries that are resource-endowed are failing to productively 
utilise the past decades growth prospects for sustainable development and the 
distribution of wealth into their societies at large. It is therefore proposed that African 
governments need to play a major role in ensuring that their countries’ rules are 
favourable to both local and international investors, so that the wealth of their countries 
can be harnessed for the betterment of their people. 
 
6.7 FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
It has been noted in chapters five and six that African states in general, and South 
Africa and Nigeria in particular, are confronted by with leadership failures. However, 
leaders and managers have a fundamental role to play in enhancing ethical 
organisations and society. In this regard, they need to ensure that the cultures that 
exist in their communities and in organisations are explicit on what acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviours entail. These leaders must ensure that their members are 
trained on in societal and organisational values, on in the code of conduct and 
expected behaviour. All structures of the state must make ethics and integrity a critical 
aspects of personal and organisational behaviour; and management must be 
capacitated with people management skills. Leaders and managers need to act in 
consistency with what they say, and discipline perpetrators of unethical conduct. 
Ethics must become a standing item on divisional meetings since the extent to which 
organisational and societal members discuss ethics constitutes an acceptable 
indicator of ethical behaviour (Dessler, 2011: 500-502).  
 
In order for government institutions to be able to meet their constitutional obligations 
and to operate on the basis of accountability and ethics, they must be managed and 
administered, according to Beetseh & and Kohol, (2013. 22) by “visionary, committed, 
focused, disciplined, purposeful, responsible, selfless and mentally resourceful 
leadership”. Koenane (2017: 9-10) proposes that politicians should be held 
accountable for their conduct, while moral development should form a core aspect of 
their formal programme. He recommends that “in order for South Africa to have a 
sustainable moral fibre, strategies must be put in place wherein politicians of all 
political structures must be formally educated towards understanding the role of 
morality in society” Koenane (2017: 10). The Success of the democratic system of 
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governance for post-colonial African states requires, according to Olu-Adeyemi (2012: 
171) that “the citizens must be politically educated and mature. This would enable 
future leaders to make ethical decisions and for the people to begin to make political 
office holders accountable while within and outside office”. (Olu-Adeyemi, 2012: 171). 
 
For Omenka (2013: 43), since the family is society’s micro unit, value reorientation 
should begin from there. He admonishes exhorts parents to endeavour to teach their 
children and wards the importance of honesty, uprightness and dedication. For 
Koenane (2017: 9-10), if South Africa is serious about establishing a sensible moral 
culture that can be universalised, then it is imperative to establish a system of moral 
formation at all tiers of education. This study contends that it is not enough to have a 
programme of ethics in all schools. Rather, it posits as Plato and Aristotle note in 
chapter three, that knowing what is good or right must be accompanied by a process 
of habituation or practicing the virtues learnt every day (Jonas, 2016: 205-206). 
 
Omenka (2013: 43) submits that “honesty and transparency should be publicly 
rewarded. This will serve as an encouragement to the society and the upcoming 
generation that it pays to be honest”. While this study agrees with the need to reward 
good behaviour, it is worth adding that non-reward of ethical conduct is not a 
justification for anyone to indulge in wrong actions and behaviour because everyone 
will must be held accountable for their actions. 
 
As a result of the impact of westernisation and globalisation, as referred to in chapter 
five, which has largely eroded the values and morals of contemporary Africans, the 
restoration of morals, stability, and social order requires, according to Udokang (2014: 
269), “an urgent need to revive our cultural values, traditional ethical principles and 
institutions. There is the need to re-establish them as the guiding principles of our daily 
life and living”.  
 
This study posits that Africans also need to play their part in restoring their values, 
cultures and traditions because they have also contributed to their erosion. Post-
colonial African states are endowed with the natural and human potential to become 
great nations “if the politicians (and the people) can change their mind-sets and learn 
to play ethical politics that adds good value to the system” (Olu-Adeyemi, 2012: 171). 
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6.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the roles of leaders, managers, societal members, 
bureaucrats, and corporate executives in the promotion of an ethical, just, and ideal 
post-colonial African society that places the needs of its community members at the 
forefront of the governance, management and administration of the state. In that 
regard, Rawls’ theory of justice has been examined, especially in view of the import of 
his transcendental institutionalism for the realisation of perfectly just institutions. The 
chapter considered the role of ethical leadership in the realisation of the ideal society; 
and the other kinds of leadership that are able to provide a just and ethical society, 
especially political, directive and values -driven leadership. The chapter further 
examined how to pursue democratic consolidation; and the options for an alternative 
democratic order since the political systems that African countries have embraced so 
far have not contributed substantially to their development.  
 
In the Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism, he accords just institutions the role of 
dispensing powers and positions, the dispersal of obligations and duties, and the 
distribution of benefits and burdens among societal members. For Rawls, the kinds of 
social structures that constitute a just system are based on two principles of justice, 
namely: the principles of equal liberty that each individual is entitled to irrespective of 
the condition that the person may be subjected to; and the principle that permits social 
and economic inequalities on condition that everyone is given equal opportunity to 
prosper and to derive any advantages that the social contract provides.  Sen criticises 
Rawls transcendental institutionalism on the basis that since it is not possible to define 
anything perfect, human beings should therefore not pursue perfect institutions. 
Rather, he recommends the comparative approach to justice which instead of focusing 
more on searching for a perfectly just society, seeks to eliminate noticed injustices.  
 
It has been noted in the chapter that ethical leadership plays a fundamental role in the 
ability of post-colonial African states to realise a transformed, harmonious and 
developmental society. The chapter has noted a pervasiveness of conflict within the 
African continent and its impact on the ability of African states to realise their objectives 
of good governance. In that regard the fundamental role that leadership, management 
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and individuals play in conflict resolution is noted. The relevance of the conflict 
resolution methods that traditional African societies employed has been considered 
and noted as measures that postcolonial African states can draw from for their ability 
to genuinely resolve disagreements and conflicts. These traditional modes of conflict 
management were also able to promote forgiveness, unity and peaceful coexistence, 
in contrast with the western system of conflict resolution, which in most cases, does 
not really engender sincerity of purpose and forgiveness.  in most cases.  
 
The citizens generally view politicians with suspicion. However, they latter are 
expected to transcend the trappings of political office, to be ethical, decisive and 
authentic leaders who care about the conditions of their citizens. They are further 
expected to be in complete control of their government, to be decisive, accountable 
and responsive to the needs and expectations of their people.   
 
The chapter has considered political, directive and values leadership as styles that 
postcolonial African states must include in their governance processes irrespective of 
any other kind of leadership style that they may subscribe to. These forms of 
leadership incorporate both soft and hard power; it they ensures a balanced system 
of rule that produces fairness, and that enables the execution of duties and 
responsibilities on schedule and as required. They also enhance the abilities of leaders 
and societal members to conduct themselves ethically. 
 
There is need to consider alternative systems of governance for contemporary African 
states as a result of their failures to effectively administer their territories in a way that 
promotes justice, fairness, and equal opportunity for everyone. Wiredu submits that in 
view of the failure of African states to  implement systems of governance that are 
conducive to the African way of life, it is necessary ily to consider the best aspects of 
the traditional system of governance as alternatives, especially a modifed version of 
democracy by consensus. Other philosophers such as Eze however, do not believe in 
the feasibility of such an alternative. However, they agree with Wiredu on a number of 
other aspects. These include discouraging autocracy, and promoting political 
contestation, freedom of thought and speech; discouraging reckless, wasteful and 
extravagant lifestyle, and lust for powe,r which appear to be well instituted in the 
politics of various oligarchic states. They further agree that post-colonial African states 
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can attain substantial rewards by adopting forms of governance that have not been 
bastardised by extreme capitalist tendencies. 
 
This chapter has noted that one of the major factors responsible for the failure of post-
colonial African states is their inability to attain democratic consolidation. Most African 
leaders have failed to make concise efforts to protect and nurture their democracies 
in a manner that enables them to adequately respond to complications that may 
emerge. The politics of survival which most African politicians, leaders, managers and 
bureaucrats adopt makes it impossible for them to ethically and objectively attend to 
their constitutional obligations, including making adequate provisions for their citizens, 
and engineering their economies for sustainable development. As a result, the chapter 
proposes a number of measures that will enable post-colonial African states to 
consolidate their democracies, including the enhancement of the quality of public 
institutions, economic performance, affluence, access to land, and a more favourable 
international climate. 
 
The chapter has proposed a number of other measures as well, which will enable post-
colonial African states to operate ethically. These include, as Koenane posits, ensuring 
that politicians are adequately educated on the role of morality in the state; that leaders 
and others with any form of responsibility are accountable for their actions and 
behaviours; that ethics and morals become critical aspects of the education of 
students at all levels of study. Parents are further expected to assume the role of 
teaching their children about ethics, morals, values and responsibility. 
 
While the public seems to generally view politicians negatively, this research submits 
that it is necessary to seek a new breed of selfless leaders who are more interested 
in sincerely attending to the needs of their population, and whose judgements are 
not clouded by selfish interests.  
  
202 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This study set out to examine the inability of post-colonial African states to implement 
ethical and good governance processes that are able to adequately address the needs 
and expectations of their citizens despite their access to vast natural and human 
resources and exposure to international best practices. The study considered the 
questionable ethical framework of the leaders, politicians, bureaucrats, officials in the 
public and private sectors and the citizens at large; why leaders find it daunting to 
institute commendable ethical systems and strategies that result in excellent economic 
performance; and why the western countries are largely able to derive better systems 
of governance. The study examined why the future of democracy in Africa remains 
uncertain despite the current strategies to institutionalise democratic systems of 
governance; the possibility of implementing western democracy in Africa; the role of 
ethical leadership in the attainment of the ideal society. The study further considered 
the contributions that all stakeholders, including leaders, politicians, managers, 
employees and community members can make to the realisation of the ideal society; 
while recommendations for an alternative system of governance for the African 
continent have been proffered. 
 
Most African states are failing to implement adequate systems and strategies capable 
of alleviating the socio-political and economic challenges that confront their citizens, 
despite their competencies in formulating excellent laws and policies. They are neither 
unwilling and/or unable to successfully promote ethical and good leadership, nor are 
they able to ensure accountability, integrity and care for the people. The failure of post-
colonial African states to adequately address the numerous challenges that confront 
their societies has led to conflicts, instability and even wars, with devastating 
consequences, which are comparable to Hobbes state of nature where the weak is 
are at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short. The manner in which 
postcolonial African states fail to properly address their numerous challenges gives 
the wrong impression that these are insurmountable obstacles. 
 
In chapter two, the concept of ethics and the moral theories that provide a framework 
for right and wrong, good and bad conduct and behaviour was were examined, notably 
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deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. The chapter espoused what philosophers 
such as Aristotle and Aquinas consider to be the ultimate goal of human life, while the 
relevance of the virtues theory for the contemporary era was also considered.  
 
Ethics is the study of morality. It is about understanding what is right; conducting 
oneself in the right manner; and a consideration of the morality of individual 
behaviours, actions and their consequences. The kinds of questions that ethics 
interrogates are: what What factors determine right and wrong conduct? What is the 
role of self-interest in moral judgements and decisions? Are laws, principles, rules or 
each situation the right determinant of individual choices and morality? Which 
conducts are right and which acts are wrong, and why? This research considers ethics 
as always taking the interest of all societal members into account in the governance 
of the state and in the fair distribution of privileges, benefits and burdens. 
 
A number of philosophers place a distinction between ethics and morality. For some 
of them, ethics is the evaluation of morality, while morality relates to systems of rules, 
principles, values or virtues. In many instances, ethics is applied to the contemporary 
idea of good and bad, right and wrong, while morality is linked to indigenous, religious 
or obsolete conceptions of acceptable conduct. Other philosophers do not see any 
difference between ethics and morality. In ordinary language, these terms generally 
refer to the same thing. In this research, ethics and morality will beis used 
interchangeably. 
 
There are various ethical theories such as deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics 
that provide the framework for right and wrong actions, good or bad conduct. However, 
these theories disagree on the measure of morality. While deontology priorities duty 
over consequences, utilitarianism emphasises social utility, and virtue ethics lays 
emphasis on the virtues of character in the determination of right actions. Their lack of 
consensus on the measure of morality eliminates the possibility of deriving a 
universally recognised measure of right and wrong. However, the utilitarian moral 
theory appears to be the most recognised and accepted measurement of moral 
judgements.  
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For deontology, morality depends not on the consequences of actions, but on the 
fulfilment of duties, and the ability of human beings to act in the right manner. In other 
words, actions are moral on the basis of their rightness and the goodness of a person, 
based on a higher level of individual morality. In kKant’s deontology, he associates the 
ultimate goal of human actions with the Categorical Imperative; this requires that 
human beings should relate with to each others in the same way that they expect 
others to treat them. This imperative is seen as providing universal moral duties that 
will bring stability and peace to communities; that will promote the adherence to rules, 
civil order and individual freedom. 
 
Deontology is criticised for being insensitive to the consequences of actions on the 
affected individuals or stakeholders. The critics suggest that such insensitivity can be 
ameliorated by complementing the deontological moral theory with the virtues theory. 
While this criticism is rejected by the deontologists on the basis that the virtues theory 
already assumes a significant position in Kant’s moral theory, the critics of deontology 
consider Kant’s virtue theory as inadequate. Deontology is further criticised for being 
insensitive to moral complexities; for advocating perfect duties and obligatory 
requirements; for expecting human beings to always fulfil their promises; and for not 
condoning exceptions or deviations.  While a number of Kantian deontologists do not 
accept these objections because they believe that Kantianism does note the 
exceptions to perfect duties, they do not however, indicate the manner in which such 
exceptions can be made.[MK32] While a number of Kantian deontologists do accept 
these objections because they believe Kantianism does note exceptions to perfect 
duties, they do not indicate the manner in which such exceptions can be made. 
 
Actions are right, according to utilitarianism, when they the lead to happiness for the 
majority of those affected. Happiness in this case refers to a lack of suffering or pain, 
and the absence of partiality. The only desirable goals, for Mill, are these elements of 
happiness, and human desires can only be pursued in order to derive their inherent 
pleasures or in order to prevent pain and promote pleasure.  
 
Utilitarianism is criticised for promoting hedonism in its consideration of happiness or 
pleasure as the ultimate good. However, Mill disagrees with the critics in this regard, 
claiming that the kinds of pleasure that he concerns himself with are not only physical 
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pleasures, but aesthetic and emotional pleasures as well. He believes that the 
attainment of a state of tranquillity and inner peace will limit the level of physical 
pleasures that human beings will pursue. He classifies happiness into the humble and 
the higher types. The humble sense of happiness for him consists of the feelings of 
pleasure and pain, while the higher element of happiness leads to a happy life and this 
is the kind of happiness that individuals with highly developed faculties aspire forto.  
 
For virtue ethics, morally right actions are determined by the virtue of character. For 
Aristotle, virtue is the excellence of character; the human potential to avoid extreme 
behaviour and conduct; and a habit or admirable traits, which enable the achievement 
of moral goodness, the pursuit of a good life and the attainment of worthy goals. A 
good life for him is a virtuous life, and virtuous people act and behave ethically without 
inhibitions. While Kant sees virtues as some kind of self-control and the strength of will 
that propels the person to properly execute his functions, Aquinas considers virtues 
as those habits that assist human beings in carrying out their duties appropriately and 
in a manner that leads to happiness. This for him can only be achieved when human 
beings conduct themselves in a disciplined manner, by acting rationally and avoiding 
selfishness. 
 
While Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtues, Aquinas 
differentiates between intellectual and appetitive virtues. Aristotle posits that while 
intellectual virtue is associated with thinking and the rational part of the soul and can 
be acquired through teaching and instruction, moral virtue does not reason on its own, 
but is able to follow thought patterns. For Aquinas, intellectual virtues are acquired 
through various forms of scientific knowledge, and appetitive virtues enable human 
appetites to be rational. However, this form of virtues for Aquinas, enables human 
beings to engage in proper intellectual and moral activities. 
 
Virtue ethics is criticised for questioning examining the virtue and character of human 
beings instead of establishing the ways and means of becoming moral through an 
appeal to universal laws. It is criticised for not recognising the importance of rules in 
the development of virtues, and for not putting actions first in its determination of 
morality as is the case with deontology and utilitarianism. This criticism is rejected by 
philosophers such as Sim, who claim that the central role that rules play in the 
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acquisition of virtues is recognised by Aristotle when he asserts that the acquisition of 
virtues is possible when human beings are law-abiding and desist from wrong 
behaviours and actions. 
 
Aristotle posits that there is no one person in whom all the virtues can be found. 
However, he believes that these virtues can be acquired through practice and learning, 
and by consulting or emulating virtuous and wise people. The other means of 
becoming ethical or virtuous include through self-introspection and self-awareness. 
Self-awareness gives human beings insight into their current situation and what they 
ideally prefer; it enables the individuals to identify the challenges that confront them, 
and to determine alternatives that will enable them to progress towards the ideal moral 
state. 
 
Virtue ethics is recognised and acknowledged for its attempt to develop not only good 
rules and regulations, but also consistently good or virtuous people. However, many 
virtue ethicists are disappointed that their moral theory has not been able to eliminate 
all the unethical conducts and behaviours in the world. Rather, what they notice is the 
increase in the number of unethical people and the prevalence of all manners of 
immorality in the world. They believe that it will be impossible to create an ethical and 
just society unless human beings become moral or virtuous. 
 
Although the importance of virtue ethics in developing good human beings is 
recognised, its critics do not consider its proposals more convincing than the other 
ethical theories. Moreover, the inability of either of these theories to create a 
universally acceptable moral system creates a dilemma in the choice for an absolute 
moral theory. It is suggested that the only means of eliminating the problem of choice 
among them is to synthesise the best of these moral theories and overlook the worse 
among them.  
 
This study believes that there are good and useful elements in all these moral theories. 
Therefore, it is recommended that some of their elements be combined. The 
categorical imperative that requires human beings to treat each the other in the same 
manner that they would like to be treated provides a universal moral requirement that 
can lead to respect for rules, individual freedom, peace and stability in the world. This 
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should be combined with the virtues theory that requires human beings to possess 
good character, to avoid extreme conduct and behaviour, to always strive for the 
golden mean, and to pursue worthy objectives, moral goodness and the good life. 
These two theories can also be combined with the utilitarian principle that promotes 
physical, aesthetic and emotional happiness, the avoidance of pain, and the realisation 
of inner peace which eliminates the human urge for excessive physical pleasure. This 
study advocates this combination of moral theories because jointly, they promote the 
adherence to rules and the appeal to the inner goodness of human beings. This 
combination will close the gap between acting ethically based on the requirements of 
the law, and because human beings believe that it is the right thing to do.  
 
Aristotle believes that the ultimate goal of human life is happiness (eudaimonia). He 
notes that while all human beings consider happiness as that which they seek in all 
their endeavours, they have different understandings of its constitutive elements. For 
some people happiness consists in the acquisition of immense wealth, while others 
consider it as derivable from honour, glory or other worldly achievements. While 
Aristotle believes that human beings need a measure of worldly goods to be happy, 
he believes that true happiness cannot be derived through from such a shallow 
medium, but can only be attained through a life of contemplation and a life of virtue.  
 
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that worldly acquisitions do not result in true happiness. 
In support of his position, he refers to the life of the rich and famous, who have not 
realised happiness through all their worldly acquisitions, but who at various periods in 
their lives have realised the vanity of worldly possessions and as a result have resorted 
to a life of service to humanity through various corporate social responsibility and 
corporate citizenship endeavours. He agrees with Aristotle that true happiness will be 
derived from a life of contemplation and living in accordance with the virtues. 
 
One of the salient points that Aristotle makes is that human beings possess natural 
virtues and have the natural ability to act virtuously. The challenge in this assertion for 
the contemporary era is that if Aristotle’s claims are true, why is the world filled with 
unethical people, leaders, politicians, public and private officials, who are unable or 
unwilling to be ethical and just in their actions and behaviours? The factors responsible 
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for these challenges and the proposed solutions have been addressed in this research 
and will be referred to in the next sections. 
 
Chapter three examined the features of the ideal state from the views of Plato, Aristotle 
and Hobbes. There is consensus among these philosophers that the state plays a 
fundamental role in ensuring development, stability and peace. However, they 
disagree on the modalities for realising the ideal state, though they all concur that 
justice plays a fundamental role in the institutionalisation of a good political society. 
 
In order to ensure the realisation of a constitutional and ethical state, Plato advocates 
a radical overhaul of every malfunctioning aspect of the state apparatus by philosopher 
kings. This reform covers both the systems and structures of the state, including 
human beings and their characters. For Plato, the ideal state is the one that is 
managed and administered by wise leaders or philosopher kings, and is structured on 
a carefully organised division of labour, in which the roles and responsibilities of an 
individual will depend on his or her good qualifications, maturity, and values or virtues. 
He classifies his envisioned state into the guardians,or philosopher kings; the 
auxiliaries or soldier; and the producers or workers. For Aristotle, the desired state 
must promote just interrelationships and the good life, and ensure that benefits are 
dispersed only on the basis of merit.  
 
Plato believes that the moral development of individuals, especially the youth must be 
accompanied by adequate education, imitation and habituation. A person can only 
become virtuous, for him, by practising the virtues and with the help of virtuous role 
models. Aristotle agrees with this process of acquiring virtues. However, while Plato 
believes that only one virtue (justice) is sufficient to turn human beings into moral, just 
and fulfilled individuals, Aristotle outlines a number of virtues that a person must 
acquire and practice every day in order to develop good character, good image, wealth 
and happiness. Plato does not believe that an individual must can practice virtuous 
acts. Rather, he believes that when students are assisted to acquire knowledge of the 
good, they will in turn choose the good.  
 
The Aristocratic state, for Plato, is the best form of government because it is the kind 
of state that is administered and managed by the best individuals in terms of their 
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knowledge, experience and values. He believes that the best state can only be 
attained if individuals who have the capacity to acquire philosophic knowledge are 
identified and adequately capacitated with the right knowledge to fulfil the function of 
managing and administering the state. Happiness for him can only be realised if and 
when human beings are committed to connecting with the real or philosophic ideas. 
He considers the other forms of rule such as democracy, oligarchy, tyranny and 
timocracy as a bastardisations of aristocracy. Plato considers the stability of the state 
and the rule of law as non-negotiable. He condemns anarchy, rebellion and chaos as 
unjustifiable for their potential to destroy the state.  
 
Plato’s reform programmes for his ideal state are seen as consisting of complicated 
programmes that are not achievable. Critics such as Popper find Plato’s expose of the 
just state to be unethical, petty and totalitarian for its suppression of the freedom of 
speech, for considering both poverty and wealth as leading to vice and therefore not 
encouraged; for promoting communal ownership of property; and for rejecting 
diversity. 
 
The best people to govern the state for Plato are those with the qualities of philosopher 
Kkings. However, the reality in various countries as shown in this research is that most 
of the leaders, politicians, public and private sector employees and management are 
either unwilling or unable to successfully perform their roles. The consequences of 
these failures manifest themselves in the problems that confront the current era. An 
effective and transforming socio-political and economic system must be conceived and 
implemented as a solution.   
 
Plato realises the enormous challenges that his reform programmes pose. As a result, 
he concedes that his envisioned state may be unrealistic. However, he hopes that 
some of these programmes are favourably considered. This study agrees with Plato 
that although many of his proposals may be unrealistic, given human shortcomings, it 
is necessary that the systems of governance in Africa in particular, and the world in 
general are overhauled. This is because the current social, political and economic 
realities in the world are not sustainable. If  drastic steps are not taken, including 
renewed and conscious ethical determination consciousness by affected stakeholders 
to put conditions in place that are  able to positively address the current challenges, 
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postcolonial African states African states in particular, and the world at large, may 
revert to the Hobbesian state of nature. 
 
While Plato considers rulers with the characteristics of philosopher kings as the best 
leaders, Hobbes promotes absolute monarchy, and Aristotle considers a mixed regime 
as the best kind of government because it is more stable and combines elements of 
the laws that are practiced in democracies and oligarchies. This is unlike unmixed 
systems that are characterised by conflicts, factionalism and revolution, as a result of 
inherent injustices.  
 
While Plato promotes complete communal ownership of property, Aristotle believes 
that communal ownership can result in disagreements:, impractical, and unjust and 
can could result in conflict when goods, and services and benefits are not dispersed 
in accordance with individual contributions. Aristotle supports private ownership of 
property and allows for the partial use of some private property in common. A number 
of philosophers agree with Aristotle   that private ownership of property will enhance 
commitment to hard work as well as promote peaceful coexistence.  
 
This study notes that one of the challenges that results from Plato and Aristotle’s 
positions on the ownership of property is that both systems of property have over the 
ages failed to satisfactorily meet the needs and aspirations of the citizens. While it is 
necessary to devise the right economic system that takes the needs of all societal 
members into account, this cannot be achieved without the right kind of leaders in 
terms of education, values and selfless commitment to advancing the rights of all 
stakeholders. This study rejects communal ownership of property. It recommends 
private ownership of property, on condition that no one is allowed to own excessive 
wealth while when the majority of the population wallows in poverty as the cases in of 
Nigeria and South Africa, among other countries, reveal. Most of the resources of a 
country must be used for the upliftment of the community members and the 
development of the state. 
 
The most perfect virtue for Aristotle is justice because it is a fundamental aspect of 
morality that is displayed towards others, and the character trait that prevents human 
beings from the maltreatment of others. He distinguishes between distributive, 
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reciprocal, economic and punitive justice.  Various philosophers and immoralists such 
as Machavelli, Nietzsche and Thrasymachus, criticise Aristotle’s justice, claiming that 
it is not possible for human beings to be fair to everyone, that the more powerful 
individuals are more deserving of justice, and that all human beings cannot be given 
equal consideration. This study observes that although the assertions of these critics 
are distressing, inequality is institutionalised around the world either overtly or covertly. 
This factor is responsible for the various problems that the world confronts, including 
unrest, conflicts, divisions and wars. 
 
For Hobbes, the fearful, troublesome, aggressive and conflicting nature of human 
beings results in disharmony among individuals. He posits, therefore, that if human 
beings do not seek peaceful means of resolving these challenges but continue to 
coexist in such in sucha state of nature, then all lives will be solitary, nasty, brutish and 
short. As a result, he asserts that the citizens must rationally enter into a social contract 
and be governed by an absolute sovereign in a commonwealth. Hobbes believes that 
the absolute monarch is the best ruler and therefore should be accorded unrestricted 
powers to govern the state indefinitely in order to avert anarchy, chaos and 
lawlessness.  
 
The sovereign for Hobbes, cannot be held accountable by the law because he is the 
supreme ruler and judge and, therefore, above the law. He considers the conduct of 
the sovereign as automatically the actions of the members of the state because he 
acts on their behalf. Hobbes believes that the kind of absolute monarch that he refers 
to is the one that operates the best form of government. He accords him unlimited 
powers and rights because human beings are inherently imperfect and in order to 
prevent the re-emergence of the state of nature. He believes that the sovereign cannot 
inflict harm on the citizens because no rational being can harm himself. For Hobbes, 
the monarchical type of government is the best form of rule because it gives the 
absolute monarch unrestricted powers to govern the state as he considers fit. He 
criticises the aristocratic and representative forms of governance for their inability to 
ensure maximum peace and security. 
 
Critics of Hobbes contend that the citizens are generally not appreciative of the rules 
of an absolute monarch since such a level of absolute authority often turns such rulers 
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into tyrants, selfish and insensitive. beings. Hobbes disagrees with these critics, 
claiming that it is not possible for the citizens to be totally happy in any case. This 
study also disagrees with the level of faith and trust that Hobbes confers on the 
absolute monarch because it is excessive and can lead to discontent, conflict or chaos 
in the state; it can also turn the sovereign into a reckless ruler who may not often 
consider the interests of the citizens in the decisions that affect their lives. Rather, a 
ruler with such a level of power must be controlled by oversight bodies in order to 
ensure that he or she does not become a tyrant. One may agree with Hobbes that 
rational persons cannot inflict harm on themselves. However, they can maltreat and 
abuse others for their own selfish interests. 
 
This study recommends that instead of according the absolute monarch unlimited 
powers as Hobbes posits, a good, ethical and competent ruler should be allowed to 
continue administering the state on condition that he governs on the basis of equity, 
justice and fairness and to the satisfaction of all or the majority of his subjects. 
However, such rulers must vacate their office or be removed from office if and when 
they are no longer able to perform their duties well. It is further recommended that the 
rulers vacate their office between the age of sixty-five and sixty eight years, even if 
they are still performing their duties excellently. The reason for this proposal is that at 
this age, human beings are no longer strong enough to engage in the stressful nature 
of politics and governance. Rather, they can remain advisers to the new rulers. In order 
to avoid possible leadership vacuum, it is imperative that the current leader institute a 
succession plan, which grooms potential leaders intellectually, experientially and 
ethically. 
 
Chapter four examined ethics and the system of governance in the indigenous African 
context and their roles in the enhancement of ethical and just traditional African 
societies. In the indigenous African societies, ethics is understood as relating to the 
goodness of character which results from a person’s ability to develop good values 
and virtues. These societies understand morality as the measure of right and wrong in 
the attitude of human beings, in desirable social relations, and in the kinds of actions 
and behaviours that promotes peaceful and happy coexistence. 
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The first westerners to the African continent refuted the existence of ethics and 
morality among the indigenous Africans. They found their traditional belief systems 
and values to be irrational, primitive, archaic and irrelevant. In their attempts to rectify 
the deficiencies that they perceived in these societies, they destroyed valuable 
elements of the traditions, cultures, values and social life of the indigenous African 
people, which were structured on ethical, religious and communal principles. 
Eventually, the true nature of the traditional African societies dawned on these 
westerners when they realised that contrary to their earlier prejudice and ignorance of 
the indigenous way of life, traditional African societies were in reality surrounded by 
well-structured standards of morality which significantly influenced their actions and 
behaviours, and the contravention of which attracted severe punishment.  
 
A number of philosophers contend that African ethics proceeds from religion; that most 
African moral thoughts have religious undertones; and therefore, the two cannot be 
separated. Other theorists do not agree with this notion, claiming that religion is a 
product of society. For Wiredu and Gyekye, the morality of human beings is shaped 
by the society and rational thoughts, and not by religion. They contend that African 
morality proceeds not from metaphysical interventions, but from human ability to 
consider the impact of their actions and behaviours on affected stakeholders. Wiredu 
calls it the motivated quest for sympathetic impartiality, claiming that the morality of an 
individual proceeds from his ability to be considerate towards the well-being of others. 
 
Anderson rejects Wiredu and Gyekye’s arguments on the basis that all African 
societies are influenced by religion, though at on different scales; and this can be 
noticed in all aspects of their existence, including their food, the way they talk, and 
even in their way of dressing. While various philosophers lack consensus on the origin 
of African ethics, this study notes that African morality proceeds from society and 
religion in most instances. While the debate on the source of African ethics continues, 
it is important to state that in order to correct all the things that have gone wrong in the 
world human beings must conduct themselves ethically. 
 
In the traditional as well as contemporary African societies (though to a lesser extent 
in the latter), all beings, including the vegetation, humans, animals and the 
supernatural beings, are interdependent, interrelated and interconnected in a manner 
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sense that the flourishing of one hinges on the wellbeing of others. The communal and 
moral responsibilities of indigenous Africans requires that they coexist in harmony, 
respect each other, consider each other’s interests, caring for each other and 
upholding the rights of others. Consequently, indigenous African ethics promotes 
humanism or the Southern African concept of Ubuntu, which provides that the welfare 
of humans are is interdependent and that human beings must respect each other and 
uphold human rights. While Ubuntu is mostly associated with interdependency and 
communalism, it also upholds individualism in the sense that while human beings are 
expected to uphold the dignity of others, they are also expected to respect their 
individuality, and ensure a balance between their individualism and their loyalty to their 
community. In other words, the degree of loyalty that they have towards their 
community must neither rob them of their individuality nor discourage individual 
initiatives and self-reliance. 
 
In African communalism, for Wiredu, human beings are inducted from childhood to be 
aware of the importance of developing a feeling of understanding, closeness and unity 
with their immediate and extended family members and ultimately with the community 
as a whole. The community members conceive this affinity as extending their 
responsibilities to each other. This notion of human connectedness, for Wiredu, 
involves the sense of kinship and is rooted in humanity. This is manifested in the 
communal belief that advocates consideration for everyone and the community. This 
traditional morality, which is a common knowledge in African societies, also coincides 
with Kant’s categorical imperative, which provides that human beings must treat each 
other in the same manner that they expect to be treated.  
 
In the traditional African society, riches or wealth can be acquired either individually or 
collectively. However, the society believes that happiness can only be realised 
collectively and within an ethical and peaceful society. It should therefore, not be 
surprising that South Africa is not a happy society. The actions and behaviours of an 
individual, according to the principle of communal responsibility, can affect the entire 
community. Many scholars criticise the principle of communal responsibility that 
indigenous African societies practice observe for holding the entire community 
accountable for individual actions and behaviours. While this principle is condemned 
by various scholars, there are other theorists, however, who encourage it for ensuring 
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that the wellbeing of the minority and the community at large is protected; for 
discouraging discrimination and taking into account the wellbeing of all community 
members. 
 
It is observed that the kind of affinity that traditional African societies had is currently 
missing in the way many people all over the world relate to each other and this has 
created unfavourable consequences for individuals and communities. This study 
proposes that the principle of communal responsibility should not be discarded. 
Rather, it is recommended that the unfavourable implications of the principle be 
discouraged, while the beneficial aspects should be upheld. 
 
Matolino and Kwindingwi condemn the moral theory of Ubuntu, which emphasises 
common humanity, interrelationship and interdependence of human beings, claiming 
that as a propagated ethical solution for the current era, Ubuntu has stagnated, lacks 
the context and capacity to inspire moral conduct,  and as a result is no longer relevant 
tofor the contemporary African society. They contend that the rapid decline in the 
influence of Ubuntu on the behaviour of Africans in the current era is not surprising 
because the factors that enabled indigenous Africans to uphold Ubuntu as a way of 
life haves changed for the current (South) Africans. They argue that the yearnings of 
the moral theory of Ubuntu for the restoration of the past’s moral way of life cannot be 
reconciled with the current conditions that present themselves to members of society. 
 
Metz rejects Matolino and Kwindingwi’s, contentions that the conditions in the 
contemporary African societies are not sufficient to appeal to the ethics of Ubuntu. He 
finds their contentions insufficient to uphold their conclusions. Instead, he posits that 
the moral theory of Ubuntu has a fundamental role to play in the promotion of human 
and organisational ethics. 
 
The import of the conclusion that Matolino and Kwindingwi make draw in terms of the 
end of Ubuntu, for Chimakonam, dwells not in its validity, but in its philosophical and 
methodical import. He suggests that their arguments should neither be dismissed nor 
accepted as incontestable. Rather, he posits that their contention is a conundrum that 
has to be subjected to critical analysis. Koenane and Olatunji disagree with Matolino 
and Kwindingwi’s declaration of the end of Ubuntu, claiming that the relevance of 
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Ubuntu cannot be denied because it has a crucial role to play in society. They further 
contend that Ubuntu is an all-inclusive worldview that encapsulates the universalised 
values of humanness; it is in a constant process of developing ethical conduct and 
behaviour and as a result must be promoted so as to encourage harmonious 
relationships.  
 
The traditional African system of governance, for African philosophers is founded on 
a unique morality that hinges on the metaphysical principle, which considers human 
beings as unique and irreplaceable components of society. They find politics and 
governance in indigenous African societies to be democratic. The decisions that were 
taken during the precolonial era in traditional African societies were made in a manner 
that took the interests of all members of society into account. During this era, most 
major decisions entailed seeking the input and consent of community members, and 
the process of conflict resolution also entailed considering the views of all adult 
members of society.  
 
The system of governance in indigenous African societies differs from the western 
style in the sense that while the indigenous rulers were appointed to rule for life and 
to be accountable to their ancestors and their subjects, contemporary leaders are 
expected to vacate their office when their terms expire. While in some indigenous 
African societies the rulers did not possess absolute authority, since their decisions 
reflect the collective pronouncements of the members of council or the council of 
elders, in other traditional African societies, the rulers were accorded absolute 
authority and dictatorial powers.  
 
Wiredu posits that in indigenous African societies almost all social and political 
engagements, interactions, deliberations and decision-making processes among 
community members were aimed at reaching consensus.  He considers democracy 
by consensus as the process of making decisions having taken into account the 
opinions of both the majority and the minority. The kind of political system that 
democracy by consensus provides, for Wiredu, neither confers  power on winners on 
the basis of majority votes, nor is characterised by  competition for power and 
domination among rival political organisations as is the case in western majoritarian 
democracy.  
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A number of philosophers, including Matolino and Eze criticise Wiredu’s treatise on 
democracy by consensus. Matolino contends that consensual democracy can result 
in the institutionalisation of one party politics. Eze further argues that Wiredu’s ideas 
in this regard are excessive rationalisation and a misleading romanticisation that can 
serve the purpose of justifying the early westerners’ single party politics that assumed 
total control of political power and as a consequence, discouraged democratic 
freedom. Other theorists agree with Eze’s position on the grounds that democracy by 
consensus as propounded by Wiredu can become a tool for hiding authoritarianism, 
for undermining the opposition, and for undermining the principle of equal rights and 
opportunities that representative democracy projects. 
 
It seems that Wiredu prefers democracy by consensus to other systems of western 
democracy because he believes that the kind of political system that can adequately 
address the needs and aspirations of Africans, despite the political parties they are 
affiliated to, is one that does not subscribe to the philosophy of winner takes it all. This 
study recommends democracy by consensus for African countries on condition that 
its deficiencies as noted by Matolino and Eze are critically examined with the view to 
eliminating elements that can could jeopardise the effectiveness of democracy by 
consensus. It is noted that over the ages, the majority party tends to disregard 
opposition parties and their contributions. On the other hand, the minority parties tend 
to adopt distrust in and disdain towards the policies and programmes of the ruling 
party. in government. Such an adversarial approach by these parties tends to heighten 
tension in the body politic and by implication impacts negatively on effective 
management and administration of the state. While the negative aspects of  
democracy by consensus is are noted, it is suggested that a further exploration of its 
pros and cons be considered in order to  strive for the realisation of the kind of ideal 
society that ethical citizens desire, in which prejudice and favouritism are rejected, but 
in which integrity, justice and fairness are promoted. 
 
This study proposes that the traditional understanding of democracy as ‘rule of the 
people’ should not be construed as giving all adult members of society the right to vote 
in elections. Rather, it is recommended that only individuals with some form of tertiary 
education be eligible to choose the leaders and other public representatives. This is 
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because the majority of the masses tend to elect unqualified individuals into office. 
This in turn contributes to service delivery failures, to other unethical challenges noted 
in chapter five and eventually to the failure of post-colonial African states. It is 
recognised that many of the elite and educated individuals perform dismally in their 
roles. However, there are others who are capable of acting ethically, making good 
decisions on behalf of the population, and ultimately contributing to the realisation of 
the ideal African society. 
 
Chapter five investigated the failure of postcolonial African states to govern their 
territories effectively from the ethical, economic, political and social considerations, 
despite their access to substantial natural and human capital, and best practices. The 
questionable moral character of African leaders, managers and the citizens at large, 
has been examined, while the reasons for their inability to contribute to the realisation 
of organisations and societies that are ethical, efficient and effective are also 
considered. The reasons why the future of democracy on the African continent 
remains vague, despite the various attempts by successive governments on the 
continent to democratise, have  also been interrogated.  
 
It has been noted that postcolonial African states are confronted by numerous 
challenges such as the distortion and loss of African values, traditions and customs; 
the declining state of African politics; decrease in the effectiveness of African 
traditional leadership; bad leadership generally; economic, social and political 
problems; underdevelopment; poverty; unemployment; diseases; famine; 
homelessness; illiteracy;  economic mismanagement; negative colonial influences; the 
negative impact of globalisation; and the inability  or unwillingness of members of 
society to behave and act ethically for the good of society. 
 
Many scholars, including Wiredu, Dolamo and Igboin posit that westerners are largely 
responsible for the erosion or loss of African customs, traditions and the value that 
Africans placed on identity, on humanism and on the sanctity of human life. In their bid 
to change all dimensions of African life to what they consider  to be the right beliefs, 
identity and practices, including intellectual and religious orientations, the African 
communalism was compromised and replaced by the kind of individualistic orientation 
that subsumes all areas of human existence, including the family, social and religious 
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orientations.  These westerners overlooked the cultural belief systems of Africans that 
hinged on a conception of the person as existing in communion with others. Instead, 
they propagated their individualistic ideology that conceives the person as an 
autonomous being who exists for himself or herself, and who may choose to associate 
with others if he or she so wishes. 
 
There are those theorists, such as Eze, who refute the claim that colonialists and 
western imports are responsible for the large scale distortion of African values, 
customs and traditions. They contend that the erosion of indigenous African customs, 
values and systems of governance in the current era, the lack of appreciation for the 
sacredly held powers of traditional rulers, and their contributions to the failure of 
postcolonial African states, can be attributed to secularism and religious proliferation 
which have distorted the traditional foundation of African consensual politics. The 
excessive extent of embracement of western values and culture by contemporary 
Africans is considered another reason for the erosion of the (traditional) African way 
of life. For Eze, the migratory, predatory and multi-cultural way of life that Africans are 
exposed to, have has negatively affected their belief in a common identity. He claims 
that contemporary Africans have embraced enlightenment and are willing to challenge 
the complications that confront them, including human rights abuses; they conceive 
themselves and their challenges differently from the way indigenous Africans 
understood themselves in the precolonial period.  
 
Lauer disagrees with Eze’s arguments, claiming that the economic difficulties that the 
community members suffered resulted in them their losing faith in the influence of 
traditional leadership for and their inability to protect their interests. Furthermore, the 
traditional leaders also lost their influence because they became poor and corrupt for 
colluding with the westerners to economically disadvantage their people, while many 
individuals who were not genetically linked with the families of traditional leaders were 
elected to chieftaincy positions. 
 
The reasons given by Wiredu for the erosion of African traditional authority, values, 
customs and traditions differ from Eze’s allusions. For Wiredu, most, if not all the 
challenges that confront postcolonial African states, including conflicts, political 
instabilities and the marginalisation of minority groups and parties is are attributable 
220 
 
to the conventional majoritarian democracy that African states largely subscribe to. He 
condemns multiparty democracy for bringing immense harm to the people as a result 
of its adversarial, divisive and aggressive nature; and for negating African 
communalism. In its place, he proposes the adoption of democracy by consensus 
which indigenous African societies practiced, and because it is not founded on party 
politics. 
 
Various philosophers and theorists pose different reasons for the loss of African 
values, cultures and traditions and the decline in the authority of traditional rulers. 
However, this study notes that instead of considering the reasons given by these 
theorists separately, they are to be collectively held responsible for these challenges. 
This study believes that contrary to the condemnation of traditional authority’s 
influence, contemporary African societies cannot abandon or overlook their relevance 
in the current era. Although the system of traditional governance is not as effective as 
it was in the past, a number of theorists believe that traditional authorities in most 
African countries are still relevant and continue to thrive. Koenane posits that 
traditional authority remains valuable for the contributions that they can make to the 
development of their country, especially the rural communities where the municipal 
administration remains corrupt and unable to deliver adequate services. He maintains 
that the traditional system of governance, unlike the western democracy, which does 
not appreciate  the contributions of other parties,  is more accountable, more tolerant 
and more effective, based on the understanding of ethics and governance, in 
traditional African societies.  
 
The study notes that while modernity may have contributed to progress and 
development, it has also contributed to the loss of values and morals among Africans 
in particular and the world at large. This can be seen for instance, in the lack of care 
and concern for the welfare of others, and in the lack of respect among people, 
especially by the youth for their seniors on the pretext of their entitlement to the 
protection of fundamental human rights. This study is not against development and 
westernisation. Rather, it believes that the traditional values, customs and traditions 
must be preserved in order to continue to build a humane society. 
 
221 
 
A number of reasons are alluded to as contributing to the worsening state of African 
politics in the contemporary African states. These include the fact that while the parting 
colonisers did not make sufficient efforts to prepare the forefathers of African politics 
for the task of running a state, the latter did not prepare themselves adequately to 
effectively manage and administer the post-independence states that they inherited. 
Rather, the dominant elite were more interested in seeking measures to consolidate 
their power base and to suit their selfish plans. The hopes of the people who agitated 
for their independence were dashed as their social, political and economic 
expectations were not fulfilled. These factors, as well as corruption, political rivalries, 
racism, tribalism, selfish ambitions, lack of commitment to and experience with of state 
administration, underdevelopment, weak state institutions, implementation of bad 
policies, service delivery failures and socio-political and economic conflicts, resulted 
in the deterioration of the African political landscape and disruptions through coups, 
counter-coups, conflicts and wars. The post-independence African leaders were no 
longer able to properly manage the political system; they also became authoritarian. 
The main contributory factor to the incessant complications on the African continent 
for a number of theorists, is the incompetence and unwillingness of the leaders, 
mangers, and bureaucrats, to manage and administer their countries and 
organisations as is constitutionally required of them.  
 
This study notes that while it may be acceptable to hold the former colonialists partially 
responsible for the failure of post-colonial African states, their inability to monitor the 
governance processes during the transition and post-independence periods is not a 
justification for the failure of African leaders to properly superintend over the affairs of 
their territories. Rather, the African elite who spearheaded the agitation for 
independence should have prepared themselves adequately to assume the leadership 
positions, because it is illogical to expect the colonialists, who were not wanted on in 
the African territories, to freely and willing prepare the agitators for state 
administration, except unless they have had some benefits to derive from it. Since 
post-colonial African states are endowed with extensive human resources, they these 
should be harnessed for the development of their countries 
 
The western liberal democracy that Africa subscribes to appears to be inflicting more 
problems than good outcomes for the contemporary African states for advocating a 
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system of governance that does not prioritise the welfare of the citizens at large. Some 
of the negative influences of westernisation on contemporary African states, which 
Chimakonam notes, result from the combination of western democracy and 
individualistic capitalism that globalisation imposed on Africa, and which in turn has 
created unhealthy political and economic systems in Africa. Chimakonam finds the 
western liberal democratic system of governance, which most African states subscribe 
to, as full of injustices for promoting inequality, class differentiation, individualism, and 
marginalisation. This contrasts with the dominant African socio-political and economic 
system that promotes communalism, consultation, consensus and egalitarianism.  
 
Many theorists observe that postcolonial African states may be riddled with a 
worsened crisis if significant efforts are not made by relevant stakeholders to rectify 
possible and potential risks. Consider South Africa, for instance: Ccorruption, service 
delivery protests, unemployment and the agitation for land restitution, which emanates 
from the apartheid era’s forced removals of citizens from their land,s and the racially 
skewed allocation of lands are some of the major ethical challenges confronting the 
post-apartheid state. Although the South African government attempts through 
regulations to rectify these imbalances in land ownership, it has not been very 
successful in its land reform programme.  
 
The agitation for land restitution by the previously disadvantaged individuals and 
groups creates a dilemma for the different understandings of justice. Distributive 
justice in this case may require that the government repossess all the contested lands 
from the previously advantaged groups with some measure of compensation and be 
shared it among all the citizens. Retributive justice may require the expropriation of 
land by the government from the previously advantaged individuals and groups without 
compensation and share themits redistibution among all the citizens.  
 
The application of these theories of justice can result in confusion around their 
justification as the previously disadvantaged  people can argue that their land was 
legitimately acquired in the past by their ancestors and that they have invested 
substantially in these properties. As events in this regard have shown already, it will 
be difficult for the government to resolve this challenges to the satisfaction of all 
stakeholders. The decisions and actions that the government takes in this regard have 
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consequences for the stability and sustainability of the country and its economy. 
Therefore all stakeholders must be consulted with the view to reaching decisions that 
are beneficial for to all concerned groups and individuals. 
 
In the Nigerian context, corruption and underdevelopment are so endemic that is has 
almost become a way of life. Many of the leaders in Nigeria since independence have 
stolen public funds and placed their personal interests above the interests of the 
country and its citizens. Corruption thrives in Nigeria because most of the institutions 
in the country, from the national to state and local levels, are weak and are not 
accountable. The extent of corruption in the country impedes the country’s social, 
political and economic development. All successive governments have failed to utilise 
the national resources for the promotion of the citizens’ well-being and to successfully 
complete commissioned capital projects. 
 
Although various governments in Nigeria have implemented strategies aimed at 
eliminating corruption in the country, these efforts have largely failed to reduce or 
eliminate the malaise because most of the officials tasked with these responsibilities 
are themselves corrupt. However, the current Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) has succeeded substantially in its anticorruption endeavours. 
Nonetheless, the level of corruption in the country remains high. Despite its 
effectiveness and successes, the EFCC is perceived by many people in the country 
as an instrument that the government employs to victimise its perceived enemies while 
many of the criminals who are on the side of the government remain unaccountable. 
This study recommends that in order for the government to be just and fair, it must 
investigate and prosecute all cases of corruption objectively, without fear or favour.  
 
It is noted that the protracted challenges that postcolonial African states continue to 
grapple with, which are referred to in this study, will compromise the realisation of good 
governance on the continent, and by implication the realisation of the ideal state, 
despite the  current  efforts at democratic consolidation. However, the ideal state will 
only become a possibility if those who superintend over the management and 
administration of the state, and the other members of the community, apply ethical 
wisdom in to their conducts and behaviour, avoid moral laxity, and engage in renewed 
moral imagination.  
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In chapter six, a number of recommendations are outlined on how the challenges that 
confront postcolonial African states can be resolved with the a view to realising a state 
which is able to meet the needs and aspirations of its citizens. In that regard, the 
chapter draws from Rawls’ efforts to define the perfectly just institutions. The chapter 
considers the role of ethical leadership in the realisation of a good society and in 
managing conflicts; the other forms of leadership that can contribute to the realisation 
of the desirable African state; how to pursue democratic consolidation; and options for 
alternative system of democratic governance for post-colonial African states in view of 
the failures of the current political systems. 
 
Rawls proposes that the desirable system of governance should be one that is 
implemented under a veil of ignorance and the principles of justice since these are 
fundamental elements for determining the just state. In his transcendental 
institutionalism, he posits that the principles of justice equips social institutions with 
the mechanisms to satisfactorily disperse dispense fundamental rights and 
obligations, benefits and burdens; while further ensuring that all spheres of the state 
promote and enforce the protection of fundamental human rights. 
 
The first principle of justice promotes equality for all human beings, by according each 
person the maximum liberty possible regardless of what their personal circumstances 
in life may be, and without compromising the freedom of others. In the second principle 
of justice he subscribes to social and economic inequalities in a just state on condition 
that each person is initially given equal opportunities to succeed. If the person fails to 
make the best of the opportunities that he is presented with, then, he believes that the 
state cannot be held responsible for the individual’s failure and the consequent 
inequality. Rawls believes that by applying these principles, through a veil of 
ignorance, the state will be able to justly determine the best means of implementing 
societal regulations. 
 
In his treatise on the veil of ignorance, Rawls posits that all human beings are biased 
as a result of the conditions in the environments in which they were born or in which 
they find themselves. As a result, their assessment of justice is influenced by these 
conditions. Based on the foregoing he proposes that all determinations of what 
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constitutes justice or on how the state should operate should be exercised in a 
hypothetical state of ignorance, in which individuals do not know their true identity, 
personal circumstances, and societal demographics. The veil of ignorance ensures 
that a person’s reasoning is not influenced by selfish interests that will cloud his 
objectivity. It also ensures that their decisions are not distorted by wrong moral ideas. 
The only knowledge that human beings can possess in this case are is well -founded 
scientific knowledge.  
 
 Sen criticises Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism as not feasible and redundant, 
because it is not possible for any country to be so perfectly organised in a manner that 
eliminates the possibility for of impartial biased agreements. Instead, he is convinced 
that it is likely to have a number of solutions to one problem; that it is possible to 
institute a ‘conglomerate theory’ that can at the same time provide both a 
transcendental identification and a comparative evaluation of various options. He is 
convinced that a society does not have to be perfectly organised before a theory of 
justice can become an inherent feature of its management and administration. 
Alternatively, he suggests that the state can reach consensus on the basis of public 
rationality, and by ranking achievable options. 
 
Although Sen criticises Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism that defines perfectly 
just institutions, as improbable,  since it is not possible for human beings to define 
anything perfect, this research considers this the Rawlsian proposal as suitable  
because the system of governance in postcolonial African states are is largely 
operated on the basis of partiality, prejudice, factionalism, discrimination, intolerance, 
selfishness, greed, corruption and the other unethical practices that have been 
exposed in this study. The veil of ignorance will produce objectivity, justice and 
fairness since leaders and the other members of society will be able to treat each other 
not on the basis of favouritism or biases, but on the basis of equality, equity, justice 
and fairness.  
 
This study notes that while the principle of equal opportunity appears to be a good 
means of administering a just state, many people will not  be able to successfully utilise 
the opportunities that the state presents, either  as a result of laziness or unwillingness 
to work hard. As a result, many of them will remain poor and become a burden to the 
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state. It is proposed, given this reality, that the onus lies on the state to implement 
welfare programmes that provides at least a minimum level of assistance to the 
disadvantaged members of society.  
 
While the veil of ignorance is hypothetical, this research submits that human beings 
can apply it by being objective, treating each other in the same manner that they want 
to be treated, as the Kant’s categorical imperative refers,requires, by applying 
humanism in all their actions and behaviours, as the moral theory of Ubuntu enjoins in 
keeping with refers, including the spirit of communalism, without necessarily 
abandoning ones individuality. 
 
It is recognised that there are various forms of leadership. However, this study 
recommends political, directive and values-driven leadership styles for postcolonial 
African states as a result of the capability of their combined qualities to employ hard 
and soft power, to attain desired objectives and to ensure that the administration of 
the state and the behaviour of the citizens are founded on ethics and values.  
 
A fundamental element of political leadership concerns its application of soft and hard 
power. While hard power concerns the coercion of community members in order to 
realise government’s objectives, soft power does not coerce people. Rather, it 
persuades and encourages citizens to act and behave in line with the requirements of 
the government.  
 
Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Machiavelli, as alluded to in this research, recognise the 
central role that good leadership plays in the attainment of the desirable, stable, 
developmental and harmonious state, though  they differ on the kind of leaders that 
can execute this objective. Some of Machiavelli’s ideas in this regard are extreme, 
especially his support for deceptive leadership style. This study posits that good 
leaders cannot be a deceptive or liars. Instead, they ought to be transparent, and 
consistently act and behave honestly, no matter the situation that may confront them, 
so as to maintain their credibility.  
 
This study posits that soft power alone is not suitable for postcolonial Africans because 
many of them will not comply with the law freely and willingly unless they are compelled 
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to do so. Therefore, this study supports Machiavelli’s proposal for the use of hard and 
soft power and force to resolve internal and external problems, especially in cases 
where the antagonists of the aggrieved parties and individuals are acting or behaving 
irrationally, such as in the South African case where protesters resort to the destruction 
of public and private properties. In such a case, the government should employ 
coercive force to prevent the escalation of the crisis and to serve as a deterrent to 
others who may want to embark on such violent protests in future. By subscribing to a 
combination of hard and soft power, postcolonial African states will also be able to 
ensure a balance between encouraging citizens to uphold the laws and punishing 
those that break the rules. Although most citizens view their leaders with suspicion, 
they nonetheless expect them to be the best leaders possible, by being authentic, 
decisive, strong, transformative, by not succumbing to the temptations of party politics, 
and by conducting themselves in a consistently ethical manner.  
 
Directive leadership is specifically channelled towards the realisation of identified 
objectives. It is more controlling and compelling than other forms of leadership as it 
expects workers and community members to adhere to instructions without excuses. 
Although this study recognises the importance of the other forms of leadership and 
personal initiatives, it recommends directive leadership for its ability to spearhead clear 
direction, clear focus, personal control, monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of a 
business or state administration. 
 
This study further recommends directive leadership for postcolonial African states 
since public officials generally do not apply the greatest measure of commitment to 
their work when they are given the freedom to use their initiatives. Many of the 
problems associated with inadequate service delivery across the continent partly 
results from this lax attitude to work. Although the relevance of personal initiatives is 
not ruled out in the delivery of good service, a directive leadership style must be 
employed in addition to the use of personal initiatives and discretion. 
 
Values-driven leadership plays a fundamental role in the realisation of good 
governance and by extension, the desirable state. The values that individuals hold 
shape their characters, and a community becomes successful and peaceful by 
adhering to good values. Through this kind of leadership style, leaders will be very 
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clear about the meaning of their values and remain committed to them. The value of 
trust is considered paramount for the wellbeing of the society as a whole. Therefore, 
leaders and other members of society are expected to be trustworthy by acting and 
behaving in a consistently ethical manner, and by keeping their words and promises. 
Trustworthy individuals are competent in their jobs since failure to deliver good results  
will compromise their integrity; they are generous, kind and caring; and they do  what 
is right despite the circumstances that may confront them. 
 
The political, directive and values-driven leadership styles that this research 
recommends incorporate both hard and soft power. They will enable postcolonial 
African states to be fair and just, and to professionally and successfully execute their 
functions to the benefit of their communities. Furthermore, they will enable the leaders 
and all members of society to conduct themselves ethically and, by implication, work 
towards the realisation of the ideal society. 
 
The pervasiveness of conflicts on the African continent and their destructive impact on 
the lives and wellbeing of the its inhabitants has have been noted in this research. In 
that regard, management, leadership, politicians and all stakeholders have a crucial 
role to play in conflict resolution. It is recommended that postcolonial African states 
critically examine the manners in which conflicts were resolved in indigenous African 
societies; and draw from the strategies that enabled them to genuinely resolve 
conflicts and restore peace and unity, unlike the current era where most conflict 
resolutions do not result in genuine forgiveness. The level of conflicts in the current 
era can also be resolved, minimised or even eliminated if the governments and their 
citizens treat everyone with justice and fairness, and if both the majority and the 
minority treat each other fairly and with respect and dignity. 
 
A reflection on the systems of governance in Africa and the challenges and failures 
associated with them reveals, as Wiredu notes, that these systems are failing to 
adequately meet the expectations of Africans; and they are also not suitable for the 
African context. Therefore, postcolonial African states need to search for alternative 
democratic systems that will be able to adequately address their specific challenges. 
He contends that there are admirable and relevant features of good governance in the 
traditional African society which contemporary Africans are failing to notice, probably 
229 
 
as a result of their adherence to western influence and culture. He asserts that a 
number of western orientations, such as the technological developments, do not, 
rightly so, necessarily improve an individual’s ethical wisdom. He therefore, proposes 
that African societies draw good lessons from the traditional and non-technological 
mode of governance, which resulted in a better way of life in the past than what 
currently obtains in postcolonial African states. In this case, he proposes the adoption 
of specific aspects of the traditional African system of rule, specifically democracy by 
consensus, which he considers to be non-adversarial, unlike the western multiparty 
democracy, but which is consensual and democratic. 
 
Wiredu proposes the abrogation of political parties in Africa in order to eliminate the  
fanaticism, and irrational conduct of many party members, mutual hostilities, power 
struggles among opposition parties, and to ensure that political engagements occur 
within a conducive and peaceful atmosphere. He notes that citizens will continue to 
participate in political affairs even if political parties are eliminated. He believes that 
the abrogation of political parties will not impact negatively on the community members 
if community affairs are handled impartially, if consideration is given to the needs of 
society and if community members are given the a platform to contribute to public 
affairs. 
 
A number of philosophers such as Eze, as alluded to in chapter four, disagree with 
Wiredu’s proposal for the adoption of a modified version of democracy by consensus 
in Africa. However, they both agree that any alternative democratic system for 
postcolonial African states cannot be autocratic; rather, it must encourage political 
contestation and freedom of speech. They both agree that such government cannot 
condone lust for power, undignified conduct, waste of state resources and extravagant 
lifestyles, which seem to define the current era. They also agree that contemporary 
African states must draw good lessons from countries around the world that are not 
corrupted by the worse forms of capitalism. 
 
This study recommends the points of agreements, as noted above, between Wiredu 
and Eze. It is also recommended that postcolonial African states must seek the kind 
of governance system that suits their African contexts and that will be able to address 
the needs of their members. This new system can draw from the good elements of 
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Wiredu’s democracy by consensus, based on humanism as the moral principles of 
Ubuntu provides; on communalism; and on the principle of individual responsibility, 
since it is unjust to hold others responsible for the actions of another person or group. 
Of course as Koenane and Olatunji argues, Ubuntu does not exclude individual 
responsibility. It is just that it is founded in communalism as opposed to individualism. 
This study is not discarding western liberal democratic system in its entirety. Rather, 
it is recommended that postcolonial African states embrace their its good elements, 
guided by ethics, integrity, values, objectivity and honesty.  
 
The failures of postcolonial African states that are noted in this research negates their 
ability to attain democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation means that the 
entrenchment of democracy in a country results from the willingness of the leaders 
and members of society to nourish and protect democracy until it solidifies in such a 
manner that it cannot be easily derailed by all sorts of complications. It is 
recommended that in order for postcolonial African states to consolidate the gains of 
their hard won democratic freedom, the following elements of good governance must 
be enhanced:  quality of public institutions, economic performance, affluence, a 
conducive international climate and access to land for all members of the state. 
 
The low quality of public institutions are is considered by many theorists as responsible 
for the underdevelopment of most countries in Africa. The quality of public institutions 
can only be improved, as Gustavson posits, when the government ensures that it 
implements sound laws and regulations; quality public service and administration; the 
security of property rights; and an independent judiciary. The development of African 
states will become a reality when consistently good and sound social institutions are 
implemented. In South Africa currently, protest actions have become very frequent as 
a result of the protesters’ dissatisfaction with the inadequate level of service that they 
receive. The lack of service delivery is also a source of concern in all other Africans 
states. Therefore, the law-makers and the government functionaries need to make 
concerted efforts to address this shortcoming since the quality of the services that are 
is provided is vital for economic growth, poverty alleviation, for bridging the gap in 
income inequality, for quality health care and education, and for the overall 
development of the country. In order to ensure improvements in the quality of public 
institutions, postcolonial African states will need to utilise the expertise of strong men, 
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strong institutions, and an enlightened and politically conscious population who are 
willing to sacrifice some of their comforts for the realisation of the greater good in the 
form of a transformed and ethical society. The shortcomings of leaders, public and 
private officials, must be challenged by the citizens, though without violence or 
destruction of property, in order to prevent their countries from remaining in their 
perennial state of failures. 
 
The level of income inequality on the African continent is so high that it needs to be 
rectified in order to promote justice and fairness. Therefore, it is recommended that 
the governments reduce the wage gaps between the earnings of senior and lower 
level officials. The government must also consult with the private sector with the a view 
to ensuring that the salaries of lower ranking employees are increased. A greater 
share of the national income should be utilised in for improving the wellbeing of the 
citizens as well as in creating employment opportunities for them. 
 
This study notes that it is not just and fair for a few individuals to own most of the 
resources of a country. Although it is not the intention here to advocate for communism 
or socialism, it is recommended that post-colonial African governments must institute 
proper structures that allow for the channelling of the national resources for the benefit 
of the entire population. In that regard, all the national resources must be taken over 
by the government and used in line with the Rawlsian transcendental institutionalism, 
for enabling all the citizens equal opportunities to succeed and prosper. The 
government can lease some of these properties to the private sector for better returns. 
Moreover, the private properties that are in the hands of a few individuals, which are 
in optimal utilisation, should be taken over by the government and leased back to them, 
while the profits should be shared, with the greater percentage accruing to the 
government for the development of the country. 
 
In view of the tension that the agitation for land in South Africa continues to attract 
cause, the government must ensure that every citizen has access to at least a piece 
of land at affordable rates if they so desire. The very poor cannot affort anything 
anymore in South Africa. Moreover, if they can develop it for business purposes or for 
private homes, because there is sufficient land in the country for everyone. 
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While the challenges posed by exposure to western systems are noted in this study, 
including individualism, inequality and lack of care and concern for others, postcolonial 
African states cannot remove themselves from international trends and developments 
since they are part of the global village. Therefore, it is recommended that since 
African states need a measure of international opportunities such as technological 
advancement and international trade, African governments need to implement 
conducive strategies, rules and local conditions that will attract international 
investment and cooperation for the development of their countries, without 
compromising their sovereignty in the process. 
 
The shortcomings of those who superintended over the management and 
administration of post-colonial African states is are recognised as a major contributor 
to the failures of these countries. It is therefore recommended that those who are made 
leaders be committed, disciplined, responsible, selfless, focused and mentally 
resourceful visionaries. Politicians and leaders must be made to account for their 
actions and behaviours, and a core aspect of their leadership formations must consist 
of programmes in moral development.  
 
The leaders must be consistent in their ethical conduct and ensure that perpetrators 
of wrong actions and behaviour are disciplined. They must ensure that organisational 
and societal cultures are very clear about what is acceptable or and what is not 
condoned; that leaders and managers are equipped with people management skills; 
that all stakeholders are capacitated with behavioural requirements, organisational 
and societal values and codes of conduct; that ethics becomes a regular feature in 
meetings; and that ethics and integrity become part and parcel of their daily lives and 
business.  
 
As the foundation of society, parents should begin in their families to teach their 
children the importance of values, such as honesty, respect, trust, fairness, courtesy, 
commitment, dedication and uprightness. All levels of education must institute 
programmes in moral development, and the students must, as Plato and Aristotle 
suggest, accompany what they learn in school with a process of habituation and the 
practicing of virtues daily. 
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It is recommended that the society at all levels needs to publicly reward good 
behaviour, such as honesty and compassion. This will encourage more people to act 
and behave ethically and to understand that it is rewarding to be ethical. Although it is 
desirable to reward good conduct, in cases where good behaviour is not rewarded, 
community members must continue to act and behave ethically because they are 
responsible and accountable for their actions and behaviour. 
 
In order to ensure the restoration of the good African way of life that brought peace, 
stability and happiness in the past, there is an urgent need for contemporary Africans 
to invest in the revival of their indigenous ethical principles, values, cultures and 
traditions; and re-establish them as their guiding principles going forward. Plato 
realises acknowledges that it might be impossible to realise the ideal state and 
therefore proposes the implementation of practicable aspects of his theories. 
However, this study believes that it is possible for the world at large and for post-
colonial African states in particular to work towards the realisation of the ideal society 
if leaders, managers and community members are willing to act and behave ethically, 
and with consideration for the welfare and happiness of other human beings. 
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